

# *Tajwīd al-Tajrīd* as Kemālpāshāzāde's Critique and Reconstruction of *Tajrīd*: Study and Critical Edition

Ömer Mahir Alper\*  
Yasin Apaydın\*\*

**Translated by: Didar Ayşe Akbulut\*\*\***

**Abstract:** Kemālpāshāzāde Aḥmed Efendi (d. 940/1534), one of the most distinguished and prolific scholars and philosophers of the Ottoman era, presented systematic criticisms of some earlier foundational texts under the titles of “revision” (*taghyir*), “correction” (*iṣlāḥ*), and “refinement” (*tajwid*). His critical project incorporated a solid criticism of these seminal and influential works in linguistic, rational, and traditional sciences, both in form and in content. He also included Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 672/1274) *Tajrīd al-i’tiqād* in this project. In his *Tajwid*, Kemālpāshāzāde rewrote this work and wrote a commentary upon it, namely, *Sharḥ Tajwid al-Tajrīd*. His interest in *Tajrīd* was not limited to these two, for in addition to a separate commentary (*Sharḥ al-Tajrīd*) he also wrote superglosses on some glosses of *Tajrīd*, such as *Hāshiyā li-Ḥāshiyat al-Jalāl*. So far, neither his general project nor these two works have attracted sufficient scholarly interest. In this article, we focus on Kemālpāshāzāde’s studies on *Tajrīd* and present a detailed study of *Tajwid*, as well as – and for the first time – its critical edition based on all of the extant manuscript copies. Thus, the article is in four parts: The Ottoman *Tajrīd* Tradition: From *Tajrīd* to *Tajwid*, Kemālpāshāzāde’s Studies on *Tajrīd*, Kemālpāshāzāde’s Critique on *Tajrīd*: *Tajwid al-Tajrīd*,” and *Tajwid al-Tajrīd*.

**Key words:** theology (kalām), Ottoman thought, Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrīd*, Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Tajrīd al-i’tiqād*, *Tajrīd* tradition, *Tajrīd* commentaries, *Tajrīd* glosses.

\* Prof. Dr., Istanbul University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Islamic Philosophy  
Correspondance: omahir@yahoo.com

\*\* Dr., Istanbul University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Islamic Philosophy  
Correspondance: yasinapaydin@hotmail.com

\*\*\* PhD Candidate, History and Middle East Studies, Harvard University

## Introduction

The oeuvre of Kemālpāshāzāde Aḥmed Efendi (d. 950/1534), one of the highly prolific scholars and philosophers of the Ottoman era, can be classified according to several criteria. For instance, his writings encompassed a range of subjects, among them metaphysics, theology, the principles of law, and Quranic exegesis, all of which can be classified in genres like commentary, gloss, and annotation. While this versatility is true for the majority of later thinkers (*muta'akhhirūn*) in the Islamic tradition, in the case of Kemālpāshāzāde one more genre needs to be added: that of “revision” (*taghyir*) or “correction” (*iṣlāḥ*), which denotes rewriting and paraphrasing certain prominent texts in various disciplines.<sup>1</sup> Through these efforts, he sought to modify the phrasing in a text and then present a commentary through and on it. Among his works are *Taghyir al-Miftāḥ* on al-Sakkākī's (d. 626/1229) *al-Miftāḥ*,<sup>2</sup> *al-Iṣlāḥ wa al-iḍāḥ* on Ṣadr al-Sharī'a's commentary on Tāj al-Sharī'a's (eighth/fourteenth century) *Wiqāya*, and *Sharḥ muqaddimat Tahdhīb al-mantiq wa-l-kalām* on the preface of al-Taftāzānī's (d. 792/1390) *Tahdhīb* all of which were authored with the goal of revising and correcting their texts. Thus, his project incorporated diverse disciplines, such as rhetoric, jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence, and theology.

*Tajwid al-Tajrid* and its commentary,<sup>3</sup> which constitute the subject of this article, were also written within this framework of “revision and correction.” The text under consideration includes a rewriting of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's (d. 672/1274) original text as well as commentary on it. Until its recent printing, it had been available only in manuscript form and so had not attracted its due attention so far. Although there are numerous commentaries and glosses on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrid*, which was one of the main “textbooks” studied in Ottoman madrasas, such an effort of revision and correction remained unique, which further increases the significance of Kemālpāshāzāde's work.

1 In *Tezkire-i Laṭīfī*, one of the earliest sources on Kemālpāshāzāde, the extent and characteristics of his scholarly output were described as follows: “He expounded and resolved the obscurities and difficulties in all of these sciences, disciplines, texts, and commentaries through his penetrating and perspicuous discernment. He also wrote a treatise in every discipline and wrote discourses in every type of science.” Laṭīfī, *Tezkire-i Laṭīfī*, ed., Ahmed Cevdet (Istanbul: Ikdam Maṭba'ası, 1314), 80.

2 For further details on *Taghyir al-Miftāḥ* and its edition, see Musa Alak, “Kemalpaşazâde'nin Şerhu Tağyiri'l-Miftâḥ Adlı Eserinin Tahkik ve Tahlili” (unpublished PhD dissertation, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul 2009).

3 In this article we present the critical edition of Kemālpāshāzāde's *Tajwid al-Tajrid* and his own commentary on it. Thus, unless specified otherwise, *Tajwid* refers both to the original text and the commentary.

As mentioned before, numerous thinkers have devoted their attention to *Tajrīd*. One of the reasons for this interest was that it belonged to the later, mature period of al-Ṭūsī's career and thus represents his latest and most original thoughts. Moreover, it comprised the entire philosophical repertoire of its own time and al-Ṭūsī's attempt to dispense with all of the details and interpretations that he deemed superfluous or simply mistaken. Shortly after its completion, a number of works were based on *Tajrīd*. The first of them was *Kashf al-murād fi sharḥ Tajrīd al-i'tiqād* written by Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥilli (d. 726/1325), one of al-Ṭūsī's closest disciples, who had a long-lasting impact through his other philosophical works. This text, along with Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī's (d. 749/1349) commentary *Tasdīd al-qawā'id fi sharḥ al-'aqā'id*, may be considered the very first steps in the "*Tajrīd* tradition."<sup>4</sup>

This intellectual tradition around the *Tajrīd* was expanded by the contributions and teaching activities of scholars and philosophers, especially those who were students of al-Iṣfahānī. Scholars such as al-Bābartī (d. 786/1384), al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), 'Alī al-Qūshjī (d. 879/1474), al-Dawwānī (d. 908/1502), and Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 903/1498) can be mentioned in this context as well. Although they differed in their sectarian affiliations and intellectual inclinations, all of them helped transmit the *Tajrīd* as a seminal work, one that established a tradition around it over the subsequent centuries. The *Tajrīd* literature produced within the confines of Ottoman geography constitutes a significant part of this substantial tradition that encompassed dozens of titles.

## I. From the *Tajrīd* to the *Tajwīd*: The Ottoman *Tajrīd* Tradition

A number of prominent Ottoman thinkers who preceded Kemālpāshāzāde had engaged with the *Tajrīd* and compiled numerous texts around it. This interest may be attributed to various, the most fundamental of which was the quasi-state policy of including it in the curriculum of Ottoman madrasas. This elevated status caused its name to be lent to 20-*akçe* madrasas in the empire, a fact that indicates the degree of interest devoted to it during the Ottoman period. As a consequence of its extensive

4 al-Iṣfahānī's commentary has come to be known as *al-Sharḥ al-qadīm* (*The Old Commentary*), thereby distinguishing it from 'Alī Qushjī's later commentary. For a list of commentaries and super-commentaries on *Tajrīd*, see Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunūn*, ed., Şerefettin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rıfat Bilge (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941), I, 346-51; Sayyid Maḥmūd Mar'ashī Najafī, *Kitābshināsi-i Tajrīd al-i'tiqād*, ed., 'Alī Ṣadrā'i Khū'i (Qom: Kitābkhānah-i Buzurg-i Ḥaẓrat Ayat Allāh, 2003); Salih Günaydın, "Nasiruddin et-Tūsī'nin *Tecridu'l-i'tikād*'i Üzerine Oluşan Şerh-Hâşiye Literatürü: Türkiye Yazma Eser Kütüphanelerinden Bir Bakış," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 14, no. 28 (2016), 237-72.

study in those madrasas, many of their graduates wrote commentaries and glosses on this work, further enriching the scholarly and philosophical discourse around it.

The exact number of Ottoman scholars who wrote commentaries or glosses on the *Tajrīd* has not been ascertained yet; however, some prominent names can be listed based on Ṭaşköprizâde's (d. 968/1561) *al-Shaqâ'iq al-nu'māniyya* and Kâtib Çelebî's (d. 1067/1657) *Kashf al-zunûn*. Chronologically, one of the earliest works was written by Ḥasan Çelebî (d. 891/1486) as a gloss on the initial parts of 'Alî al-Qūshjî's commentary *al-Sharḥ al-Jadīd*. It seems that this limited work, which dealt with the *Tajrīd* only partially and was restricted to certain matters, has been overshadowed by his other better-known works.<sup>5</sup>

After the second half of the tenth/fifteenth century, we can observe a quantitative as well as a qualitative increase in the number of scholarly Ottoman works on the *Tajrīd*. The first that comes to mind is Khaṭībzâde Muḥyî al-Dîn Efendi's (d. 901/1496) supergloss on al-Jurjânî's *Hāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, which achieved lasting fame and had an impact on many later scholars.<sup>6</sup> Thus, in *al-Shaqâ'iq*, Ṭaşköprizâde mentioned the *Hāshiyat al-Tajrīd* at the top of the list of Muḥyî al-Dîn Efendi's works and noted that "it is a work widely circulating among the people of instruction [i.e., instructors] and students." The fame that Khaṭībzâde derived from this work reached as far as Iran, at that time an important center of scholarly and philosophical activity, so that scholars such as al-Dawwānî took notice of him and mentioned his name in their own works.<sup>7</sup> Khaṭībzâde clearly stated that his supergloss included both affirmation and rejection of the views of al-Jurjânî, who had proved his own authority in scholarly verification and inquiry through his

5 For a manuscript copy, see *Hāshiyat al-sharḥ al-jadīd*. MS, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, no. 1626, fol. 18b-29a.

6 It is related that Khocazâde (d. 893/1488) studied both Khaṭībzâde and al-Dawwānî's super-glosses on al-Jurjânî's gloss on *Tajrīd* and disapproved of the former but prized the latter. See Ṭaşköprizâde, *Al-Shaqâ'iq al-nu'māniyya fî 'ulamâ' al-dawlat al-'uthmāniyya*, ed., Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabâtabâ'î al-Bahbahānî (Tehran: Kitābkhānah, Mūzih wa Markaz-i Asnād, Majlis-i Shūrâ-yi Islāmî, 1431 [2010]), 127. In the same vein, Mollâ Luṭfî (d. 900/1495) is reported to have intended to write a rebuttal against Khaṭībzâde's super-commentary and upon the former's execution for infidelity, Khaṭībzâde said that his super-commentary was saved from criticism. See Ṭaşköprizâde, *Al-Shaqâ'iq*, 249.

7 Ṭaşköprizâde, *Al-Shaqâ'iq*, 137. Unlike other manuscript copies, the Feyzullah Efendi copy includes a preface that dedicates the work to Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512). See Feyzullah Efendi, no. 1114, Millet Ktp., fol. 232a. Also, Kâtib Çelebî stated that Khaṭībzâde had mentioned Bayezid II's name in this work. However, the author must have added this part of dedication later on at the end, because we come across references to criticisms raised by Khaṭībzâde in Mollâ Akhawayn's (d. 900/1494-95) super-commentary on *Tajrīd*, which was written earlier and dedicated to Mehmed II (r. 1444-46; 1451-81), indicating that Khaṭībzâde must have written his super-commentary before Bayezid II's reign.

gloss on *Tajrīd*.<sup>8</sup> As his rejections were rather numerous, he was targeted by later authors who sought to counter his criticisms.

Another gloss on the *Tajrīd* was written by a contemporary of Khaṭībzāde, Muḥyī al-Dīn Meḥmed Efendi (d. 974/1566), who was better known as Mollā Akhawayn. As in the case of Khaṭībzāde, his supergloss on al-Jurjānī's gloss on the *Tajrīd* was mentioned at the beginning of the list of his works in *al-Shaqā'iq*.<sup>9</sup> Mollā Akhawayn dedicated his work to Meḥmed II and, in the preface, stated that al-Jurjānī's gloss "comprised such subtleties that may not be comprehend by every mind, and therefore it has been subject to undue objections and inappropriate challenges presented by certain people." His aim was "to attest to the already expounded matters and answer the objections directed toward it."<sup>10</sup> Although he referred to the objectors with anonymous designations like "some honorable men," "some virtuous men," or "some great men," his marginal notes in a manuscript reveal that these objectors were 'Alī al-Qūshjī, Khayālī (d. 875/1470 [?]), and Khaṭībzāde, respectively.<sup>11</sup>

Another text that stands out in this regard is the *Ḥāshiyā 'alā Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd* by Muḥyī al-Dīn Meḥmed Efendi (d. 919/1513), better known as Şamsünizāde, who belonged to the scholarly Sāmsünizāde family. As the title indicates, this was a supergloss of al-Jurjānī's gloss that, in Mecdī Efendi's (d. 999/1591) words, had attained a degree of fame that was "beyond explication and description."<sup>12</sup> Sāmsünizāde himself noted that after receiving a gift favor from Bayezid II, he has completed this work by compiling his numerous notes.<sup>13</sup>

In the work's short preface, Sāmsünizāde stated that the science of theology occupies the first place among things that deserve to be desired in the true sense of the word. Thereafter, he expounded that al-Jurjānī's *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd* was "the gist of all the conclusions derived through theoretical speculation and an epitome of all the newly acquired ideas" and hence it has attracted the special interest of the later thinkers.<sup>14</sup> However, he added that upon reading al-Jurjānī's gloss, he had discovered a discrepancy between what was intended in al-Jurjānī's own expressions and what was expounded by later glossators. Surmising that

8 Khaṭībzāde, *Ḥāshiyā 'alā-l-Tajrīd*, MS, Millet Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi, no. 1114, fol. 232a.

9 Ṭāşköprizāde, *Al-Shaqā'iq*, 171.

10 Mollā Akhawayn, *Ḥawāshī 'alā Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, MS, Milli Kütüphanesi, no. 3227, fol. 52b.

11 For the author's marginal annotations, see *ibid.*, fol. 53a-54a.

12 Mecdī Efendi, *Ḥadā'iq al-shaqā'iq* (Istanbul: Dār al-Ṭibā'at al-Āmira, 1269), 313.

13 Sāmsünizāde, *Ḥāshiyā 'alā Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*. MS, Burdur İl Halk Kütüphanesi, no. 155, fol. 2a.

14 Sāmsünizāde, *Ḥāshiyā 'alā Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, fol. 1b.

there was still much to be said in this regard, he began writing this work.<sup>15</sup> Like Mollā Akhawayn, Sāmsūnizāde also considered and responded to the objections expressed in Khaṭībzāde’s gloss. On almost every page he quoted these objections and answered them, but only mentioned the objector as a certain “virtuous man” or resorted to the passive “it is said.”<sup>16</sup>

Another significant work preceding Kemālpāshāzāde’s study of the *Tajrīd* was *Ḥāshiya ‘alā Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd* written by Ḥusām al-Dīn b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (d.926/1520), alias, Ḥusām Çelebi. This supergloss on al-Jurjāni’s gloss ends at the chapter of causation, and like the other two glossators, incorporates Khaṭībzāde’s objections and sought to resolve them.<sup>17</sup>

Works on the *Tajrīd* undoubtedly cannot be limited to those mentioned here, for many others were written during this period, which corresponded to the emergence and rise of the Ottoman Empire. The sources mention other glosses written by relatively early scholars, such as Khidrshāh Mantashawī (d. 853/1449), Khayālī, and Abū al-Wafā Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Muṣṭafā (d. 896/1491) as well.

In sum, before Kemālpāshāzāde, many Ottoman scholars both read and studied the *Tajrīd* and the glosses on it. The efforts of explanation and commentary around this work started as partial glosses, as in the case of Ḥasan Çelebi’s supergloss, and later developed into more comprehensive texts that incorporated far more extensive discussions, as we see with Khaṭībzāde’s and Sāmsūnizāde’s superglosses.

## II. Kemālpāshāzāde’s Studies on the *Tajrīd*

Kemālpāshāzāde’s interest in the *Tajrīd* was not limited to the *Tajwīd*, which constitutes this article’s subject. Although the bio-bibliographic sources that list his oeuvre do not mention any title other than *Tajwīd*, here we can draw up a new list as a result of our research in manuscript libraries and library catalogues. In this part we will review Kemālpāshāzāde’s works on the *Tajrīd* other than the *Tajwīd*, and in the next part we will examine the latter work independently.

15 Ibid., fol. 1b-2a.

16 Ibid., fol. 7a.

17 Several copies of this work, which is extant only in manuscript form, can be found in manuscript libraries. At the colophon of the MS. 115 in Adana İl Halk Kütüphanesi, completed in 985 AH, Ḥusām Çelebi is referred as a *mudarris* (teacher) at Bursa’s Yıldırım Han Medresesi. See Ḥusām Çelebi, *Ḥāshiya ‘alā Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*. MS, Adana İl Halk Kütüphanesi, no. 115, fol. 56b.

### 1. The *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd*

A manuscript in Süleymaniye Library under the shelf mark İsmihan Sultan 429 features a *subscriptio*-statement on the front of the text-block, which indicates that the text is Kemālpāshāzāde's *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd*. It contains an incomplete commentary on the *Tajrīd*, including only the chapter on general matters (*al-umūr al-'amma*), and is bound in a volume that contains some other treatises by him. The text ends abruptly in the middle of the discussion on the superaddedness of existence to quiddity and is followed by another treatise. Although the bio-bibliographical sources state that he had written a commentary on the *Tajrīd*, this was often associated with the *Tajwīd*. While this commentary presents important parallels with the *Tajwīd* and contains some similar explanations, it does not completely overlap it. Indeed, the explanations in this commentary are much more succinct compared to those in the *Tajwīd*. Therefore, one can surmise that they constitute earlier versions of some of the thoughts that were later developed and elaborated in *Tajwīd*.

### 2. The *Ḥāshiya muta'alliqa 'alā-l-ḥawāshī al-Tajrīdiyya* <sup>18</sup>

This work, Kemālpāshāzāde's lengthiest study on the *Tajrīd*, has survived in multiple manuscript copies. It is a supergloss on al-Jurjānī's gloss *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, comprising only the introduction and the section on general matters until the topic of the "indefinability of existence." As such, it is primarily a supergloss on al-Jurjānī's gloss. Nevertheless, Kemālpāshāzāde has also selected and incorporated some statements by al-Iṣfahānī, another *Tajrīd* commentator, together with his own annotations on them, as well as rebuttals against the objections expressed in Khaṭībzāde's gloss.

### 3. The *Ḥāshiya li-ḥāshiyat al-Jalāl*

This work is found in an anthology in Süleymaniye Library under the shelf mark Carullah 1256 and seems to be the only extant copy. It consists of Kemālpāshāzāde's gloss (*ta'liqa*) on al-Dawwānī's gloss on 'Alī al-Qūshjī's commentary entitled *al-Sharḥ al-Jadīd* and comprises only the subject of the superaddedness of existence to quiddity, which is part of the general matters section. Throughout the text, the author both quotes and seeks to explain 'Alī al-Qūshjī's statements. Like the previous works, this one also ends abruptly.

18 In some of the manuscript copies, the work is titled as "*Ḥāshiya 'alā-l-ḥāshiyat al-qadīma 'alā Sharḥ al-Tajrīd*." See Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, no. 1626, fol. 2a.

#### 4. The *Ḥawāshi ‘alā awāil Tajrīd al-muḥaqqiq wa ḥawāshihī li-l-Sayyid al-mudaqqiq*

As the title indicates, the text is as a supergloss on the preface of “inquiring” (*mudaqqiq*) al-Jurjānī’s gloss on “verifying” (*muḥaqqiq*) al-Ṭūsī’s *Tajrīd*. Although it may seem similar to Kemālpāshāzāde’s supergloss on al-Jurjānī’s gloss (number 2), a closer reading reveals that it is based on a very limited section of both the *Tajrīd* and the *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd* and hence contains much more detailed and elaborate explanations. Another of its distinguishing features is that the beginning of the text’s first page contains a statement written in a different hand and designating the text as a “treatise” (*risāla*). Although we prefer not to denote it as such,<sup>19</sup> it confirms that this text was meant to be an independent work.

The text starts with an introduction that may be considered lengthy compared to the work’s overall volume.<sup>20</sup> This section relays important information: It was written upon the request of a dear friend of Kemālpāshāzāde at a time when he was teaching the *Tajrīd*. Upon noticing that, unlike the previous glossators who eschewed a thorough verification of the subjects, in his lectures Kemālpāshāzāde was pointing out and correcting the mistakes committed by some glossators and correcting them, this person has requested him to write a commentary. He does not explicitly identify “the (previous) glossators.” Nevertheless, Kemālpāshāzāde mentioned Khaṭībzāde by name and explicitly stated that he found his opinions erroneous and therefore wrote this gloss to rebut them.<sup>21</sup> This work is dedicated to a certain vizier who is mentioned only as “the venerable Pasha.”

Apart from these four texts, manuscript libraries contain another work by Kemālpāshāzāde: the “*Risāle fi al-‘umūr al-‘amma*” (Treatise on the general matters). The first chapter, “*al-maqṣad al-awwal fi al-‘umūr al-‘amma*” (The first article in the general matters), gives the impression that this too is a gloss on the *Tajrīd*’s first chapter.<sup>22</sup> However, upon a closer reading we can suggest that this is a separate treatise by Kemālpāshāzāde on the general matters based on the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*.

19 This work’s title is recorded in an inscription written in red on the top of the first page as “hadhihi risāla mu‘allaqa ‘alā awwal *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd* li-l-fāḍil al-shahīr bi-Kemālpāshāzāde (This is a treatise on the first part of the *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd* by the virtuous scholar known as Kemālpāshāzāde).” However, we preferred the author’s own designation mentioned in the introduction referring to his work. See Kemālpāshāzāde, *Ḥawāshī ‘alā Awā’il al-Tajrīd*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa Ktp., nr. 2737, fol. 106a. Nevertheless, this aforementioned inscription is still significant because it denotes an independent treatise in a collection of treatises.

20 This work is located between folios 106a-113b. The introduction takes up the first folio.

21 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Ḥawāshī ‘alā Awā’il al-Tajrīd*, fol. 106a.

22 Multiple copies of the work are extant. For the quoted statement, see Kemālpāshāzāde, *Risāla fi-l-Umūr al-‘amma*, MS, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, no. 2838, fol. 21b.



Indeed, tracing the statements commented upon further in the text reveals that they are derived from *al-Mawāqif* and its commentary *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*.

When all of the texts presented above in their outlines are considered together, we can draw some general conclusions. First, Kemālpāshāzāde's interest in the *Tajrīd* was too extensive to be confined to a single text. He authored five independent texts, including the *Tajwīd*, each of which embody a distinct effort toward explicating and explaining the *Tajrīd*. Almost all of them are incomplete and mostly contain only the topics from the general matters section. This may represent his personal interests but can also be regarded as a general attitude among the scholars of the time. In fact, Ṭāṣköprizāde mentioned in his autobiography that he has read and taught the general matters section of both the *Tajrīd* and the *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*.<sup>23</sup> In a similar vein, the introduction of Kemālpāshāzāde's gloss on the *Tajrīd* states that he has also taught these two works and penned his own gloss within that context.

Although it is quite hard to ascertain exactly when Kemālpāshāzāde wrote each of these works, we may conclude that degree of technicality and detail in his explications increased gradually. Presumably, some notes taken in course of teaching the *Tajrīd* evolved into full-fledged explanations and eventually ended up with a rewriting of it.

Lastly, some annotations that were added to the same passages of the same text at different times are of great importance, as they demonstrate how the author's opinions on the respective subjects evolved. It needs to be stated that the topics related to the general matters and their problematics in particular have been deliberately treated from different aspects in all of Kemālpāshāzāde's works. Due to its importance, he had apparently been dealing with the *Tajrīd* for a long of time and wanted to discuss it from various perspectives to highlight several of these problematics. And as we will see in the coming part, he eventually achieved his goal of subjecting the *Tajrīd* to an overall criticism.

### III. Kemālpāshāzāde's Critique of *Tajrīd*: *Tajwīd al-Tajrīd*

#### A. The *Tajwīd* and the *Sharḥ al-Tajwīd* in bio-bibliographical sources

The *Tajwīd* is mentioned among Kemālpāshāzāde's works in all the relevant sources, and yet they vary in describing its exact features. For instance, after

23 Ṭāṣköprizāde, *Al-Shaqā'iq*, 473-74.

stating that Kemālpāshāzāde had been authoring works constantly, Tāşköprizāde added that “[He] has a book in the discipline of theology, consisting of a main text and a commentary, that he entitled *Tajwid al-Tajrid*.”<sup>24</sup> In *Ḥadā’iq al-Shaqā’iq*, Mecdi Efendī stated “And in the discipline of theology, he composed and compiled a text and commentary entitled *Tajwid al-Tajrid*, which is vastly preferable to those compiled by his predecessors who were the lords of the place of honor and majesty (*Şadr-i jāh wa Jalāl*)” thus alluding to the dispute around ‘Alī al-Qūshjī’s *al-Sharḥ al-Jadīd* between Mīr Şadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī and al-Dawwānī, who came to be known as “Tābaqāt-i Şadriyya and Jalāliyya” respectively.<sup>25</sup>

In *Sullam al-wuşūl*, Kātib Çelebī mentioned the *Tajwid al-Tajrid* only by name among Kemālpāshāzāde’s works but provided no further details.<sup>26</sup> However, in his *Kashf al-zunūn* under the article “Tajwid fi-l-kalam,” he wrote “Then it is reported that he [i.e., Kemālpāshāzāde] wrote a commentary on [Tajwid] entitled *Tajrid*, though it is more likely that [the titles] are the other way around.”<sup>27</sup> Apparently, the work had come to be known as *Tajrid al-Tajwid* among some circles; however, Kātib Çelebī pointed out that the correct title had to be *Tajwid al-Tajrid*, as already recorded by Tāşköprizāde. But al-Kafawī, in his *Katā’ib a’lām*, said that the title was *Tajrid al-Tajrid* and added that it consists of a text and a commentary.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, Bağdatlı İsmail Paşa (1839-1920) recorded that Kemālpāshāzāde had a book of theology entitled *Tajwid fi ‘ilm al-kalām* as well as a commentary on it entitled *al-Tajrid fi sharḥ al-Tajrid*.<sup>29</sup>

The *Qāmūs al-A’lām*, which can be considered a relatively later source, states that Kemālpāshāzāde authored a text and a commentary named the *Tajwid* and the *Tajrid*, respectively.<sup>30</sup> In his *Uqūd al-Jawhar*, Cemil Bey mentioned the book as *al-Tajwid fi Sharḥ al-Tajrid*.<sup>31</sup> Lastly Nihal Atsız, who attempted to provide a complete

24 Ibid., 333.

25 Mecdi Efendī, *Ḥadā’iq al-shaqā’iq*, 383. Mustaqimzāde (d. 1202/1788) repeated similar statements later on. See Müstakimzāde, *Devhatü’l-meşâyih*, ed., Ziya Kazıcı (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1978), 17.

26 Kātib Çelebī, *Sullam al-wuşūl ilā t̄abaqāt al-fuḥūl*, ed., Mahmud ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Arnā’ūt (Istanbul: İslam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, 2010), I, 150.

27 Kātib Çelebī, *Kashf al-Zunūn*, I, 354.

28 al-Kafawī, *Katā’ib a’lām al-akhyār min fuqahā’ madhhab al-Nu’mān al-mukhtār*, ed., Saffet Köse, Murat Şimşek, Hasan Özer, and Hüzeyfe Çeker (Istanbul: Maktabat al-irshād, 2017), IV, 392.

29 Bağdatlı İsmail Paşa, *Hadiyyat al-‘Arifin*, ed., İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnan and Avni Aktuç (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1955), I, 141.

30 Şemseddin Sāmī, *Qāmūs-ı a’lām* (Istanbul: Mihran Matba’ası, 1306 [1889]), V, 3886.

31 Jamil Bey, *Uqūd al-jawhar* (Beirut: Dār al-Muqtabas, 1436 [2015]), 219. However, some other sources like *Osmanlı Müellifleri* and *Sicill-i Osmānī* do not mention *Tajwid* among the works of Kemālpāshāzāde. See Bursalı Mehmed Tāhir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri* (Istanbul: Matba’a-i ‘Amire, 1333), I, 223; Mehmed Süreyyā, *Sicill-i Osmānī* (Istanbul: Matba’a-i ‘Amire, 1308), I, 224.

list of Kemālpāshāzāde's works based on library records, cited the *Tajwid* as “a critique of Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's book of theology called *Tajrid al-'aqā'id*.”<sup>32</sup>

Considering all of these pieces of information from the relevant sources together, we may draw certain conclusions. Firstly, Kemālpāshāzāde clearly authored a book of theology consisting of a text and its commentary. Most of the sources list the text's title as *Tajwid*,<sup>33</sup> whereas the commentary's title is either *Tajrid al-Tajrid* or *Tajrid fī sharḥ al-Tajwid*. Other sources, however, provide only the title of the main text.

Lastly, we have to state that in another work on mental existence, Kemālpāshāzāde himself referred to the *Sharḥ al-Tajwid*. While explaining the difference between “subsisting (*qā'im*) through other” and “existing (*thābit*) through other,” he referred to this work as follows: “We have verified the difference between the two in the *Sharḥ Tajwid al-Tajrid* in a way that resolves all doubts and confusion.”<sup>34</sup> Thus, as it becomes clear through the author's own words, the text in question was entitled *Tajwid al-Tajrid* and the commentary *Sharḥ Tajwid al-Tajrid*. Indeed, in the *Tajwid*'s very introduction, Kemālpāshāzāde referred to the text in question as *Tajwid al-Tajrid* but gave no title for the commentary.<sup>35</sup>

Lastly, all of this confusion about the work's title, in addition to the facts that only a few copies are extant and that most of them are incomplete, suggests that this particular work did not attract much interest in the scholarly circles, apparently because it is a commentary on a very limited part of the *Tajrid*. After all, it contains merely the subjects related to the relationship between existence and quiddity, which are treated at the beginning of the *Tajrid*'s first chapter on general matters.

## **B. Content and Analysis of the *Tajwid***

According to the extant manuscripts, Kemālpāshāzāde's *Tajwid* covers al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrid* from its beginning until the subject of the “superaddedness of existence to quiddity,” which is discussed in the context of general matters. Certain remarks by Kemālpāshāzāde at the beginning of the text<sup>36</sup> indicate that his apparent goal

32 Nihal Atsız, “Kemalpaşa-oğlu'nun Eserleri,” *Şarkiyat Mecmuası*, VII (1972), 98.

33 Indeed in one of the two manuscript copies that we predominantly relied on this critical edition the main text and commentary are named together as “*Tajwid al-Tajrid*” on the front of the textblock”. See Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*, MS, Bibliothèque nationale de France, AY, no. 4374, fol. 140a.

34 Kemālpāshāzāde, “Risāla fī taḥqīq al-wujūd al-dihni,” in *Majmū' rasā'il 'allāma Ibn Kemāl Bāshā*, ed., Ḥamza al-Bakrī (Istanbul: Dār al-Lubāb, 2018), VI, 91.

35 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*, MS, Bibliothèque nationale de France, AY, no. 4374, fol. 142a.

36 For example, see Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*, fol. 141b, 142a-b.

in this study was to scrutinize al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd* in terms of its phrasing, content, structure, and organization. As such, he intended to reconstruct the original text in a better, more proper and appropriate way and then comment on this new version. Indeed, when the book is considered in its entirety, it becomes clear that he realized these aims.

Following the layout of the *Tajrīd* and after making some preliminary comments and explanations on the *ḥamdala* and the *ṣalwala* (invoking praises to God and blessings to the Prophet), Kemālpāshāzāde focused on al-Ṭūsī's phrase "the problems of theology" (*masā'il al-kalām*). Elaborating on it, he presented some introductory explications about the discipline of theology without delving into much detail. At this point, he did not touch upon earlier scholars' discussions with regard to defining and subjecting the science of theology, but simply echoed al-Ījī (d. 756/1355)<sup>37</sup> by defining theology as "a science that gives competence in proving religious beliefs to someone else by way of furnishing evidences and removing doubts." Similarly, just like al-Ījī,<sup>38</sup> he propounded that the subject matter of theology is "the known thing(s) as much as they are closely or remotely pertinent to the proofs of religious beliefs."<sup>39</sup> Thus, Kemālpāshāzāde determined that its subject matter is a "known thing" not in an absolute sense, but rather as conditioned by its association with the proofs of religious beliefs. Hence, the emphasis on "proofs of religious beliefs" constitutes an important part of his definition of theology.

According to Kemālpāshāzāde, theology's actual purpose (*al-maqṣūd al-aṣli min 'ilm al-kalām*) is "the cognizance (*ma'rifa*) of conditions of the provenance and the destination." Since the *Tajrīd* was a theological work, al-Ṭūsī had laid out two purposes explaining the conditions of the provenance and the conditions of the destination, respectively. However, the existence of provenance is established by proving the originatedness (*ḥudūth*) of the universe, which consists of substances and attributes. Hence, the states of substances and attributes need to be examined first. These states are of two types: (1) one of them is common to both of them and (2) the other is specific to only one of them. In order to deal with these two types, al-Ṭūsī had preferred to open up two more purposes (i.e., chapters). Moreover, most of the discourse on the destination is based on scriptural proofs that are reported either from the Prophet, whose prophethood is confirmed by miracles, or,

37 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif fi 'ilm al-kalām* (Beirut: 'Ālam al-Kutub, n.d.), 7.

38 al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif fi 'ilm al-kalām*, 7.

39 See Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwīd al-Tajrīd*, fol. 141b.

according to some people, from the *Imām*.<sup>40</sup> Hence, two more purposes are added to deal with prophecy and *imamate*. In this way, Kemālpāshāzāde established why the *Tajrīd* consists of six goals (or chapters) in total.<sup>41</sup>

Kemālpāshāzāde's analysis of the six purposes comprising al-Ṭūsī's texts is quite similar to that of 'Alī al-Qūshjī's in his commentary entitled *Sharḥ Tajrīd aqā'id*.<sup>42</sup> However, immediately after this analysis, he criticized 'Alī al-Qūshjī but did not mention his name. The critique is directed to the latter's remark<sup>43</sup> that "Thus, the author [al-Ṭūsī] has necessarily composed his book in six goals."<sup>44</sup> Kemālpāshāzāde maintained that there was no necessity at all in this regard; rather, it was done as such simply due to its being better and more appropriate (*'alā wajh al-istiḥsān lā 'alā wajh al-ḍarūra*).<sup>45</sup>

After this introduction, Kemālpāshāzāde started to discuss the "First Purpose," which is "About the General Matters," and provided some brief and concise explanations about their nature. What stands out here and differs from other texts is that he held that these general matters correspond to "mental entities" (*al-umūr al-i'tibāriyya*).<sup>46</sup> Although he gave no reasoning for this preference, in another text he provided the following explication: "We said 'mental entities' because if they existed, they would belong to one of the already mentioned parts of [existence; i.e., Necessary Existence, substance, or attribute]. Thus, it would be appropriate to treat their states in the context of one these parts; [however, this is contrary to the very concept of general matters]."<sup>47</sup> This explanation reveals that according to him, general matters amounted to the secondary intelligibles that are other than the three parts of external existence and yet encompass them all.

40 Ibid., fol. 142a.

41 The six "purposes" (*maqṣad*) in al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd* are as follows: The First Purpose: On the General Matters," "The Second Purpose: On the Substances and Accidents," "The Third Purpose: On Proving the Attributes and Acts of the Creator," "The Fourth Purpose: On Prophethood," and "The Sixth Purpose: On the Ultimate Destination, and the Divine Promise and Threat" "The Fifth Purpose: On the *Imamate*." See Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Tajrīd Al-i'tiqād*, ed., Muḥammad Jawād al-Ḥusaynī al-Jalālī ([Qom]: Maktab al-I'lāmī al-Islāmī, 1407).

42 'Alī al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-'aqā'id*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Zārī'ī al-Ruzāyī (Qom: Rāid, 1393), 71-72.

43 Ibid., I, 72.

44 This critique of Kemālpāshāzāde is indirectly aimed at Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī as well. Like 'Alī al-Qūshjī, Iṣfahānī had stated that al-Ṭūsī had organized his work "necessarily" in six chapters. See Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasḍīd al-qawā'id fī sharḥ Tajrīd al-'aqā'id*, ed., Khālīd Ibn Ḥammād al-'Adwānī (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyā', 1433 [2012]), I, 170.

45 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwīd al-Tajrīd*, fol. 142a.

46 Ibid., fol. 142b.

47 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Risāla fī-l-umūr al-'amma*. MS, Veliyyüddin Efendi Kütüphanesi, no 3235, fol. 17b.

As a result, he contends, mental entities denoted such states that are not specific to one of the parts of existence, namely, the substance, attribute, or Necessary Existence. Rather they could apply to either all parts of existence, as in the case of the concept of “existence,” or they could involve only substance and attribute, as in the case of the question of “being caused” (*ma'lūliyya*).<sup>48</sup> Thus, mental entities or general matters included all of those states that are true either for all parts of existence or for the majority of them.

In the *Tajrīd*, al-Ṭūsī divided the “First Goal” that is “About General Matters” into three sub-sections: “Existence and non-existence,” “Quiddity and its Properties,” and the “Cause and Caused.” As mentioned above, based on extant copies, Kemālpāshāzāde’s *Tajwīd* tackled the first section, but only some principal matters.

Kemālpāshāzāde started his discussion of this first section by stating that in the present text “existence and non-existence” (*al-wujūd wa-l-'adam*) are actually “existent and non-existent,” because for him, what is intended by the “general matters are the derivatives (*al-mushtaqqāt*) and those that are analogous to them (such as quiddity and cause).” However, what is investigated here as existent and non-existent are not existent and non-existent things as such, but rather “[the state of being] existent and [the state of being] non-existent.” In other words, existent and non-existent are discussed “not by their essence (*dhāt*) but by their qualities,” since the “superaddedness” and “univocity” [of existence] are also about the “quality of existence.” On that account, any attempt to define the existent and non-existent is in reality an inquiry about the sense of “existing” and “non-existing.”<sup>49</sup>

Kemālpāshāzāde assumed that these demarcations and explanations are immanent in al-Ṭūsī’s text and regarded them as foundational (*qā'ida*) for a sound discussion of existence. Within this framework, he underlined three critical subjects that were also widely discussed in the classical literature<sup>50</sup>: (1) The superaddedness of existence to quiddity. According to him, although previous thinkers (*'uqalā*) have disagreed, for a truly intelligent mind (*'āqil*) even to engage in a debate regarding the superaddedness of existence is both superfluous and unwarranted, because it is self-evident that the concept of generation (*kawn*) cannot be taken to be the same as external essence. Nevertheless, the superaddedness of the concept of existent and of the sense of “generated” (*kā'in*) are debatable; (2) Whether existence is an

48 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwīd al-Tajrīd*, fol. 142b.

49 Ibid., fol. 143a.

50 For concise information on the sides of this debate, see al-Ijī, *al-Mawāqif fi 'ilm al-kalām*, 46 ff.

equivocal concept or not. Kemālpāshāzāde maintained that this was a matter of debate between the Ash'arīs and others, one that was founded on the disagreement regarding the first subject. Thus, he wrote: "What is mentioned with regard the first subject may be said in this regard as well"; and (3) Whether existence is said of its meanings in a "gradational" way or not. According to him, those who argued for the gradation of existence deduced this on the claim that the sense of existence obtains in individuals at various "gradations." It is clear that the "concept of existent" is indeed realized at various gradations in every individual; however, whether this is true for the "concept of existence" as well is open to debate.<sup>51</sup>

In this first section, Kemālpāshāzāde continues his inquiry into the problem of defining existence and non-existence. He first examined the various definitions suggested by theologians and philosophers as brought up in al-Ṭūsī's text and then analyzed how all of them led to circularity. Additionally, he indicated other "subtleties" and underlined other points that did or could lead to errors. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), one of Kemālpāshāzāde's most important sources, clearly played an influential role in all of these discussions. Indeed, he quoted a lengthy passage from the *al-Maṭālib al-'āliya* by al-Rāzī, whom he referred to simply as "imām" regarding the sense, definition, and self-evidentiality of existence.<sup>52</sup> He was not alone in drawing al-Rāzī into this debate, for al-Iṣfahānī and Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, both of whom were among the *Tajrid*'s most important commentators, had also done so when defining existence and non-existence. Although al-Ḥillī did not mention any particular title, he included two arguments by "Fakhr al-Dīn" for invalidating the definition of existence.<sup>53</sup> al-Iṣfahānī had also stated that in the *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* "the Imām" had presented three proofs for the self-evidentiality of the conception of existence.<sup>54</sup> The fact that these authors resorted to al-Rāzī in the same context is not merely due to their seeking support for their own opinions, but because al-Rāzī represented a particular position in this discussion. Therefore, al-Ḥillī also added that al-Ṭūsī did not approve of "Fakhr al-Dīn's" proofs for negating the definition.<sup>55</sup>

After this section, there is a rupture in the text. (In the Ms. Paris on folio 147a.) It is hard to determine conclusively whether this goes back to Kemālpāshāzāde or is

51 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*, fol. 143a-b.

52 Ibid., *Tajwid al-Tajrid*, fol. 144b.

53 Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ Tajrid al-i'tiqād* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-'Alami lil-Maṭbū'āt, 1408 [1988]), 3.

54 al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdid al-qawā'id fī sharḥ Tajrid*, 186.

55 al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ Tajrid al-i'tiqād*, 3.

due to a complication in the course of transmitting the text. In any case, after this break Kemālpāshāzāde presents a new subject: the univocity of existence. Here, often engaged in explications (*taqrīr*), he pointed out the relationship between breaking existence down into parts and its univocity. Accordingly, those who reject its univocity have to reject its parts of existence, such as the Necessary, substance, and attribute as well. Since this partition is a consequence of the univocity of existence, “it is impossible to reject the principle while accepting the consequence (*far‘*).”<sup>56</sup> Kemālpāshāzāde also recorded that Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī (d. 324/935-36) and the Mu‘tazilī scholar Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) had maintained a contradictory view on this subject, which has been already recorded in multiple distinct sources.<sup>57</sup> Significantly, here Kemālpāshāzāde wrote: “Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, who is from us (*minnā*).”<sup>58</sup> It would be more appropriate to interpret “from us” as referring to “*ahl al-sunna*” in general, rather than to Ash‘arism specifically.

The *Tajwid*’s last part – running parallel to the *Tajrīd* – is about the superaddedness of existence to quiddity. Like al-Ḥillī<sup>59</sup> and al-Iṣfahānī,<sup>60</sup> Kemālpāshāzāde regards the superaddedness of existence as a consequence of the fact that existence is a concept attached to all existing quiddities univocally. He stated that there was no disagreement about the superaddedness of absolute existence,<sup>61</sup> for the dispute arose when it came to the superaddedness of specific existence (*fi ziyādat al-wujūd al-khāṣṣ*). Though “for those who reject the absolute existence, it is not quite possible to argue for the superaddedness of existence to quiddity.”<sup>62</sup>

At this point, he followed the *Tajrīd*’s layout and thus claimed and demonstrated the superaddedness of existence through various arguments. The first of them (I) is as follows: (A) Existence is true of the existent quiddities univocally. If it was not superadded to quiddities, then it would be identical to these quiddities. If existence were identical with quiddity, then all quiddities would be unified. If existence is

56 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrīd*, fol. 148b.

57 At this point, Iṣfahānī wrote: “The majority of the verifying scholar (*muḥaqqiqīn*) agreed that existence is said of all existents univocally. Ash‘arī, however, is opposed to them and propounded that for every existent, its existence is identical to its quiddity and that they (i.e., the existents) only share the name of existence. The author [Ṭūsī] shared the majority view.” al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdid al-qawā‘id fi sharḥ Tajrīd al-‘aqā‘id*, 193.

58 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrīd*, fol. 148b.

59 al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-murād fi sharḥ Tajrīd al-i‘tiqād*, 5.

60 al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdid al-qawā‘id fi sharḥ Tajrīd al-‘aqā‘id*, 199.

61 al-Iṣfahānī too stated that there was not any disagreement about it except for the objection raised by al-Ash‘arī and his followers. See al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdid al-qawā‘id fi sharḥ Tajrīd al-‘aqā‘id*, 199.

62 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrīd*, fol. 148b.



true of quiddities univocally and is identical to quiddity, then all quiddities are identical. However, this is impossible. (B) If existence were to be part of existent quiddities, then it would be part of itself (*aw kāna juz'an li-nafsihī*). However, this is also impossible because part of an existent is also existent, for an existent cannot subsist through a non-existent [part].

In the first part of this argument (A), Kemālpāshāzāde remained generally in accord with al-Ṭūsī. But in the second part (B), he adopted a different approach and changed al-Ṭūsī's phrasing. The second part (B) of al-Ṭūsī's argument reads as follows: [If existence were to be part of a quiddity], then parts of the quiddity would not be limited (*lam tanḥaṣir ajzā'uhā*). [To the contrary, parts of a quiddity would make up an infinite sequence.] Yet Kemālpāshāzāde subjected the central phrase of al-Ṭūsī's expression, namely, "[parts of the quiddity] would not be limited" to an extended explication.<sup>63</sup> What is striking here is that in this discourse, to some extent he relied on 'Alī al-Qūshjī and even cited a passage<sup>64</sup> from his work, but without mentioning the scholar's name. Apart from these, Kemālpāshāzāde also brought forward other questions and problems in this context and introduced additional considerations.

After this first argument, which is based on the univocity of existence, the non-identity of quiddities, and the principle that a thing cannot be part of itself, Kemālpāshāzāde moved on to the second argument (II) for the superaddedness of existence to quiddity.<sup>65</sup> al-Ṭūsī had expressed this argument quite concisely as follows: Existence is superadded to quiddity "because existence and quiddity can be separated in the mind (*wa li-infikākihīmā ta'aqqulan*).” Kemālpāshāzāde's explication of this argument is that "It is possible that we can think of existence without thinking of a particular quiddity. And at other times we can think of a quiddity without knowing its existence. Such a case cannot be conceived to be true for a thing and itself."<sup>66</sup> He then raised and evaluated other points of criticism that can be brought against this deduction.

The third argument (III) is based on "the realization of contingency [for quiddities] (*wa li-taḥaqquq al-imbān*)," in other words the subsistence (*thubūt*) [of a contingent]. Kemālpāshāzāde stated that this realization occurs in itself (in *nafs*

63 Ibid., fol. 149a-b.

64 Cf. 'Alī al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-'aqqā'id*, I, 99-101.

65 See Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwīd al-Tajrīd*, fol. 150a.

66 Ibid., fol. 150a.

*al-amr*) and formulated, in a way that resembles ‘Ali al-Qūshjī’s expressions,<sup>67</sup> how the realization of contingency in itself indicates the superaddedness of existence: “Among the existents there are also contingent existents. If existence were not to be superadded to quiddity, then there would be no contingent existent, because contingency denotes the equal relation of the quiddity to existence and non-existence. If existence were to be the essence of quiddity, such an equality [i.e., equal relation] would be unthinkable.”<sup>68</sup> According to Kemālpāshāzāde, this reasoning is about common existence and therefore does not demonstrate that specific existence is also superadded to quiddity.

The fourth argument (IV) is based on the meaningfulness of predicating existence on quiddity (*wa [li-]fā’idat al-ḥaml*). According to Kemālpāshāzāde, “Existence’s predication on quiddity is meaningful, so it renders a new meaning. However, predicating something on itself cannot be meaningful at all. Similarly, when considered insightfully, predicating part of a thing on this thing does not render any meaning either. But the predication of existence is not such (i.e., meaningless).”<sup>69</sup> He added that this explication was in accord with al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s (d. 816/1413) relevant comments in the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*,<sup>70</sup> and hence when understood as such, he maintained that al-Ṭūsī’s expression of “*wa [li-]fā’idat al-ḥaml*” (for the meaningfulness of predication) needs to be regarded as a separate argument.

Kemālpāshāzāde insisted that in the *Tajrīd*, this phrase constitutes as a separate argument. In this context, his reference to al-Jurjānī contains a criticism that is directed toward other interpretations of it. This problem can be epitomized as follows: Should we understand “*wa [li-]fā’idat al-ḥaml*” as a separate proof, or should it be understood together with the following phrase: “*wa [li]al-ḥāja ilā-l-istidlāl*” (and for the need of proving)? Like al-Ḥillī,<sup>71</sup> Kemālpāshāzāde also argued that these were two separate arguments and have to be understood independently. However, ‘Ali Qūshjī (and even al-Iṣfahānī<sup>72</sup>) regarded this as a single argument and considered it as a whole that reads “*wa [li-]fā’idat al-ḥaml wa [li]al-ḥajat ilā-l-istidlāl*” (for the meaningfulness of predication and for the need of

67 Cf. ‘Ali al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-‘aqā’id*, I, 110.

68 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwīd al-Tajrīd*, fol. 150b.

69 Ibid., fol. 150b-151a.

70 Cf. al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* (Constantinople: Dār al-Ṭibā’at al-‘Āmira, 1266), 96.

71 al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ Tajrīd al-‘itiqād*, 6.

72 al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdid al-qawā’id fī sharḥ Tajrīd al-‘aqā’id*, 203-04.

proving).<sup>73</sup> Kemālpāshāzāde claimed that “*wa [li]al-ḥājat ilā-l-istidlāl*” constituted a fifth argument (V) and, therefore, it is unnecessary to connect it with the meaningfulness of the predication of existence on quiddity and, as such, to run it together with the former argument. He said that “whoever conceived that these two make up a single argument together has indeed misconceived.”<sup>74</sup> thus, criticizing ‘Alī al-Qūshjī (and indirectly al-Iṣfahānī) without mentioning his name. So, the explication of this fifth argument is that “We need a proof in order to know the existence of a quiddity; however, the subsistence of its essential qualities (*dhāti*) is evident.” Kemālpāshāzāde added that at this point someone might object that this fifth argument was also inconclusive and summarized this potential argument’s objection as follows: “The need for a proof is valid only for certain matters, and it may be due to the fact that these matters were not conceived of truly.”<sup>75</sup>

The last argument (VI) that demonstrated the superaddedness of existence to quiddity is that “the negation of contradiction is based on the negation of the compoundness of the Necessary [Existent] (*wa li-intifā al-tanākuḍ wa tarakkub al-wājib*).” Like al-Iṣfahānī<sup>76</sup> and ‘Alī al-Qūshjī,<sup>77</sup> and unlike al-Ḥilli, Kemālpāshāzāde regarded al-Ṭūsī’s words of “*wa li-intifā al-tanākuḍ wa tarakkub al-wājib*” as a single argument. However, al-Ḥilli contended that “*wa li-intifā al-tanākuḍ*” (and for the negation of contradiction) and “*wa tarakkub al-wājib*” (the compoundness of the Necessary [Existent]) denoted two separate arguments. Thus, the former phrase made the sixth argument and the latter one indicated the seventh argument.<sup>78</sup>

Again, in a way unlike al-Ḥilli and similar to ‘Alī al-Qūshjī,<sup>79</sup> Kemālpāshāzāde provided the following explication for this last argument: Both of these errors (i.e., contradiction and the compoundness of the Necessary [Existent]) are implied when existence is not considered as superadded to quiddity, because if existence is not superadded to quiddity then it has to be identical to it. In that case, the first error [i.e., contradiction] arises, for in that case an expression such as “Black is not existent” means “Black is not black” [which elicits a contradiction, i.e., judging two contraries as equal]. When “not existent” is said of a thing, it has to negate the

73 See ‘Alī al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrid al-‘aqā’id*, I, 110.

74 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*, fol. 151a.

75 Ibid., *Tajwid al-Tajrid*, fol. 151a.

76 al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdid al-qawā’id fī sharḥ Tajrid al-‘aqā’id*, 204.

77 See ‘Alī al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrid al-‘aqā’id*, I, 111 vd.

78 al-Ḥilli, *Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ Tajrid al-i’tiqād*, 6.

79 Cf. ‘Alī al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrid al-‘aqā’id*, I, 111-13.

existence of this thing; however, in that case we have assumed that existence is identical to “black.” When we deny the superaddedness of existence to quiddity, the second option is that existence is part of quiddity. In that case, the second error (i.e., the compoundness of the Necessary [Existent]) is implied, because if that were the case, then existence would be part of the Necessary [Existent] as well, [thus making the Necessary (Existent) compound, which is not true].”<sup>80</sup> According to Kemālpāshāzāde, the following objection can be raised against this argument (which also appears in ‘Alī al-Qūshjī’s work<sup>81</sup>): “What is determined through this argument is that existence is not part of the unity [of the whole (*kull*)]; however, this does not imply that existence is external to that unity either. Therefore, this argument cannot elicit conclusively that existence is superadded to unitary existence.”<sup>82</sup>

Kemālpāshāzāde’s analysis of these six arguments completes his *Tajrīd*. Based on the foregoing overview, one can see that he has verified the matters that al-Ṭūsī dealt with in his *Tajrīd* within the framework of the scholarly and philosophical tradition that he himself has inherited. In doing so, he referred to certain significant names like al-Rāzī and al-Jurjānī either directly or, as in the case of al-Ḥilli and ‘Alī al-Qūshjī, through indirect allusions. Also evident in his *Tajrīd* is use of a critical approach as a concomitant of the general method of “verification” to reconstruct and comment upon by reassessing the phraseology, organization, and content of al-Ṭūsī’s *Tajrīd*. Certain remarks by ‘Alī al-Qūshjī in his commentary on the *Tajrīd* constitute an especially important subject for this critical reassessment. Nevertheless, it would not be incorrect to claim that ‘Alī al-Qūshjī, rather than al-İṣfahānī, constituted a significant source for this work of Kemālpāshāzāde.

Kemālpāshāzāde’s way of explicating certain laconic expressions and arguments made by al-Ṭūsī in the *Tajrīd* also needs to be highlighted. He has explicated and reformulated almost all of al-Ṭūsī’s arguments regarding the above-mentioned subjects. This attitude must have been informed by ‘Alī al-Qūshjī, but maybe even more so by al-Ḥilli. But Kemālpāshāzāde did not confine himself to merely analyzing the problems and arguments related to them, for he also added potential challenges and objections that could be raised against these arguments. The name behind these objections was partly ‘Alī al-Qūshjī; however, unlike ‘Alī al-Qūshjī’s approach in his commentary on the *Tajrīd*, Kemālpāshāzāde was rather reluctant to respond to these objections.

80 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrīd*, fol. 151a-151b.

81 See ‘Alī al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-‘aqā’id*, I, 113.

82 Kemālpāshāzāde, *Tajwid al-Tajrīd*, fol. 151b.

As a concluding remark, we can state that although Kemālpāshāzāde compiled his *Tajwīd* by drawing on the commentaries of al-İşfahānī, 'Alī al-Qūshjī, and al-Ḥillī, it is nevertheless quite distinct for both its structure and content. This can be attributed to the fact that it is not a commentary on *Tajrīd* in the traditional sense, but rather belongs to a new genre of "refinement" (*tajwīd*). Although its author's scholarly and philosophical preferences must have been consequential, more extensive and compared studies are needed to determine this work's place *within* the *Tajrīd* tradition exactly and accurately.

### C. Manuscript Copies of the *Tajwīd al-Tajrīd*

Both the *Tajwīd* and the *Sharḥ al-Tajwīd* existed only in manuscript form until recently, when they were published within a collection of Kemālpāshāzāde's treatises.<sup>83</sup> According to the editor's introduction, the published version was edited by collating three incomplete copies. He also noted that despite the incompleteness of the available copies, the edition was prepared due to the work's significance and in the hope that a complete copy would eventually be found.<sup>84</sup>

This critical edition was based on three out of the six manuscript copies presented below, while the two most complete copies and another one that has a date of copy have been disregarded. Hence, the edition did not cover approximately one-fifth of the whole text that is available only in these disregarded manuscript copies. Moreover, since this edition omitted the two most complete copies, some of the additional information found in them – the author's annotations in the Paris copy and some marginal notes by a *mudarris* (teacher) in the Bursa copy – and is directly related to the matters discussed is missing.

In addition to those shortcomings, the published edition is also marred by some misreadings. Taking the Atıf Efendi copy as the only source for most parts has contributed to this. One can assume that when some of the problematic passages are collated with the Paris and Bursa copies, most of the mistakes can be eliminated. These and some other reasons have necessitated a new critical edition of this work. This present edition presents the *Tajrīd* and the *Sharḥ al-Tajwīd* to the scholarly world in the most complete way possible, based on the available manuscript copies.

83 Kemālpāshāzāde, "Sharḥ Tajwīd al-Tajrīd," in *Majmū' rasā'il 'allāma Ibn Kemāl Bāshā*, ed., Ḥamza al-Bakrī (Istanbul: Dār al-Lubāb, 2018), VII, 325-52.

84 Kemālpāshāzāde, "Sharḥ Tajwīd al-Tajrīd," VII, 322. Remarkably, the editor provided the name of the collection to which the manuscripts belong, but not the shelf numbers.

**1. Bibliothèque nationale de France (Paris), AY, no. 4374, fol. 140b-151b**

One of the two relatively more complete copies. it is bound in a volume that also includes Kemālpāshāzāde's *Taghyir al-Miftāḥ*. "Tajwīd al-tajrīd li-l-mawlā Kemālpāshāzāde" is written on top of the text. The textblock's front page provides the ownership and acquisition records made by Muḥammad Ḥusaynī b. Mawlā Ḥusayn Akhizāde; Yaḥyā b. 'Abd al-Ḥalīm, a *mudarris* at Sinanpaşa Medresesi; and Akhizāde İbrāhīm Efendī. Another note states that a certain "Maḥmūd Efendī" has copied this work. This person is most likely Mollā Maḥmūd Efendī, who, according to another note on the front page, was the son of Akhizāde Muḥammad Ḥusaynī's uncle.

As this copy is clearly incomplete, it is currently impossible to decide whether it represents the author's last version or not. However, the fact that the text ends with a *tamma* (ended) record indicates that at least the original copy used by the copyist reached only this far. This copy includes also annotations made by the author and ends with the section on "the superaddedness of existence to quiddity." Although other copies include some of the author's annotations as well, the Paris manuscript includes all of them in addition to some extra notes. All of these annotations have been indicated in the critical edition's section for footnotes.

Another feature of this copy is that the *Tajwīd* is followed by another work that starts immediately on the next folio without any interruption. This text, which appears on folios 152a and 159b, bears certain elements suggesting that it is a continuation of the *Tajwīd*. First of all, it has no any introductory material, such as the *basmala* or a preface. Secondly, its first sentence reads: "It is on the general matters, which is the first chapter (*maqṣad*) of [the *Tajrīd*?]" and gives the impression that, like the *Tajwīd*, this text has also been written on the *Tajrīd*. As it stands, one can think that this is also part of the former. However, a more detailed study and a comparison with Kemālpāshāzāde's other works warrants the opposite view as well.

This second text may be a whole one or part of another text added by the copyist immediately after *Tajwīd* due to their similarity in subject. Two pieces of evidence support this claim. First of all, Kemālpāshāzāde already expressed his opinions on the goal (*maqṣad*) of the *Tajrīd*'s, which deals with the general matters, in the very first pages of *Tajwīd* under a separate chapter. Thus, it seems highly unlikely that he would do this twice in a single text. Secondly, this second text comprises the same explanations found in his *Risāla fī al-umūr al-'amma*. The only divergences are that it starts with a reference to the *Tajrīd* instead of the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* and that the above-mentioned title-sentence has been written by another hand, which may

indicate that it is simply a mistake by a later reader. When read properly, it is clear that the statements explained are indeed from the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*. Thus, this text comprises of a gloss (*ta'liqa*) on the second chapter (*mawqif*) of Ījī's *al-Mawāqif*. When these two pieces of evidence are considered together, one can argue that the *Tajwīd* and the second pieces must be considered separate works that the copyist put together due to their similarity in subject.

We believe, however, that there is a third possibility: The extant text of the *Tajwīd* is the author's final version and the following text is a later addition, again made by the author himself. Although a low-probability scenario, some textual and extra-textual clues do support it. First of all, the *Tajwīd*'s discussion on general matters is rather brief and concise, perhaps because the author considered his previous and rather lengthy explanations on that subject in his *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* as sufficient. Therefore, instead of repeating them he just added them to the *Tajwīd*'s end. A supporting extra-textual clue is that the concomitance of this work and the gloss on the general matters chapter of the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* is not unique to the Paris manuscript. Interestingly, in the Bursa and Atıf Efendi manuscripts (presented below), both the *Tajwīd* and this gloss come together. Although this might be mere coincidence, it is worth considering as a clue that suggests this third scenario.

Another matter that needs to be stated is that this manuscript contains a half-written page that corresponds to the author's commentary on the incomplete definition of existence. At this point, a sentence is cut in the middle and the text continues on the following folio with a new theme, namely, the univocity of existence. We cannot express a conclusive opinion on whether this was the case in the original copy as well, but the fact that this part is left vacant in the other copies – assuming that they do not stem from the same parent copy – suggests that it was the author who left it uncompleted.

In the collated edition, the Paris manuscript is indicated by (ف).

## **2. İnebey Manuscript Library (Bursa), Genel, no. 4672, fol. 1b-10b**

This copy, which also presents a relatively complete version of the *Tajwīd*, has not been referenced in the modern literature so far. In fact, the present authors are the first ones to have detected it. The margin of the copy's first folio contains the statement “*Majmū'a min 'aqā'id al-kalām*” Relying on this note, the volume is

catalogued under this title. During the Ottoman period, it was apparently stored in the Süleyman Paşa Library and later transferred to the İnebey Manuscript Library.

The front page contains an ownership statement of İbrâhîm b. Muştafâ (?). The author's marginal annotations correspond completely to those in the Paris manuscript. In addition to these, other marginal annotations are signed at the end by "ḥaqîr" (the wretched one). Although we cannot know for certain to whom these notes belong, it is likely that he is the same person as indicated in the ownership statement.

There are interesting similarities between this manuscript and the Paris manuscript. As mentioned above, both manuscripts include annotations by the author. Moreover, both of them start at the same point and end with the author's commentary on the very same statements. These manuscripts and the Atîf Efendi manuscript (introduced below) are interrupted at the same places throughout the text. Based on these similarities, we can think of a connection between these two copies, for it seems that one constituted the original copy for the other. Considering the additional annotations made by a reader in the Bursa manuscript, we can assume that it was copied from the Paris manuscript and that these annotations were added later.

Another significant similarity appears at the end of the text. As mentioned above, the Paris manuscript is followed by Kemâlpâshâzâde's gloss on the section of general matters in his *Sharḥ al-Mawâqif*, which is catalogued as a separate work and can hardly be part of the *Tajwîd*. This same text appears at the end of the Bursa manuscript as well. The *tamma* record for the *Tajwîd* appears in the middle of the folio 10b, and then a new work starts with the following statement: "Qâla al-maqṣad al-awwal fî-l-umûr al-'amma" (The first chapter on the general matters). As stated above, this strengthens the possibility that the author added this second text to the *Tajrîd*'s end.

These two copies, introduced here in a relatively detailed way, are currently the most complete of the extant ones and serve as the basis for the present edition. The following three manuscripts are more deficient.

In the collocation, this copy is indicated by (1).

### **3. Atîf Efendi Library (Istanbul), no. 2816, folio. 184b-187b**

This manuscript is bound in a collection that includes other treatises by Kemâlpâshâzâde. Like the previous copy it ends abruptly and without any record of completion in the middle of the discussion on the superaddedness of existence to



quiddity, and the next treatise follows immediately thereafter. The catchword at the bottom of the last folio indicates that the following folio was torn off or otherwise removed from the volume at some point. Ḥamza al-Bakrī used this deficient copy for his earlier printed edition.

Although the Atif Efendi manuscript features some significant differences compared to the two previously mentioned copies, here too there are cases a discussion being interrupted abruptly and the following text introducing another subject. In this copy, the lacunae are indicated with three dots that correspond to the half-written pages in the previous copies. This correspondence suggests the possibility that the author is responsible for their being left incomplete; however, the available evidence does not allow a decisive judgement on this matter.

In the collocation, this copy is indicated by (ع).

#### **4. Topkapı Palace Museum Library (Istanbul), Revan Köşkü, no. 2022, folio. 99a-100a**

This copy, which is bound in a volume that includes other treatises by Kemālpāshāzāde, only contains the text's introductory section. At its beginning, a clause in red ink reads "*Taghyīr Tajrīd al-'aqā'id l-l-mawlā al-mudaqqiq Kemālpāshāzāde*" which suggests that the disagreement over the work's title stems from a discrepancy in the manuscripts. Indeed, this title is repeated within the text as well. In the previous two copies the work is entitled *Tajwīd al-Tajrīd*; here it reads *Tahrīr al-'aqā'id*. Although this particular title is not found in the sources that list Kemālpāshāzāde's work, it is meaningful when taken together with his other works written within the framework of his above-mentioned revision (*taghyīr*) project.

Unlike all of the other copies, the Revan Köşkü manuscript bears a date of copy, for at the end of the treatise a record of completion reads: "The found part [of the work] was completed in the hands of Yūsūf b. Muḥammad in Ramadan of the year 1009 [March 1601]." This statement, found in a copy written half a century after the author's death, shows that the copyist had obtained an incomplete copy.

Another feature of this copy is that it contains only some of the author's annotations (*minhuwāt*), which are indicated in the critical edition's section for footnotes. Based on the fact that the same concluding remarks are found in the two copies mentioned below and the correspondence of the author's annotations,

as well as the fact that they also comprise only the introductory section, suggests that their source was the Revan Köşkü copy.

In the collocation, this copy is indicated by (ج).

### **5. Süleymaniye Library (Istanbul), Bağdatlı Vehbi, no. 2041, folio. 251b-252a**

This copy, which is found in an anthology that contains various other treatises, is heavily deficient compared to the previous manuscripts. It also features only the introduction and ends with the statement: “With the help and divine assistance of God, the found part [of the book] has been completed.” The clauses that are commented upon are written in a different color and thus distinguished from the rest of the text.

In the collocation, this copy is indicated by (ب).

### **6. Murat Molla Library (Istanbul), no. 1834, folio. 341a-342a**

This copy, found in an anthology, is quite similar to the previous copy, except for some minimal differences. The points highlighted for the previous copy are valid for this one as well. Considering the similarities between the last three manuscripts, we can assert that one of them should have constituted the source for the other two.

In the collocation, this copy is indicated by (ا).

## **D. The Method of Critical Edition**

For the critical edition, we have followed the *İSAM Tahkikli Neşir Kılavuzu (ISAM Manual of Critical Edition)*. Since there is no autographed copy or any copy that has been read together with the author, we had to choose between the two most complete copies, namely, the Paris (ب) and the İnebey (ا) manuscripts. As we preferred the former due to its greater accuracy, whenever we preferred the latter, we indicated this in the footnote along with other differences. The edition includes all of the marginal notes and the author’s annotations, and the differences that occur in the incomplete copies are indicated. The various references made in the text, as well as the identity of those who made the assertions and objections, have

been identified. The main text of the *Tajwīd* is presented in bold font and within quotation marks, whereas the rephrased *Tajwīd* is given in bold font only. In order to demonstrate the differences between both texts and enable a better comparison, they are presented together at the end of the article.

## Bibliography

- Alak, Musa. "Kemalpaşazâde'nin *Şerhu Tağyiri'l-Miftâh* Adlı Eserinin Tahkik ve Tahlili." Unpublished PhD dissertation, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul 2009.
- Aşma'î. *al-Aşma'iyât*. Edited by Aḥmad Muḥammad Şâkir and 'Abd Al-Salâm Hârûn. Cairo: Dâr Al-Ma'ârif, n.d.
- Atsiz, Nihal. "Kemalpaşa-oğlu'nun Eserleri," *Şarkiyat Mecmuası*, VII (1972).
- Bağdatlı, İsmail Paşa. *Hadiyyat al-Ârifin*, I. Edited by İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnan and Avni Aktuç. Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1955.
- Dawwānī, Jalāl al-Dīn. *al-Ḥāshiyā al-qadīma 'alā al-sharḥ al-jadīd*. Published in *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-'aqā'id*. I. Edited by Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Zārī'ī al-Rızāyī. Qom: Râid, 1393 [1973].
- Günaydın, Salih. "Nasiruddīn et-Tūsī'nin *Tecridu'l-i'tikād*ı Üzerine Oluşan Şerh-Hāşiyeye Literatürü: Türkiye Yazma Eser Kütüphanelerinden Bir Bakış," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 14, no. 28 (2016): 237-72.
- Hasan Çelebi. *Ḥāshiyā 'alā-l-sharḥ al-jadīd*. MS, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, no. 1626.
- Khātibzāde. *Ḥāshiyā 'alā-l-Tajrīd*. MS, Millet Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi, no. 1114.
- Hilli, Ibn al-Muṭaḥḥar. *Kashf al-murād fi sharḥ Tajrīd al-i'tiqād*. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-'Alami lil-Maṭbū'āt, 1408 [1988].
- Ḥusām Çelebi. *Ḥāshiyā 'alā Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*. MS, Adana İl Halk Kütüphanesi, no. 115.
- İjî, 'Aḥd al-Dīn. *al-Mawāqif fi 'ilm al-kalām*. Beirut: 'Ālam al-Kutub, n.d.
- İsfahānī, Shams al-Dīn. *Tasdid al-qawā'id fi sharḥ Tajrīd al-'aqā'id*, I. Edited by Khālid Ibn Ḥammād al-'Adwānī. Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyā 1433 [2012].
- Jamil Bey. *'Uqūd al-jawhar*. Beirut: Dār al-Muṭtabas, 1436 [2015].
- Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Shārif. *Sharḥ al-Mawaqif*. Constantinople: Dār al-Ṭibā'ah al-'Āmirah 1266.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Sharḥ al-Mawaqif*. Constantinople: Dār al-Ṭibā'ah al-'Āmirah, 1311.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Ḥāshiyā al-Tajrīd*. MS, Köprülü Kütüphanesi, Fâzıl Ahmed Paşa, no. 800.
- Kâtib Çelebi. *Kashf al-Zunūn 'an asāmī al-kutub wa al-funūn*, I. Edited by Şerefettin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Sullam al-wuṣūl ilā ṭabaqāt al-fuḥūl*, I. Edited by Mahmud 'Abd al-Qādir al-Arnā'ūt. İstanbul: İslam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, 2010.
- Kafawī. *Katā'ib al'alam al-akhyār min fuqahā' madhhab al-Nu'mān al-mukhtār*, IV. Edited by Saffet Köse, Murat Şimşek, Hasan Özer, and Hüzeyfe Çeker. İstanbul: Maktabat al-Irshād, 2017.
- Kemālpāshāzāde. *Ḥāshiyā 'alā al-Ḥāshiyat al-qadīma 'alā Sharḥ al-Tajrīd*. MS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, no. 1626.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Risāla fi al-umūr al-'amma*. MS, Veliyyüddin Efendi Kütüphanesi, no 3235.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Risāla fi taḥqīq al-wujūd al-dihni." In *Majmū' rasā'il 'allāma Ibn Kemāl Bāshā*, VI. Edited by Ḥamza al-Bakri. İstanbul: Dār al-Lubāb, 2018.

- \_\_\_\_\_, "Sharh Tajwid al-Tajrid" In *Majmū' rasā'il 'allāma Ibn Kemāl Bāshā*, VII. Edited by H̄amza el-Bekri, Istanbul: Dār al-Lubāb, 2018.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Hawāshī 'alā Awā'il al-Tajrid*. MS, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, no. 2737.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Risāla fi al-Umūr al-'amma*. MS, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, no. 2838.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*. MS, Bibliothèque nationale de France, AY, no. 4374.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*. MS, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, no. 4672.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*. MS, Atıf Efendi Kütüphanesi, no. 2816.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*. MS, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Revan Köşkü, no. 2022.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*. MS, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Bağdatlı Vehbi, no. 2041.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Tajwid al-Tajrid*. MS, Murat Molla Kütüphanesi, no. 1834.
- Latifi. *Tezkire-i Latifi*. Edited by Ahmed Cevdet. Istanbul: İkdām Maṭba'ası, 1314.
- Mecdi Efendi. *Haddā'iq al-shaqā'iq*. Istanbul: Dār al-Ṭıbbā'at al-'Āmira, 1269.
- Mollā Akhawayn. *Hawāshī 'alā Hāshiyat al-Tajrid*. MS, Milli Kütüphane, no. 3227.
- Müstakimzāde. *Devhatü'l-meşāyih*. Edited by Ziya Kazıcı. Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1978.
- Najafi, Sayyid Maḥmūd Mar'ashi. *Kitābshināsi-i Tajrid al-i'tiqād*. Edited by 'Ali Şadrā'ī Khū'i. Qom: Kitābkhānah-i Buzurg-i Hāzrat Āyat Allāh, 2003.
- Qurashi, Abū Zayd Muḥammad ibn Abi al-Khaṭṭāb. *Jamharat Ash'ār al-'Arab fi al-Jāhiliyya wa-l-Islām*. Edited by 'Ali Muḥammad al-Bajāwi. Cairo: Dār Nahḍat Mişr, [1967].
- Qushji, 'Ali. *Sharh Tajrid al-'aqā'id*, I. Edited by Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Zāri'ī al-Rızāyi. Qom: Rāid, 1393 [1973].
- Sāmī, Şemseddin *Ḳāmūs-ı a'lām*, V. Istanbul: Mihran Maṭba'ası, 1306 [1889].
- Sāmsünizāde. *Hāshiyā 'alā Hāshiyat al-Tajrid*. MS, Burdur İl Halk Kütüphanesi, no. 155.
- Süreyyā, Meḥmed. *Sicill-i Osmāni*, I. Istanbul: Maṭba'a-i 'Āmire, 1308.
- Ṭāhir, Bursalı Meḥmed. *'Osmānlı Müellifleri*, I. Istanbul: Maṭba'a-i 'Āmire, 1333.
- Ṭaşköprizāde. *Al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya fi 'ulamā' Al-dawlat al-'Uthmāniyya*. Edited by Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī al-Bahbahāni. Tehran: Kitābkhānah, Müzih Va Markaz-i Asnād, Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, 1431 [2010].
- Ṭūsī, Naşir Al-Din. *Tajrid al-i'tiqād*. Edited by Muḥammad Jawād Al-Ḥusaynī al-Jalālī. [Qom]: Maktab Al-'Ilāmī Al-Islāmī, 1407 [1986].

## شرح تجويد التجريد

للمولى كمال باشازاده<sup>١</sup>

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

/ [١٤٠ ظ] «أما بعد»<sup>٢</sup> «أما» حرف وُضِعَتْ للتفصيل. فقد يكون<sup>٣</sup> لمجمل سابق،<sup>٤</sup> وقد يكون  
لمتعدد في الذهن ينتقي<sup>٥</sup> منه المتكلم ما يهّمه. ثم قد يسبقه ما يدل عليه بوجه ما، وقد لا يسبقه<sup>٦</sup>  
ومن هذا القسم الأخير ما في صدور الكتب والرسائل وهو المسمى بـ«فصل الخطاب». وفائدته  
فضل<sup>٧</sup> التوكيد لما يُعْلَمُ أن تفصيل المجمل واختيار جملة مخصوصة أو جمل مما في الذهن يدل على  
زيادة اعتناء بشأنها.

«حمد واجب الوجود» أثر من صفاته العلى ما هو أقوى اختصاصاً به تعالى؛ فإن الوجوب الذاتي  
اختصاصه بالذات منشأ لاختصاص سائر الصفات الكمالية به<sup>٨</sup> كما أن ثبوته له منشأ لثبوت  
سائرها لانطوائه عليها من حيث إنه معدن<sup>٩</sup> لكل كمالٍ ومبعّد<sup>١٠</sup> عن كل نقصانٍ. ولم يذكر اسم  
الموصوف تنبيهاً على ظهور<sup>١١</sup> اختصاص الوصف المذكور به تعالى بحيث لا يذهب<sup>١٢</sup> الوهم عند  
الإطلاق إلى غيره.

- ١ ر: تغيير تجريد العقائد للمولى المدقق كمال باشازاده رحمة الله عليه رحمة واسعة.
- ٢ م ب: باسمه سبحانه أما بعد.
- ٣ ع: تكون.
- ٤ ع: سابقا.
- ٥ ر م ب: ينتغي.
- ٦ ع - قد يسبقه ما يدل عليه بوجه ما وقد لا يسبقه.
- ٧ ر م ب: فصل.
- ٨ ر م ب - به.
- ٩ أ: مقدرة.
- ١٠ وفي هامش أ: إنما قلنا على ظهور دون على قوة كما قاله الشريف الفاضل؛ لأن مدار ما ذكر من عدم ذهاب الوهم  
إلى غيره على الظهور لا على القوة كما لا يخفى، منه.
- ١١ ع: يسبق.

«على نعمائه» التي من جملتها التوفيق بتأليف هذا الكتاب الجليل الشأن. «والصلاة على سيد أنبيائه»<sup>١٢</sup> اختار من أوصافه عليه السلام<sup>١٣</sup> ما يدل على أنه أشرف الأنام وأكملهم خَلْقًا وَخُلُقًا<sup>١٤</sup> ويفصح عن أنه خير / [١٤١] والورى لدخول باقي<sup>١٥</sup> الأوصاف الكمالية فيه دخول «كل صيد في جوف الفرى» وعدم ذكر الموصوف معه؛ لأنه كالعلم له عليه<sup>١٦</sup> السلام.

«وعلى أكرم أحبائه» يعني من اتصف من محبوبيه<sup>١٧</sup> واحدًا كان أو متعددًا بزيادة الكرم في الجملة لا<sup>١٨</sup> من جميع الوجوه؛<sup>١٩</sup> لأن الكرم من جميع الوجوه<sup>٢٠</sup> عسى أن لا يوجد في واحدٍ منهم.

وما سبق إلى بعض الأوهام<sup>٢١</sup> من أن يكون المكتوب بصورة<sup>٢٢</sup> حرف الجر اسم علي رضي الله<sup>٢٣</sup> عنه بأباه المقام؛ لأن مقتضاه التجنب عما يوهم التعصب، فضلاً عن إظهار التصلب فيه.<sup>٢٤</sup> نعم لا بُعد في أن يقصد المصنف<sup>٢٥</sup> نظم كلامه على وجه يحتمل<sup>٢٦</sup> صورته أن يقرأ<sup>٢٧</sup> على ما هو المختار عنده. وهذا من دقائق الاعتبار لا يخفى لطف موقعه على ذوي الاختبار.<sup>٢٨</sup>

- ١٢ م + ما .  
 ١٣ ع ب + الصلاة .  
 ١٤ م : خلقاً .  
 ١٥ ع : ما في .  
 ١٦ ع : الصلاة ؛ ب : أفضل الصلاة .  
 ١٧ ع : بمحبوبيته صلى الله و سلم عليه .  
 ١٨ ر م ب : لأن .  
 ١٩ وفي هامش أ ر م ب : فيه تعيين لتعلق قوله في الجملة إلى الكرم ومن صرف الظرف المذكور إلى الزيادة لتقصان الفهم ؛ فقد أضلّ وضلّ . "منه" .  
 ٢٠ ع ر م ب - لأن الكرم من جميع الوجوه .  
 ٢١ ذكر هذا الوجه كاحتمال عليّ القوشجي في شرح التجريد ، ص ٧ - ٧١ .  
 ٢٢ ع : بسورة .  
 ٢٣ ع + تعالى .  
 ٢٤ وفي هامش أ : ولهذا غير العلامة الزمخشري وهو علم بالتعصب والتصلب في مذهب الاعتزال عبارة خلق إلى أنزل في ديباجة كتابه الكشف عن اختياره المذهب المذكور وانتصاره لأهله . "منه" .  
 ٢٥ ع + رضي الله عنه .  
 ٢٦ ع : يعمل ؛ أ ر م : يتحمل .  
 ٢٧ م : يقرأه .  
 ٢٨ أ : الاختيار .

«فإني<sup>٢٩</sup> مجيب» أراد<sup>٣٠</sup> الإجابة الفعلية؛ فضمّنه معنى السرعة. كما في قول الشاعر: <sup>٣١</sup>

وداعٍ دعا يا: مَنْ يُجِيبُ<sup>٣٢</sup> إِلَى النَّدى  
فَلَمْ يَسْتَجِبْهُ عِنْدَ ذَاكَ مُجِيبٌ

تنبيهًا على أنه بنشاط ورغبة لا بكسلٍ وكراهية<sup>٣٣</sup>. وهذا من لطائف الكنايات. ولذلك<sup>٣٤</sup> قال: إلى؛ أي<sup>٣٥</sup> أتى بأداة التعدية والإجابة متعدية بنفسها. نعم إذا كانت في مقابلة السؤال بمعنى الاستفسار تعدى<sup>٣٦</sup> بـ«عن»؛ يقال «أجاب عن سؤاله»<sup>٣٧</sup>.

«ما سئلت» أي سألته على صيغة المجهول من سألْتُ / [١٤١ ظ] الشَّيْءَ إِذَا التَّمَسَّتْهُ،<sup>٣٨</sup> لا من سألته<sup>٣٩</sup> عن الشيء إذا استفسرته عنه. «من نقد» عبارة الأصل من تحرير، والبدل خير منه لفظًا ومعنى<sup>٤٠</sup>.

«مسائل الكلام» هو علم<sup>٤١</sup> علم يقتدر به على إثبات العقائد الدينية على الغير بإيراد<sup>٤٢</sup> الحجج عليها ودفع الشبه<sup>٤٣</sup> عنها. وموضوعه المعلوم من حيث يتعلق<sup>٤٤</sup> به إثبات العقائد الدينية<sup>٤٥</sup> تعلقًا قريبًا أو بعيدًا. «ونضدها» عبارة الأصل وترتيبها والبدل أقل حرقًا وأجل ظرفًا<sup>٤٦</sup>. «على أبلغ

- ٢٩ ر: فإنه.  
٣٠ ع - راد.  
٣١ هو كعب بن سعد الغنوي. انظر الأصمعيات للأصمعي ص ٩٦، جمهرة أشعار العرب لأبي زيد محمد القرشي، ص ٥٥٨.  
٣٢ ب: مجيب.  
٣٣ ر م ب: كراهية.  
٣٤ ع: ولهذا.  
٣٥ ع م ب - أي.  
٣٦ أ ع ر م ب: يتعدى.  
٣٧ م: سؤال.  
٣٨ م ب - إذا التمسته.  
٣٩ ر ب: سألت.  
٤٠ وفي هامش أ: أما الأول، فلأنه أخصر وأحسن لما فيه مع قرينة صنعة الجناس. وأما الثاني، فلأنه أخص لما ترك. "منه".  
٤١ أ ع - علم.  
٤٢ وفي هامش أ: معنى "الباء" مطلق السببية، وكفى قرينة المقام للدلالة على إرادة السببية العادية. فمن عدل عنها إلى كلمة مع لم يصب كما لا يخفى. "منه".  
٤٣ ع: به الشبهات.  
٤٤ أ: متعلق.  
٤٥ ر م ب - علي الغير بإيراد الحجج عليها ودفع الشبه عنها. و موضوعه المعلوم من حيث يتعلق به إثبات العقائد الدينية.  
٤٦ وفي هامش أ: لاحتتماله المعنى المراد مع اشتماله صنعة الجناس. "منه".

النظام» ترتيب المسائل في التجريد<sup>٤٧</sup> لم يكن على أبلغ النظام كما لا يخفى على المتأمل فيه من ذوي الأفهام. وقد انقلب<sup>٤٨</sup> إليه بعد التجويد<sup>٤٩</sup> على ما تقف عليه بإذن الله<sup>٥٠</sup> الملك العلام.

«مشيرا إلى درر قواعد الاعتقاد» بدل<sup>٥١</sup> ما في الأصل من «الغرر»<sup>٥٢</sup> ب«الدرر»؛ لأنها صالحة للإضافة إلى الفرائد دون الدرر. «وغرر فرائد الاجتهاد» عبارة الأصل ونكت مسائل الاجتهاد. ولا يخفى فضل البديل. والمراد من الفرائد المسائل بطريق<sup>٥٣</sup> الاستعارة وهي أبلغ من صريح التشبيه الواقع في الأصل. «مما قادي<sup>٥٤</sup> الدليل إليه» وأنا<sup>٥٥</sup> أقول: بذلت الجهد في تحقيق ما ساقني<sup>٥٦</sup> التوفيق إليه. «وقوي اعتمادي عليه»-وعندي لا اعتماد على أصول عقلية جلّها بل كلّها مدخول. وإنما التعويل على الدليل المستند على الشرع الجليل.

/ [١٤٢ و] «والله»<sup>٥٧</sup> قدّمه تخصيصًا للسؤال به تعالى «العصمة والسداد»<sup>٥٨</sup> أن يجعله<sup>٥٩</sup> ذخرا ليوم المعاد» غير هنا<sup>٦٠</sup> ترتيب الأصل وتركيبه حيث قدّم قوله «ورتبته علي ستة مقاصد» على قوله وسميته نخ. لأن حق الإخبار عن الترتيب أن يُقدّم على الإخبار عن التسمية وتمم بهذا «ناهجا» من نهجت الطريق إذا سلكته. «منهج المنصف» المنهج، الطريق الواضح. «القاصد» من القصد بمعنى العدل. ووجه الحصر فيما ذكر هو أن المقصود الأصلي من علم الكلام هو معرفة أحوال المبدأ والمعاد؛ فاستحسن تعيين المقصدين<sup>٦١</sup> لبيان أحوالهما.

٤٧ ر م ب: التحرير.

٤٨ ر م ب - النظام كما لا يخفى علي المتأمل فيه من ذوي الأفهام وقد انقلب.

٤٩ م: التجريد.

٥٠ ع - الله.

٥١ أ ف: يدل.

٥٢ ر م ب: القدر.

٥٣ ع - الاجتهاد ولا يخفى فضل البديل والمراد من الفرائد المسائل بطريق.

٥٤ ر + في.

٥٥ ر م ب: فأنا.

٥٦ ر م ب: قادي.

٥٧ ع: وبالله العصمة.

٥٨ ر م + أسأل؛ ب: أسأل.

٥٩ ر: يجعله.

٦٠ ر م ب: ههنا.

٦١ ر م ب: بالمقصدين.



ولمّا كان الاستدلال على وجود المبدأ بحدوث العالم<sup>٦٢</sup> وهو جواهر وأعراض احتيج إلى<sup>٦٣</sup> البحث عن أحوالهما وهي على قسمين أحدهما مشترك بينهما والآخر مختص بواحد منهما، ناسب وضع مقصدين آخرين لهما. ثم لمّا كان بيان المعاد أكثرها<sup>٦٤</sup> بأدلة سمعية منقولة عن النبي المؤيد بالمعجزة وعن الإمام<sup>٦٥</sup> أيضًا عند<sup>٦٦</sup> بعض، ذكر مقصدين آخرين لبيان النبوة والإمامة.<sup>٦٧</sup>

وهذا أيضًا على وجه الاستحسان لا<sup>٦٨</sup> على وجه الضرورة كما أوهمه<sup>٦٩</sup> من قال: "لا جرم رتب المصنف كتابه على ستة مقاصد".<sup>٧٠</sup> وأما وجه الترتيب فلا يخفى على<sup>٧١</sup> اللبيب «وسمّيته بتجويد التجريد»<sup>٧٢</sup> / [١٤٢ ظ] عبارة الأصل وسمّيته بتجريد العقائد. ولما غيرته في بعض المواضع من جهة الترتيب والتهديب وعبرت عن المرام بما هو حق الكلام وبدلت ما<sup>٧٣</sup> فيه موقع نقص<sup>٧٤</sup> بموضع الإتمام وبذلت الجهد في النقض والإبرام فلا جرم<sup>٧٥</sup> غيرنا<sup>٧٦</sup> الاسم أيضًا «ومن الله تعالى التوفيق والتسديد» قد مر<sup>٧٧</sup> وجه التقديم في مثل هذا المقام.<sup>٧٨</sup>

- ٦٢ ر م - العالم.  
٦٣ م ب: عن.  
٦٤ ع: وأكثرها؛ م ب: أكثر.  
٦٥ ر م ب: الأنام.  
٦٦ ر م ب: عن.  
٦٧ ع: الأمة.  
٦٨ ر ب - لا.  
٦٩ ر م ب: وهمه.  
٧٠ وممن قال بهذا الرأي شمس الدين الإصفهاني في تسديد القواعد، ص ١٧٠، وتبعه علي القوشجي في ذلك في شرح التجريد، ص ٧٢.  
٧١ م ب + الفطن؛ ر - اللبيب.  
٧٢ م ب: وسمّيته بتغيير تحرير العقائد؛ ر: وسمّيته بتحرير العقائد.  
٧٣ ر م - ما.  
٧٤ ر م ب: بعض.  
٧٥ ر م ب - فلا جرم.  
٧٦ م ب: غيرت.  
٧٧ ر م ب: قدم.  
٧٨ م ب + تم ما وجد بعون الله وحسن توفيقه؛ ر: تم ما وجد بعون الله في أواخر رمضان في سنة تسع وألف على يد يوسف بن محمود عفا عنهما العافي.

## المقصد الأول في الأمور العامة

التعريف في الأمور للعهد، والمعهود المناسب للمقام ما لا دخول له في قسم من أقسام الموجود من الأمور الاعتبارية. فلا انتظام بمثل الكم والكيف والعلم والقدرة. والمراد من العموم الشمول في الجملة بأن يوجد في القسمين سواء وجد في الثالث أيضًا كالوجود أو لا يوجد<sup>٧٩</sup> فيه كالعلية<sup>٨٠</sup> والمعلولية، أعم من أن يكون العروض في حالة الوجود كالحادث أو لا<sup>٨١</sup> في حالة الوجود كالعدم. وهذا التعميم بناءً على أن موضوع هذا العلم المعلوم دون الموجود<sup>٨٢</sup>. ثم إن ما هو من الأمور العامة مطلق الوجوب ومطلق القدم<sup>٨٣</sup> ومطلق الامتناع والبحث عن قسم الذاتي منها؛ لأنه من أقسامها كالبحث عن الوجود الخاص الواجبي والماهية المجردة والعلة الفاعلية.

«وفيه فصول ثلاثة: الأول منها في الوجود والعدم» يعني الموجود والمعدوم؛ لأن المراد من / [١٤٣] الأمور العامة المشتقات وما في<sup>٨٤</sup> حكمها<sup>٨٥</sup> كالماهية والعلة. وإنما سلك طريقة<sup>٨٦</sup> المجاز للإشارة إلى أن البحث ههنا عن الموجود والمعدوم من جهة الوصف لا من جهة الذات. فهو بحث في الحقيقة عن الوصفين المذكورين؛ ولذلك تراهم ينسبون الشركة والزيادة إلى وصف الوجود دون مفهوم الموجود.

فتحديدهما بما ذكر تحديده في الحقيقة للوجود<sup>٨٧</sup> والعدم بما يفهم منه. وقد نبّه على ذلك أي على التجوّز المذكور بقوله «وتحديدهما» أي تحديده<sup>٨٨</sup> الموجود والمعدوم؛ فكان في<sup>٨٩</sup> ذكر الوجود في عنوان الفصل<sup>٩٠</sup> والإتيان بحد الموجود بيان أن مراد القوم من الوجود في مباحث هذا الفصل

٧٩ - ع في القسمين سواء وجد في الثالث أيضًا كالوجود أو لا يوجد.

٨٠ وفي هامش أ: والأشاعة لا ينكرون توقف المركب على أجزائه؛ فمطلق العلية يوجد عندهم أيضًا في الممكنات على أن وضع مباحث علم الكلام لا يجب أن يكون على وفق معتقدتهم. "منه".

٨١ ع: إلا.

٨٢ وفي هامش أ: أقول: ومبنى هذا التعميم يعتبر إذا كان قسيم الوجود معتبرا أيضًا، فتأمل فيه. "فقير".

٨٣ ع: العدم.

٨٤ أ - في.

٨٥ للمقارنة انظر: الحاشية القديمة للدواني، ١ / ٧٤.

٨٦ وفي هامش أ: أقول: قوله "وإنما سلك طريقة" يظهر مما بعده من جهة الوصف. فتدبر فيه بما أمكن وأمعن. "فقير".

٨٧ ع - دون مفهوم الموجود؛ فتحديدهما بما ذكر تحديده في الحقيقة للوجود.

٨٨ ع: تجديده.

٨٩ ع - في.

٩٠ يعني عنوان الفصل الأول من المقصد الأول من التجريد وهو عن الوجود والعدم.

«الموجود». فكأنه أشار إلى بسط قاعدة في مفتتح الكلام بها تندفع<sup>٩١</sup> في كثير من المواضع شكوكٌ وأوهامٌ. منها مسألة زيادة الوجود على الماهية؛ فإنها محل الخلاف بين جمهور العقلاء.

ولا ينبغي لعقل أن ينازع في زيادة الوجود؛ إذ معلوم بالبديهة<sup>٩٢</sup> أن مفهوم الكون لا يصلح أن يكون عين الذات الخارجي. نعم يمكن أن ينازع في زيادة مفهوم الموجود ومعنى الكائن.

ومنها مسألة اشتراك الوجود؛ فإنها أيضاً محل خلافٍ بين / [١٤٣ ظ] الأشاعرة وغيرهم بناءً على الخلاف في المسألة الأولى.<sup>٩٣</sup> وما ذكر ثمة جاز<sup>٩٤</sup> هنا أيضاً.

ومنها ما قالوا: إن الوجود مقولٌ بالتشكيك بناءً على التفاوت في تحققه<sup>٩٥</sup> في ضمن أفرادهِ وذلك التفاوت<sup>٩٦</sup> في تحقق مفهوم الموجود في ضمن أفرادهِ ظاهرٌ. وأما تحقق مفهوم الوجود في ضمن أفرادهِ فمحل نظرٍ كما لا يخفى على من تأمل في تفصيل الكلام، وأمعن النظر في تحصيل المرام.

«بالثابت العين والمنفي العين» التقييد بـ«العين» للاحتراز عن الثابت للغير كالعَمى الثابت في الخارج للأعمى؛ فإنه لا حظ له من الوجود في الخارج، وعن المنفي عن الغير؛ فإنه قد يكون موجوداً في الخارج كالبياض<sup>٩٨</sup> المنفي عن الأسود.

«أو الذي يمكن أن يخبر عنه» لا يتوهم صدق هذا الحد على المعدوم المطلق وهو معدومٌ مطلق؛ لأن صدق المفهوم الإيجابي فرع الوجود في الجملة للموضوع، ولا حظٌ للمعدوم المطلق من الوجود حال كونه معدوماً مطلقاً. نعم بعد ما حصل في الخارج أو في الذهن يصدق عليه المفهوم المذكور، ولا يلزم الانقلاب من الامتناع إلى الإمكان؛ لأن مرجعه إلى انقلاب الموصوف من وصفٍ إلى آخر ولا موصوف هنا؛ لأن المعدوم المطلق لا شيء محض.

٩١ ع: يندفع.

٩٢ ع: بالبداهة.

٩٣ وفي هامش أ: أقول: قوله "بناء على الخلاف في المسألة الأولى" مبني على قوله فيما سبق "فإنها محل الخلاف بين جمهور العقلاء" فليوفق بينهما وتدبر. "فقير".

٩٤ ع: جار.

٩٥ ع: في تحقق مفهوم الموجود.

٩٦ ع - في ضمن أفرادهِ وذلك التفاوت.

٩٧ ع: أفراد.

٩٨ وفي هامش أ: أقول: مثال البياض يشكل بأن يطابق تعميم الأول لجميع ما يليق به، فتدبر. "فقير".

«ومقابلته» أي الذي لا يمكن أن يخبر عنه عبارة الأصل وبتقيضه ولا حاجة / [١٤٤] وإلى حرف «الباء»؛ بل لا وجه لذكره هنا مع تركه<sup>٩٩</sup> في المنفي العين. <sup>١٠٠</sup> ثم إنه لا تناقض بين المفهومين المذكورين. إنما التناقض<sup>١٠١</sup> بين الصلتين المذكورتين. <sup>١٠٢</sup> «أو بنحو ذلك» مثل قولهم في تعريف الموجود «ما يكون فاعلاً أو منفعلاً»، وفي تعريف المعدوم<sup>١٠٣</sup> «ما لا يكون فاعلاً ولا منفعلاً» غَيْرَ لفظ غير<sup>١٠٤</sup> الواقع في الأصل وعُبر عن المعنى المراد بما هو خير منه؛<sup>١٠٥</sup> لأنه بإطلاقه لا يصح كما لا يخفى.

«يشتمل على دور ظاهر» لم<sup>١٠٦</sup> يقل «وفي تحديدهما دور ظاهر» مع أنه أخصر وأظهر قصدًا بعبارة الاشتمال أن يشير إلى أن الغرض بيان فساد التحديد الضمني وهو تحديد الوجود والعدم بما علم من تحديد الموجود والمعدوم بما ذكر؛ لما عرفت أن التحديد المذكور تحديداً<sup>١٠٧</sup> في الحقيقة للوصف لا للموصوف، فافهم هذه الدقيقة الأنيقة. فإنها قد ذهبت على الناظرين<sup>١٠٨</sup> في هذا<sup>١٠٩</sup> المقام حتى قالوا في تفسير ما سبق من الكلام: «أي تحديد الوجود والعدم، كما هو الظاهر، بالثابت العين، أي: بما علم منه تحديده به»<sup>١١٠</sup>. ولم يخطر ببالهم ركافة عبارة «يشتمل» حينئذٍ.

والمعلوم من التحديد<sup>١١١</sup> الأولين ثبوت العين ونفي العين، ومن التحديد<sup>١١٢</sup> الثانيين<sup>١١٣</sup> ما به يمكن الإخبار عن الشيء وما به لا يمكن الإخبار عن الشيء، ومن التحديد<sup>١١٣</sup> الثالثين ما به يكون الفعل والانفعال وما به / [١٤٤] لا يكون الفعل ولا الانفعال. وهذا بناءً على

٩٩ ع + حسيدي.

١٠٠ أ: العيني.

١٠١ ع: فالتناقض.

١٠٢ أ: المذكورين.

١٠٣ ع: والمعدوم.

١٠٤ أ - غير.

١٠٥ أ: خبر عنه.

١٠٦ ع: ولم يقل.

١٠٧ ع - تحديد.

١٠٨ والمقصود هو علي القوشجي. انظر: شرح التجريد، ص ٨٠.

١٠٩ ع - في.

١١٠ ع - والعدم كما هو الظاهر بالثابت العين أي بما علم منه تحديده به.

١١١ ع: التجريدين.

١١٢ أ: الثابتين.

١١٣ ع: التجريدين.

أن المقصود من تحديد الموجود والمعدوم تحديد مفهوماً<sup>١١٤</sup> لا تحديد ما صدقا عليه؛ لأنها حقائق مختلفة، والمفهوم المشتق تحديده راجعٌ إلى تحديد مأخذ الاشتقاق. ومن لم يفهم سر هذا المقال قال في هذا المقام ما قال.<sup>١١٥</sup> والمراد من الدور المذكور حاصله،<sup>١١٦</sup> وهو توقف الشيء على نفسه، ومن الظاهر معناه اللغوي. وذلك لأن التعريفين الأولين خلوان عن الوساطة في التوقف، والدور في التعريفين الثانيين مضمّرٌ ضرورة أنه لتوقفهما على معرفة الإمكان الموقوفة<sup>١١٧</sup> على معرفة الوجود والعدم.

«بل المراد تعريف اللفظ» إضراب عما سبق باعتبار المعنى؛ كأنه قيل: إن التحديدات المذكورة ليست بصحيحةٍ لاشتغالها على الدور؛ بل صحيحةٌ لأن المراد تعريف لفظي الوجود والعدم وعدم الصحة على تقدير أن يراد تعريف الحقيقة. ولما كان مظنة أن يتوهم أن فساد التعريف على تقدير كونه حقيقياً لا يدل على عدم قصده. فإن الفساد في التعريفات الحقيقية غير عزيزٍ تدارك دفعه بقوله «إذ لا شيء» يعني في المفهومات المشتركة بين الموجودات. صرح الإمام [الرازي] بذلك في المطالب العالية<sup>١١٨</sup> حيث قال: «إنا إذا رجعنا إلى عقولنا / [١٤٥ و] وجدنا معنى الحصول والوجود معنى معلوماً من فطرة العقل ومن بديته. وإنا لا نجد البتة شيئاً آخر أعرف من معنى الحصول معنىً واحداً في الكل». «أعرّف من الوجود» عندهم. فكيف تيسر<sup>١١٩</sup> لهم قصد تعريفه حقيقةً وهم يعرفون أن المعرف شرطه أن يكون أعرف من المعرف؟ «والاستدلال» يعني على استغناء الوجود عن التعريف الحقيقي المفهوم من<sup>١٢٠</sup> التعليل المرقوم. «بتوقف التصديق بالتنافي» يعني بين الوجود والعدم في قولنا «الوجود منافٍ للعدم». «عليه» أي على تصور الوجود ضرورة توقف التصديق على تصور أطرافه والتصديق المذكور بديهيٌ حاصلٌ لمن لا قدرة له على النظر، وما يتوقف عليه البديهي أولى بالبديهة. ووجه بطلان الدليل المذكور أن توقف التصديق المذكور على تصور الوجود بوجه ما، والكلام في تصوره بالكنه. وأما إبطاله بمنع التوقف<sup>١٢١</sup> فقد اندفع بتقريرنا؛ فمن وهم بطلانه بوجهين فقد وهم.

١١٤ ع: بمفهومهما.

١١٥ انظر: شرح التجريد للقوشجي، ص ٨١-٨٢.

١١٦ أ: حاصلته.

١١٧ ع: المتوقفة

١١٨ انظر: المطالب العالية من العلم الإلهي للرازي، ج ١ ص ١٧٠.

١١٩ ع: يتيسر.

١٢٠ أف - من.

١٢١ انظر: تسديد القواعد للإصفهاني، ص ١٨٧.

«وبعدم قبول التحديد للزوم توقف الشيء على نفسه أو خلاف المفروض» عبارة الأصل وتوقف الشيء على نفسه أو عدم تركيب الوجود مع فرضه مركبا ولا وجه لها؛ لأن الاستدلال بعدم / [١٤٥] صلاحية التحديد للزوم أحد المحذورين المذكورين وعدم صحة الرسم أصلاً، لا بالتوقف المذكور والعدم المزبور وإبطال الرسم على الوجه المشهور.

«وبطلان الرسم» عبارة الأصل أو إبطال<sup>١٢٢</sup> الرسم ولا وجه؛ لها لأن مقتضى المقام تصدير الكلام بـ«الواو» الجامعة دون «أو» الفارقة؛ والعدول عن الإبطال إلى البطلان رعايةً للمناسبة بين التعريفين<sup>١٢٣</sup> باطل.

أما تقرير هذا الوجه، إن الوجود معلومٌ بلا خلافٍ وطريق العلم البدئية<sup>١٢٤</sup> والنظر لا غير. ولا احتمال هنا للثاني؛ لعدم قبوله التحديد وبطلان الرسم وطريق النظر منحصراً فيهما؛ فتعين الأول. أما عدم قبوله<sup>١٢٥</sup> التحديد؛ لأن الحد لا يكون إلا بالأجزاء ولا أجزاء له؛ إذ حيثئذ لا يخلو من أن يكون فيها وجود فيلزم المحذور الأول ضرورة توقف المركب على كل واحدٍ من أجزائه، أو لا يكون فيها وجود أصلاً فيلزم المحذور الثاني؛ إذ حيثئذ لا بد من حصول أمرٍ زائدٍ عند الاجتماع وهو الوجود فالتركيب في معروضه والمفروض أنه فيه.

وأما بطلان الرسم؛ لأنه يتوقف على العلم باختصاص المرسوم به بالمرسوم وهو يتوقف على العلم بالمرسوم وبما عداه والتوقف على العلم بالأول يستلزم الدور / [١٤٦] والعلم بالثاني موقوفٌ على إحاطة الذهن بما لا يتناهى وهو محال. وأما تقرير بطلانه فمن وجوه:

الأول: أن الوجود معلومٌ بوجهٍ ما بلا خلافٍ، أما أنه معلوم بالكنهه فمحلّ خلافٍ؛ فلا يلزم من عدم تعريفه<sup>١٢٦</sup> أن يكون معلوماً بكنهه بالبدئية<sup>١٢٧</sup>.

والثاني: أنا نختار أن في أجزائه وجوداً، ونمنع لزوم الفساد؛ فإن الجزء كالحیوان يصدق على الكل كالإنسان صدقاً ذاتياً، ولا يلزم توقف الشيء على نفسه؛ فلم لا يجوز العكس والفرق بينهما

١٢٢ ع: بطلان.

١٢٣ أ: الفريقين.

١٢٤ ع: البدئية.

١٢٥ ع: قبول.

١٢٦ ع: تعريف.

١٢٧ ف: بالكنهه بدئية.

بالصحة والفساد دون خرط القتاد؟ وأما الجواب بـ“أن الوجود عرضي لجزئه<sup>١٢٨</sup> لا ذاتي؛ فاللازم توقفه على معروضه لا على نفسه؛ فلا يلزم توقف الشيء على نفسه بل على معروضه“ فلا يشفي. لأن المراد أنه لا يخلو من أن يكون في الأجزاء ما هو وجود في حد نفسه أو لا يكون؛ فالاحتمال المذكور داخل في ثاني شقي الترديد.<sup>١٢٩</sup>

والثالث: أنا نختار الثاني ونسلم أنه لا بد حينئذ من حصول أمر زائد هو الوجود ولكن نمنع لزوم المحذور المذكور؛<sup>١٣٠</sup> فإن ذلك الزائد يجوز أن يكون هو المجموع المغاير لكل واحد الزائد عليه الحاصل عند الاجتماع.

والرابع: النقص بالمركبات التي لا خلاف في تركيبها حقيقة؛ فإن الدليل المذكور على تقدير تمامه يدل على ان لا يوجد مركب أصلاً.

والخامس أن التوقف / [١٤٦ ظ] في الرسم على نفس الاختصاص لا على العلم به، والمحذور المذكور<sup>١٣١</sup> إنما<sup>١٣٢</sup>....

/ [١٤٧ و] بوجود المكان<sup>١٣٣</sup> ونتردد في أنه بعد مفروض أو مفطور أو سطح ولا يلزم منه اشتراك مفهوم المكان بين الثلاثة المذكورة في نفس الأمر.

والمشهور في تقرير الوجه المذكور هو أننا إذا علمنا وجود ممكن، جزمنا بوجود موجد مع التردد في كونه واجباً أو ممكناً عرضاً أو جوهرًا متحيزًا أو غير متحيز إلى غير ذلك. فبالضرورة يكون الأمر المقطوع به الباقي مع التردد في الخصوصيات مشتركاً بين الكل. ويرد عليه أنه على تقدير تمامه كما يدل على شركة الوجود بين تلك الخصوصيات كذلك يدل على شركة<sup>١٣٤</sup> الإيجاد بينها ولا يقول به المستدل.

والثاني منها: ما ذكره بقوله «وإتحاد مفهوم العدم». وتقديره: أن العدم مفهوم واحد؛ إذ لا تمايز فيه. وموجبه أن يكون الوجود أيضاً مفهوماً واحداً ضرورة أن أحدهما رفع الآخر، ورفع المتعدد

١٢٨ ع: بجزئه.

١٢٩ وفي هامش أ: والجواب بمنع الفساد فيه، مرجعه إلى ثالث الوجوه كما لا يخفى. "منه".

١٣٠ أ - مذكور.

١٣١ ع - المذكور.

١٣٢ أ - إنما.

١٣٣ ع: الإمكان

١٣٤ أ: اشتراك.

متعدد في الجملة ولا توقف في تمثية هذا الوجه على أن يكون أحدهما نقيض الآخر. بل هو يتمشى على تقدير أن يكون أحدهما ملكة الآخر.<sup>١٣٥</sup> ثم إنه لا دليل على التعيين. ومن هنا ظهر وجه الإصابة في العدول عن عبارة النقيض الواقعة في الأصل.

وللمخالف<sup>١٣٦</sup> أن يقول: لا نسلم أن العدم مفهوم واحد؛ بل هو متعدد<sup>١٣٧</sup> متمايز بحسب إضافته الى الوجود. والمشهور في تقرير الوجه المذكور هو أن / [١٤٧ظ] مفهوم العدم واحد. فلو لم يكن مفهوم الوجود أيضاً واحداً لبطل الحصر العقلي بينهما لبقاء احتمال آخر وهو أن لا يكون معدوماً ولا موجوداً بالمعنى الذي أريد، بل موجوداً<sup>١٣٨</sup> بمعنى آخر.

ولا يخفى ما في هذا التقرير من الخبط والخلط بين الوجهين المستقلين. وذلك أن ما ذكر بقوله إن مفهوم العدد واحد وجه مستقل لا حاجة في تمثيته إلى التمسك بمقدمة الحصر على ما وقف عليه أنفاً. وتلك المقدمة أيضاً مبنية وجه آخر لا حاجة في تمثيته إلى التمسك بوحدة مفهوم العدم؛ إذ على تقدير تعدده يكون بطلان الحصر أظهر.

وتقرير هذا الوجه أن الوجود مفهوم واحد. وإلا لما صح الحصر العقلي بين الموجود وبين نقيضه؛ لأن مفهوم التردد حينئذ أن الشيء إما موجودٌ بوجوهٍ خاصٍ أو ليس بموجودٍ أصلاً. وذلك ليس بمنحصر لجواز أن يكون موجوداً بوجوهٍ خاصٍ آخر أو<sup>١٣٩</sup> أن الشيء إما موجودٌ بوجوهٍ ما من الموجودات أو ليس بموجودٍ أصلاً. وذلك ليس<sup>١٤٠</sup> بحصر عقلي؛ لأنه حينئذ يكون الحصر بملاحظة لفظ الوجود وشموله تلك المعاني المتعددة التي وضع بإزائها؛ فلا يكون عقلياً معنوياً بل استقرارياً لفظياً.

لا يقال: «لا بد في تمام هذا الوجه من بيان وحدة مفهوم العدم؛ إذ على تقديرها يكون معنى المعدوم ما لا يكون موجوداً أصلاً. ولا يكون / [١٤٨و] التردد بينه وبين الموجود بوجوهٍ خاصٍ حاصراً<sup>١٤١</sup> بخلاف ما إذا كان العدم متعدداً؛ فإن مفهومه حينئذٍ رفع وجوهٍ خاصٍ لا

١٣٥ أ: بل هو يتمشى على تقدير أن يكون أحدهما ملكة الآخر.

١٣٦ أ: وللمخاطب.

١٣٧ أ - و.

١٣٨ أ: موجود.

١٣٩ أ: و.

١٤٠ ع - بمنحصر لجواز أن يكون موجوداً بوجوهٍ خاصٍ آخر أو أن الشيء إما موجودٌ بوجوهٍ ما من الموجودات أو ليس بموجودٍ أصلاً وذلك ليس.

١٤١ ع - حاصراً.



رفع الوجودات بأسرها؛ فيكون التردد بينه وبين ذلك الوجود حاصراً من غير ملاحظة المقدمة الأجنبية القائلة يمتنع كون الشيء موجوداً بوجود غيره. وإنما يحتاج إليها إذا ردّ بين الوجود الخاص ورفع الوجودات بأسرها».

لأننا نقول: الحصر الذي تمسك به في تقرير الوجه المذكور، الحصر بين الموجود والمعدوم بمعنى ليس بموجود أصلاً، لا الحصر بينه وبين المعدوم بمعنى ليس بموجودٍ بوجودٍ خاصٍ بعينه بحيث يجوز أن يكون<sup>١٤٢</sup> موجوداً بوجودٍ خاصٍ آخر. ولا يلزم حينئذٍ أن يزيد في الحجة مقدمة أخرى، بل يكفي تعيين المراد من الحصر الذي تمسك به، وليس هذا من قبيل الزيادة في المقدمات.<sup>١٤٣</sup>

والثالث منها<sup>١٤٤</sup>: ما ذكر بقوله «وقبوله القسمة». وتقريره: أن الوجود يقبل القسمة إلى وجود الواجب ووجود الممكن، ووجود الجوهر ووجود العرض. وهكذا يقسم<sup>١٤٥</sup> إلى وجودات الأنواع وأشخاصها. ومورد<sup>١٤٦</sup> القسمة مشتركٌ بين جميع أقسامه مطلقاً؛<sup>١٤٧</sup> لأن حقيقة التقسيم ضم مختصاً إلى مشتركٍ.

ولا يخفى أن هذا الوجه قريبٌ من المصادرة؛ فإن من أنكر الشركة في مفهوم الوجود لا يمكنه القول بقبوله القسمة؛ / [١٤٨ظ] لأنه فرع الشركة ولا مجال<sup>١٤٨</sup> لقبول الفرع مع رد الأصل. «يعطي الشركة» أي يفيد علمها. وقد خالف في هذه المسألة أبو الحسن الأشعري منا وأبو الحسين البصري من المعتزلة.

لا يقال: «نحن نعلم بالضرورة أن بين الموجود<sup>١٤٩</sup> والموجود من الشركة في الكون في الأعيان ما ليس بين الموجود والمعدوم. وهذا لا يمنعه إلا المعاند».<sup>١٥٠</sup>

١٤٢ ع + معه.

١٤٣ وفي هامش أ: كما سبق إلى وهم بعض الناظرين في هذا المقام. "منه".

١٤٤ أ - منها.

١٤٥ ع: القسم.

١٤٦ أ: بين.

١٤٧ وفي هامش أ: فيه رد لقول الشريف في شرح المواقف التي ينقسم إليها ابتداء. "منه".

١٤٨ ع: لا محالة.

١٤٩ ع: الوجود.

١٥٠ ذكره الإيجي ضمن وجوه شركة الوجود معنى قولاً لأحد الفضلاء، المواقف، ص ٤٧.

لأننا نقول: فيه تجهيلٌ للفريقين؛ لأن من قال بالشركة تمسك فيه بالحجج ولقد أبدع من نظم دعوى الضرورة<sup>١٥١</sup> هنا في سلكها. ثم إنه أورد النقض بالماهية والتشخص ولم يدر أن النقض من خواص الدليل.

لا يقال: «لعل المخالف لا ينكر الشركة في معنى الكون».

بل نقول: إن للوجود<sup>١٥٢</sup> معنى آخر وراء الكون؛ لأنه حينئذ يلزم أن لا يكون محل النزاع محرراً بين الفريقين. ولا يخفى ما فيه من نسبة القوم إلى المقصور<sup>١٥٣</sup> في العثور على المراد، فافهم. والله الهادي إلى الرشاد.

«فيزيد على الماهية» تفرع على ما ثبت من كون الوجود مفهوماً مشتركاً بين الماهيات الموجودة. عبارة الأصل فيغاير الماهية. ولا يخفى ما فيها من القصور. ولا خلاف في زيادة الوجود المطلق؛ إنما الخلاف في زيادة الوجود الخاص. نعم من أنكر الوجود المطلق لم يتيسر له القول بزيادته<sup>١٥٤</sup> على الماهية<sup>١٥٥</sup>. «وإلا» أي وإن لم يكن الوجود المشترك بين الماهيات الموجودة زائدة<sup>١٥٦</sup> عليها «اتحدت الماهيات» أي<sup>١٥٧</sup> التي ثبت<sup>١٥٨</sup> شركة الوجود / [١٤٩ و] بينها. فالتعريف للعهد.

«أو كان» أي الوجود «جزءاً لنفسه»؛ لأنه<sup>١٥٩</sup> لا يخلو من أن يكون عينها، فيلزم المحذور الأول وذلك ظاهراً أو جزئياً، فيلزم المحذور الثاني. وذلك لأن جزء الموجود موجوداً لاستحالة تقوّم الموجود بالمعدوم، ويكون الوجود جزءاً منه أيضاً بناء على الفرض المذكور فيلزم المحذور المزبور. ولا احتمال لأن يكون الماهية جزءاً من الوجود ضرورة أنه يطلق عليها بدون العكس.

لا يقال: يجوز أن لا يكون الوجود جزءاً منه؛ لأن المفروض رفع الإيجاب الكلي إلى<sup>١٦٠</sup> الجزء الآخر؛ فإن المركب لا بد له من جزئين والوجود جزءٌ منه ومن جزئه أيضاً لما مر؛ فيلزم المحذور المذكور. ولا مجال لمنع<sup>١٦١</sup> جزئيته من ذلك الجزء أيضاً؛ إذ حينئذ يلزم الاتحاد بين الجزء الأول

١٥١ ع + إلى.

١٥٢ أ ف: الوجود.

١٥٣ ع: القصور.

١٥٤ ع: زيادة.

١٥٥ وفي هامش أ: فمحل الخلاف للأشاعرة واحد لا اثنين كما هو الظاهر من الشرح القديم. "منه".

١٥٦ ع: زائدا.

١٥٧ ع - أي.

١٥٨ ع: ثبتت.

١٥٩ أ ع + حينئذ.

١٦٠ ع: لا.

١٦١ أ: بمنع.

وجزاء الجزء الثاني، وفساده ظاهر. ولا يتجه على هذا التقرير إلا أن يقال: يجوز أن يكون الوجود زائداً على ماهية جزء الجزء. وذلك لأن المدعى هو أن كل وجود زائد ونقيضه سلب جزئي، فجاز أن يكون الوجود داخلاً في بعض الماهيات دون بعض.

عبارة الأصل وإلا لم ينحصر أجزاءؤها. وتقديره: أنه لو كان الوجود جزءاً للماهيات لكان لها أجزاء أخرى موجودة لامتناع تقوّم / [١٤٩ ظ] الموجود بالمعدوم؛ ولا بد أن يكون جزءاً لتلك الأجزاء أيضاً؛ إذ الفرض أنه جزءٌ للموجودات بأسرها، فتلك الأجزاء لها أجزاء أخرى موجودة. ثم ننقل ١٦٢ الكلام إلى أجزاء الأجزاء وهكذا إلى أن يتسلسل. وأما بطلان التالي؛<sup>١٦٣</sup> فلأن المركب لا بد له<sup>١٦٤</sup> من الانتهاء إلى البسيط؛ لأنه مبدأ المركب. فلو انتفى انتفى المركب قطعاً، والكثرة وإن كانت غير متناهية لا بد فيها من الواحد. وما يتجه على الوجه الأول، يتجه على هذا الوجه أيضاً قوله «إذ الفرض أنه جزء للموجودات بأسرها» ليس بذلك؛ لما عرفت أن معنى قوله «وإلا» رفع الإيجاب الكلي لا السلب الكلي.<sup>١٦٥</sup> ثم إنه يتجه على هذا الوجه خاصة أمر آخر وهو منع كون البسيط الحقيقي مبدأً للمركب مطلقاً. فإن القدر الضروري هو أن<sup>١٦٦</sup> المركب لا بد له من أجزاء يتقوم هو به. وأما انتهاؤه إلى ما ليس بمركبٍ فليس بيناً بنفسه ولا مبيّن. والكثرة لا بد فيها من الواحد العددي لا من الواحد الحقيقي لجواز اشتماله على آحاد آخر وهكذا.

فإن قيل: أليس يكفي في بطلان التالي أن يقال «والتسلسل باطل»؟

قلنا: بطلانه إنما ثبت في الأمور الخارجية المرتبة وهو غير لازم مما ذكر. فإن الوجود على تقدير كونه جزءاً يكون جزءاً ذهنياً. وغاية ما يلزم / [١٥٠ و] حيثئذ امتناع تعقل كنه الماهية بالقياس إلى القوى القاصرة عن إدراك تفاصيل ما لا يتناهى. وأما القوى العالية فيجوز أن يحضر عندها بكنهها بلا ارتسام الصور،<sup>١٦٧</sup> فتدبر.

١٦٢ ع: ينتقل.

١٦٣ ع: الثاني.

١٦٤ أ - له.

١٦٥ وفي هامش أ: من هنا اتضح وجه العدول عن عبارة الأصل. "منه".

١٦٦ نهاية نسخة عاطف أفندي.

١٦٧ انظر: حاشية التجريد للجرجاني، ١٤ ظ.

«ولانفكاكهما» أي ولانفكاك كل من الوجود والماهية عن الآخر «تعلقًا» عطف على ما تقدم من جهة المعنى؛ لأنه في معنى قولنا «لشركته وعدم اتحادها وعدم جزئية الشيء لنفسه وجهٌ ثانٍ للزيادة». وتقريره: أنا قد نعقل الوجود ولا نخطر ببالنا ماهية مخصوصة، وقد نعقلها ونغفل عنه؛ وهذا لا يتصور بين الشيء وذاتيه.

وللمخالف<sup>١٦٨</sup> أن يقول: هذا إذا كان الشيء متصورًا بالكنه ولا نسلم حصول ماهية بكنهها في ذهننا. وأيضًا يجوز أن يكون الحال في الماهيات التي لا نعلمها على خلاف ما ذكر. والزيادة في البعض لا يستلزم الزيادة في الكل لجواز أن لا يقتضي الوجود شيئًا من الزيادة والعينية والدخول أو يقتضي الزيادة في البعض والعينية<sup>١٦٩</sup> في الآخر. وغاية ما يلزم أن يكون مقولًا بالتشكيك، وهو لا يستلزم الزيادة في الكل.

ولا يُتَوَهَّمُ أن الدليل المذكور لو تم لدلّ على زيادة الوجود الخاص على الماهية أيضًا؛<sup>١٧٠</sup> إذ لم يثبت بعد أن في الموجودات وجودًا / [١٥٠ ظ] خاصًا وراء حصته المطلق، وتام الدليل المذكور لا يستلزمه. ومن وَهَمَ أنه بعد تمامه لا بد من مقدمة أخرى وهي أن الخاص معلوم لنا إما بالكنه أو بوجهٍ يمتاز عن جميع ما عداه فقد وهم<sup>١٧١</sup>. إذ بدونها لا يتم الدليل المذكور والكلام بعد تمامه. ثم إنه ما فهم أن ما ذكره لا يفي في تمام المرام؛ إذ يحتمل أن يكون معلومًا لنا<sup>١٧٢</sup> ولا نعلم أنه معلومٌ.

«ولتحقق الإمكان» يعني في نفس الأمر؛<sup>١٧٣</sup> لأنها إحدى المواد الثلاث الثابتة في أنفسها على ما يأتي بيانه بإذن الله تعالى. وجه ثالث للزيادة. وتقريره: أن في الموجودات ما هو ممكنٌ ولو لم يكن الوجود زائدًا على الماهية لم يوجد ممكنٌ أصلاً؛ لأن الإمكان عبارةٌ عن تساوي نسبة الماهية إلى الوجود والعدم. ولو كان الوجود ذاتيًا لها لم يتصور ذلك التساوي. وهذا لا يقتضي تحقق الوجود الخاص لتام المرام بتحقيق حصته المطلق؛ فلا دلالة في الوجه المذكور على زيادة الوجود الخاص. ولا يذهب عليك أن الاستدلال بهذا الوجه قريبٌ من المصادرة. لأن من أنكر زيادة الوجود على الماهية لا يقول بتحقيق النسبة بينها. فأتى القول بالتساوي المذكور.

١٦٨ أ: وللمخاطب.

١٦٩ أ: أو العينية.

١٧٠ وفي هامش أ: لا حاجة إلى أن يقال التي يمكن تعقل خصوصها مع الغفلة عن وجودها؛ لأن قولنا لو تم بغنى عنه. "منه".

١٧١ ذكره علي القوشجي في شرح التجريد، ص ١٠٩.

١٧٢ أ- لنا.

١٧٣ فيه رد على السيد الشريف حين قال بأن المراد من تحقق الإمكان تحققه في نفسه بحسب الخارج؛ بل حصوله للأشياء واتصافها به. انظر: حاشية التجريد للجرجاني، ١٦ و.

«ولفائدة الحمل» لا بد من إعادة الجار للدلالة على الاستقلال في الاستدلال. وفي الأصل ذكرت / [١٥١ و] في الثاني والثالث وتركت هنا وفي الأخيرين. ولا وجه للفرق. وتقريره: أن حمل الوجود على الماهية مفيدٌ فائدةً جديدةً، وحمل الشيء على نفسه لا يفيد أصلاً. وحمل جزئه عليه لا يفيد فائدةً جديدةً إذا كان الشيء معقولاً ولكنه بخلاف حمل الوجود عليه.<sup>١٧٤</sup> وبهذا التقرير المطابق لما في شرح الشريف للمواقف تبين استقلال هذا الوجه. ويتجه عليه: أنا لا نسلم تعقلنا شيئاً من الماهيات بالكنه، ولو سلم فما ذكر إنما يدل على زيادة الوجود على الماهية<sup>١٧٥</sup> التي تعقلناها بالكنه.

«وللحاجة إلى الاستدلال» وجهٌ خامسٌ لزيادة الوجود على الماهية. تقريره:<sup>١٧٦</sup> أنا قد نحتاج في العلم بوجود الماهية إلى الاستدلال، والذاتي بين الثبوت. ولا خفاء في أنه لا حاجة في تمشية هذا الوجه إلى التمسك بمقدمة الفائدة في الحمل. فمن وهم أن مجموعهما وجهٌ واحدٌ، فقد وهم. ويرد على هذا الوجه أيضاً: أنه قاصرٌ؛ لأن الحاجة إلى الاستدلال في بعض المواد وأيضاً يحتمل أن يكون ذلك لعدم تعقلها بالكنه.

«ولانتفاء التناقض وتركب الواجب» عطف على المضاف إليه أي لانتفاء هذين الأمرين. وتقريره: أن أحد المحذورين المذكورين لازمٌ على تقدير عدم زيادة الوجود على الماهية؛ إذ حينئذٍ لا بد من أن يكون عينها، فيلزم المحذور / [١٥١ ظ] الأول؛ إذ حينئذٍ يكون معنى قولنا «السواد ليس بموجود» مثلاً «السواد ليس بسوادٍ» ضرورة أن معنى «ليس بموجودٍ»، «المنتفي عنه الوجود».<sup>١٧٧</sup> والمفروض أنه عين السواد أو جزئها، فيلزم المحذور الثاني؛ إذ حينئذٍ يكون جزءاً من الواجب أيضاً.

ويرد على هذا الوجه: أن الثابت به عدم دخول الوجود في الكل. ولا يلزم منه الخروج عن الكل حتى يتم المطلوب وهو الزيادة على الكل. وهو يناقض القضية الصادقة في نفس الأمر وهي أن «السواد سوادٌ».

تم.

١٧٤ انظر لتقرير السيد الشريف في شرح المواقف، ١ / ٢٦٩.

١٧٥ ف - الماهية.

١٧٦ أ: بتقريره.

١٧٧ أ: الموجود.

## تَجْرِيدُ الإِغْتِقَادِ لِلطُّوسِي

أَمَّا بَعْدَ حَمْدِ وَاجِبِ الوجودِ عَلَى نِعْمَائِهِ،  
وَالصَّلَاةِ عَلَى سَيِّدِ أَنْبِيَائِهِ مُحَمَّدِ المَصْطَفَى، وَعَلَى  
أَكْرَمِ أَحِبَّائِهِ.

فَإِنِّي مُجِيبٌ إِلَى مَا سُئِلْتُ مِنْ تَحْرِيرِ  
مَسَائِلِ الكَلَامِ، وَتَرْتِيبِهَا عَلَى أَبْلَغِ النِّظَامِ، مُشِيرًا  
إِلَى غُرَرِ فَوَائِدِ الإِغْتِقَادِ، وَنُكْتِ مَسَائِلِ الإِجْتِهَادِ،  
مِمَّا قَادَنِي الدَّلِيلُ الإِلَهِيُّ، وَقَوِي اعْتِمَادِي عَلَيْهِ.

وَسَمَّيْتُهُ بِ«تَجْرِيدِ الإِغْتِقَادِ» وَاللَّهُ أَسْأَلُ  
العِصْمَةَ وَالسَّدَادَ، وَأَنْ يَجْعَلَهُ ذُخْرًا لِيَوْمِ المَعَادِ.

وَرَتَّبْتُهُ عَلَى سِتَّةِ مَقَاصِدَ.

المَقْصِدُ الأَوَّلُ فِي الأُمُورِ العَامَّةِ. وَفِيهِ  
فُصُولٌ ثَلَاثَةٌ.

الفَضْلُ الأَوَّلُ فِي الوجودِ وَالْعَدَمِ.

وَتَحْدِيدُهُمَا بِالثَّابِتِ العَيْنِ وَالْمُنْتَهِي العَيْنِ، أَوِّ الَّذِي  
يُمْكِنُ أَنْ يُحْبَرَ عَنْهُ وَتَقْيِضُهُ، أَوْ بَعْضِ ذَلِكَ، يَشْتَمِلُ  
عَلَى دَوْرٍ ظَاهِرٍ. بَلْ المَرَادُ تَعْرِيفُ اللَّفْظِ؛ إِذْ لَا  
شَيْءَ أَعْرَفُ مِنَ الوجودِ.

## تَجْوِيدُ التَّجْرِيدِ لِلْمَوْلَى كَمَالِ بِأَشَارَاةِ

أَمَّا بَعْدَ حَمْدِ وَاجِبِ الوجودِ عَلَى نِعْمَائِهِ،  
وَالصَّلَاةِ عَلَى سَيِّدِ أَنْبِيَائِهِ، وَعَلَى أَكْرَمِ أَحِبَّائِهِ.

فَإِنِّي مُجِيبٌ إِلَى مَا سُئِلْتُ مِنْ نَقْدِ مَسَائِلِ  
الكَلَامِ وَنَضْدِهَا عَلَى أَبْلَغِ النِّظَامِ، مُشِيرًا إِلَى دُرَرِ  
قَوَاعِدِ الإِغْتِقَادِ وَغُرَرِ فَوَائِدِ الإِجْتِهَادِ مِمَّا قَادَنِي  
الدَّلِيلُ الإِلَهِيُّ، وَقَوِي اعْتِمَادِي عَلَيْهِ.

وَاللَّهُ أَسْأَلُ العِصْمَةَ وَالسَّدَادَ، وَأَنْ يَجْعَلَهُ  
ذُخْرًا لِيَوْمِ المَعَادِ. وَرَتَّبْتُهُ عَلَى سِتَّةِ مَقَاصِدَ نَاهِجًا  
مَنْهَجَ المُنْصِفِ القَاصِدِ.

وَسَمَّيْتُهُ بِ«تَجْوِيدِ التَّجْرِيدِ» وَمِنَ اللّهِ تَعَالَى

التَّوْفِيقُ وَالتَّسْدِيدُ.


المَقْصِدُ الأَوَّلُ فِي الأُمُورِ العَامَّةِ. وَفِيهِ  
فُصُولٌ ثَلَاثَةٌ.

الأَوَّلُ فِي الوجودِ وَالْعَدَمِ. وَتَحْدِيدُهُمَا

بِالثَّابِتِ العَيْنِ وَالْمُنْتَهِي العَيْنِ، أَوِّ الَّذِي يُمَكِّنُ أَنْ  
يُحْبَرَ عَنْهُ وَمُقَابِلِهِ، أَوْ نَحْوِ ذَلِكَ، يَشْتَمِلُ عَلَى دَوْرٍ  
ظَاهِرٍ. بَلْ المَرَادُ تَعْرِيفُ اللَّفْظِ؛ إِذْ لَا شَيْءَ أَعْرَفُ  
مِنَ الوجودِ.

## The first and last folios of the manuscripts of *Sharḥ al-Tajwīd*

### 1) Bibliotheque nationale de France (Paris), AY, nr. 4374



2) İnebey Manuscript Library, (Bursa), General, n. 4672.







4) Topkapı Sarayı Museum, Revan Köşkü, n. 2022

