NAZARİYAT

Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede's Thoughts on Ethics: Synthesizing Peripatetic Philosophy and Sufi Thought in Ishrāqī Wisdom

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Abstract

This article analyzes the chapter on ethics from Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede's (d.1702) commentary *Sharḥ al-Akhlāq al-'Aḍuḍ*, written in the genre of practical philosophy consisting of ethics, household management, and politics. Müneccimbaşı lived from the mid-17th to the beginning of the 18th century in the Ottoman period. Firstly, considering the period in which Müneccimbaşı's commentary was written, it can be seen as a renewal and adjustment of the old tradition in terms of practical philosophy and ethics. However, in the context of philosophical ethics, the commentary aimed to renew and revive the ancient philosophy not as a separation of methods but within the framework of expanding the area of integrated methods. The second aim expressed the problematic of combining peripatetic philosophy's virtue theory with the method of purification and abstraction from physical, bodily pleasure and other things through *mujāhada* [spiritual struggle] and *riyāḍa* [asceticism] in Sufi thought in order to see and know the essence of the absolute lights, which is the purpose of Ishrāqī wisdom. Accordingly, virtue theory involves having the temperaments and behaviors arising from the powers of desire and anger from the human soul become mediocre and moderate in terms of quantity and quality through wisdom.

Keywords: Müneccimbaşı, ethics, virtue, asceticism, practical perfection, divine light.

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Introduction

This article analyzes the first chapter of Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede's (1631-1702) commentary on *al-Akhlāq al-'Aḍuḍiyya*[1] titled "Science of Ethics" with an exclusive focus on the problematics of the quiddity of the human soul, which is the source of habits and moral behaviour, the soul-body relation, powers of the soul and its goal, as well as the method to reach this goal by drawing upon a number of highly representative examples.

In addition to these, the article discusses what Müneccimbaşı's commentary on *al-Akhlāq al-'Aḍuḍiyya* represents in the tradition of philosophical ethics and within the context of Ottoman renewalist thought that operated along the ancient-modern dichotomy. Lastly, Müneccimbaşı's ethical thought remains underexplored since there is no other previous study focusing on this aspect of his thought as problematic and this study aims to fill this gap in the literature.[2]

The article consists of two parts and a conclusion. The first part explains the quiddity of the soul and the relationship between the soul and body in the comparative context of Ishrāqī/Illuminationist wisdom and Peripatetic philosophy. The second part is a content analysis of the sections on the faculties of the human soul, its goal, and method on the basis of two examples about the virtues and vices of the rational and appetitive faculties of the soul. In relation to this, I will try to identify where to place or how to characterize this commentary from the perspective of practical philosophy considering the basic particularities of the period in which Müneccimbaşı lived. The conclusion presents a general re-evaluation of the main points.

1 The work known as *Sharḥ Akhlāq-i 'Aḍuḍiyya, Sharh al-Akhlāq al-'Aḍuḍiyya* or *Sharḥ Kitāb al-'Aḍuḍ* is an Arabic commentary written on 'Aḍuḍ al-Dīn al-'Ījī's (d.1355) treatise *al-Akhlāq al-Aḍuḍiyya* written in Arabic by Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede as an example of the type of practical wisdom consisting of three main sections: ethics, household management, and politics. Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede, *Sharh al-Akhlāq al-'Aḍuḍiyya*, Süleymaniye Library, Esad Efendi 1868, 1b; Asiye Aykıt, "Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede'nin Şerhu Ahlâk-ı Adûd Adlı Eseri, Metin Tahkiki ve Değerlendirme" (PhD Dissertation, Marmara University, Institute of Social Sciences, 2013), 19.

2 I'm grateful to Assoc. Prof. Mustakim Arıcı for providing manuscript copies of Müneccimbaşı's commentary. For studies on Müneccimbaşı's commentary, see Asiye Aykıt, "Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede'nin Şerhu Ahlâk-ı Adud Adlı Eseri, Metin Tahkiki ve Değerlendirme" (PhD Dissertation, M. Ü. Social Sciences Institute, 2013); Asiye Aykıt, "Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede'nin Şerhu Ahlâk-ı Adud İsimli Eserinin Değerlendirilmesi," *Tahkik* İslami İlimler *Araştırma ve Neşir Dergisi* 3/1 (2020): 311–350; Mustakim Arıcı, "Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Literatürü ve Şerhlerde Yöntem Sorunu", İslâm İlim *ve Düşünce Geleneğinde Adudüddin el*-Îcî, Ed. Eşref Altaş (Istanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2017), 631–655; Mustakim Arıcı, "Osmanlı İlim Dünyasında İşrâkî Bir Zümreden Söz Etmek Mümkün mü? Osmanlı Ulemasının İşrâkîlik Tasavvuru Üzerine Bir Tahlil", Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi, 4/3 (October 2018), 1-48.

Problem Analysis I: Quiddity of the Soul and Soul-Body Relationship

Müneccimbaşı begins his theory of soul directly with the definition of the soul and explanations about its nature without going into a more prior ontological discussions on whether it exists or not, or how its existence can be known if its existence is affirmed, or whether it needs to be proven by evidence. This is because he accepted the existence of the soul as being independent and different from the body,[3] a position that is consensually accepted by both the Peripatetic and Ishrāqī philosophers as a self-evident matter. Moreover, such question belonged to other disciplines: the existence of the soul and the proofs for it were the issues of metaphysics while the soul's explanation through its physical effects on the body were examined in psychology,[4] a sub-discipline of physics.

According to Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede, "the rational (*nāṭiq*) soul is an immaterial created substance (*al-jawhar al-mujarrad*) in terms of its essence but material in terms of its actions."[5] This definition was a common definition shared by the Ishrāqī and Peripatetic philosophers. In both systems of thought, "*mujarrad*" refers to separation from matter, whereas substantiality meant not being predicated on a subject nor subsisting and expanding in a substrate, or another thing and not becoming a nature for that thing.

However, the Peripatetic and Ishrāqī philosophies have different positions in terms of what they meant by the concepts of body (*al-jism*) and substance (*al-jawhar*). In the Peripatetic philosophy, substance denotes things that do not need to be related to a subject (*mawḍuʿ*) in order to exist and it has two types. The first kind is a body (*jism*) that consists of the combination of two other substances: matter and form. The second type of substances are the so-called separate incorporeal substances (*mufāriq*) such as self-intellective celestial spheres, and souls of human beings and intellects.[6]

In Ishrāqī thought, substance (*al-jawhar*) means not subsisting in a subject, place, or thing, and it has two categories, too. The first group includes immaterial lights

3 Essentially, a compromise is found among the basic thought traditions of Islamic thought such as Peripatetic, Ishrāqī, kalam, and theoretical Sufism / *waḥdat al-wujūd* that such a thing as *nafs* exist. Among these traditions of thought, the difference that exists regarding the soul is related to what kind of aspect (bodily or intangible) the soul has and what the powers of the soul are. See Ömer Türker, "İslam *Düşüncesinin Soyut Nefs Teorisiyle* İmtihanı", İnsan *Nedir? İslam Düşüncesinde* İnsan *Tasavvurları*," Ed. Ö. Türker & İ. H. Üçer (Istanbul: İLEM Yayınları, 2019), 19–57.

4 Atilla Arkan, "Psikoloji: Nefis ve Akıl", İslâm *Felsefesi Tarih ve Problemler*, Ed. M. Cüneyt Kaya (Istanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2013), 572–573.

5 Müneccimbaşı, Şerh, 1b.

6 Ibn Sīnā, *Metafizik*, I, trans. Ekrem Demirli and Ömer Türker, (Istanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2004), 53-56; Ali Durusoy, İbn *Sinâ Felsefesinde* İnsan *ve* Âlemdeki *Yeri* (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1993), 68.

that are self-apprehending and self-illuminating substances containing light in their essence and they also manifest other substances. The second type of substances called "dusky substances" (*jawāhir ghāsiqa*) do not contain light in their essences and they are dark/invisible and dead, hence not visible on its own nor able to make other entities visible or comprehensible.[7] Bodies (*barzakh*) belong to this category of substances.

The lights that are visible and illuminating are differentiated from each other on vertical and horizontal levels by their strengths/perfections and weaknesses/deficiencies. Bodies, on the other hand, become visible through the attachment of adventitious lights (*al-nūr al-ʿāriḍ*) which correspond to sensible/physical lights. The adventitious lights are both visible themselves and make others visible. However, unlike immaterial lights, they cannot apprehend themselves since their lights do not originate from their own essences.[8]

According to Ibn Sīnā, within the Aristotelian conception, body (*al-jism*) is a substance composed of two other substances: (1) matter which is receptive of division and characterized by preparedness (*istiʿdād*), and (2) form that is the actual source of conjunction, the needed cause of matter and to which the accidents in the sense of the quiddity of the species and four attributes of the four basic elements inhere. With the conjunction of the surface to the corporeal form, three dimensions (width, length and depth) and magnitude too inhere to the body. As they are considered under the category of quantity, their existence rests upon form and they are not from constituents of the quiddity of the body, the surface, three dimensions and magnitude, according to Peripatetic philosophy, are not substances but accidents[9].

According to Suhrawardī, on the other hand, from a Platonic framework, the body is a dusky substance which accepts three dimensions (width, length and depth) and is devoid of light which is a mental construct consisting of the magnitude that corresponds to the commonness in bodies. The differentiation of bodies is due to the relationship between the states which refer to the attributes/accidents that inhere to the bodies/

7 Suhrawardī, *Hikmat al-Ishrāq*, trans. Eyüp Bekiryazıcı and Üsmetullah Sami (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2015), 302.

8 John Walbridge, "Sühreverdî ve İşrâkîlik", İslam *Felsefesine Giriş*, Ed. P. Adamson & R. C. Taylor, Trans. C. Kaya (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2007), 233–235; A. Kàmil Cihan, "Sühreverdî ve İşrâkîlik,", İslâm *Felsefesi Tarih ve Problemler*, 408-414; Fatma Turğay, İşrâkî *Felsefeye Misâl* Âleminden *Bakmak* (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2019), 36–55. Also, see Eyüp Bekir Yazıcı, "Şihâbeddin Sühreverdî'nin Felsefesinde Ontoloji Problemi" (PhD Dissertation, Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2005), 112; Salih Yalın, "İbn Rüşd ve Sühreverdî'de Töz Kavramının Karşılaştırmalı İncelemesi" (PhD Dissertation Erciyes Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2008), 95–96; İshak Arslan, "Nurun Işımaları, Sıcaklığın Değişimleri: İşraki Hareket Kavramı", *Dîvân Disiplinlerarası* Çalışmalar *Dergisi* 39 (2015/2): 6–7.

9 For the category of quantity in the Aristotelian system, see Engin Koca, "Aristotelesçi Sistemde Fizik ve Sanat İlişkisi," *Divan Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi* 43 (2017/2): 1–23.

magnitudes and also determine the degrees of perfection and deficiency in lights and the preparedness and entelechy of the corporeal substances. In other words, they differ from each other in terms of their becoming concrete bodies due to the degree of heat.

According to Suhrawardī, simple bodies in the universe of elements are divided into three, based on whether they transmit light or not. The simple body that is opaque and blocks the light entirely is *earth*. The transparent simple body that transmits light completely is *water*. Lastly, the translucent simple body which blocks light in an incomplete way is *air*.

For Suhrawardī, fire is not an individual element; it corresponds to hot air and is included in the category of air due to its transparency. The only difference between fire and air is that the quality/accident of heat in fire is greater (higher) than in the air. But according to Ibn Sīnā, fire is not hot air but a separate element. Therefore, while four simple bodies are in question for Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī does not accept fire as an element in itself. According to him, only three simple bodies exist.[10]

The five substance theory of the Peripatetic philosophy was reduced to two substances in the Ishrāqī philosophy, namely the immaterial lights and bodies; and the theory of accidents corresponded to the theory of states (*hayʾa*). In addition, in Ishrāqī philosophy the quantity that accepts the three dimensions of width, length, and depth is not considered to be a state/an accident but rather a substance as it constitutes the essence of the body. Hence according to the viewpoint of Peripatetic thought, the human rational soul is not a body that is formed by the combination of matter and form (*murakkab*), nor is it a substance existing in the body in this sense; it is an indivisible rational/immaterial (*mufāriq*) entity that neither increases nor decreases (*basīṭ*). In terms of Ishrāqī thought, the human soul is not a body consisting of quantity/temperature that accepts the three dimensions of width, height, and depth; in this sense, it is an abstract light that does not settle in the body.

In his definition of the soul Müneccimbaşı did not include the term "simplicity"[11], which Peripatetic philosophy used alongside the terms of "abstractness" and

10 Walbridge, "Sühreverdî ve İşrâkîlik", 235–236; Cevdet Kılıç, "Sühreverdî'nin Varlık Düşüncesinde Nurlar Hiyerarşisi ve Meşşâî Felsefe ile Karşılaştırılması," *Fırat Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 13 (2008): 62; Tahir Uluç, *Sühreverdî'nin İbn Sînâ Eleştirisi* (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2012), 124–127. Also see Yazıcı, "Şihâbeddin Sühreverdî'nin Felsefesinde Ontoloji Problemi," 109, 113–114; Cihan, "Sühreverdî ve İşrâkîlik", 409; Arslan, "Nurun Işımaları, Sıcaklığın Değişimleri", 7; Turğay, İşrâkî Felsefeye Misâl Âleminden Bakmak, 95–98.

11 For the definition of Ibn Sīnā and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, which synthesized Plato and Aristotle, mostly Platonist, in the form of "simple, intangible and self-subsisting substance," see Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Ahlâk-ı Nâsırî*, Trans. Anar Gafarov, Zaur Şükürov (Istanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2007), 27–32; Alper, "İbn Sînâ ve İbn Sînâ Okulu," 257–258; Arkan, "Psikoloji: Nefis ve Akıl," 574–579.

"substantiality." The reason for this may be that Müneccimbaşı wanted to highlight the common aspects as opposed to the differences between the Peripatetic and Ishrāqī philosophies. Suhrawardī has objected to using the proof of the simplicity of the soul as a starting point to prove the immortality of the human soul unlike Ibn Sīnā who had used it to demonstrate the immortality of the rational soul. According to Ibn Sīnā, matter requires potential non-existence, whereas form requires actual existence. Because the soul does not exist through the combination of matter and form, it does not have materiality in itself, nor does it become the nature of a subject by settling in it. Hence, the soul should be accepted as requiring not non-existence but existence due to the existence of the Active Intellect and the First Cause as its cause. Therefore, according to Ibn Sīnā, the simplicity of the soul necessitates its perpetuity. However, Suhrawardī believed the simplicity of the soul did not require its immortality because if simplicity necessitated perpetuity, the simple accidents should also be perpetual. Yet this is not the case; everyone knows that the accidents disappear.

Ibn Sīnā answered these kinds of objections that were raised later by Suhrawardī as well, by stating that the disappearance of the accidents is not because of their simplicity but because of their dependence on their substrates; they disappear with the disappearance of their substrates.[12]

While defining the human soul, Müneccimbaşı stated the soul to be created. Both the Peripatetic and Ishrāqī philosophies also accept the soul as being temporally originated.[13] The origination of the soul in relation to its existence in the universe of elements refers to its perfection through individuation and identification which happens as a result of its actions i.e. soul's attachment to or hanging on to the corporeal body and actualization of it or its illumination of the dusky essence of body with its light and making it alive, perceptive and movable.

According to Müneccimbaşı, the human soul is far from its perfections prior to its temporally origination (*waqt hudūthihā*). The soul exists with the goal of resembling the immaterial intellects in terms of gaining and actualizing perfections such as good states (*hay'āt*) and qualities (*kayfiyyāt*) that emanate from the supreme principles (*al-mabādi' al-'āliya*) and situate in the soul according to its proximate disposition (*isti'dādan qarīban*) The soul obtains proximate disposition with the help of right views (*al-anẓār al-ṣahīha*) and praised deeds (*al-a'māl al-ḥamīda*) and it is suspended by attaching to the bodies (*ta'allaqāt bi-l-ajsām*)[14].

12 Uluç, *Sühreverdî'nin İbn Sînâ Eleştirisi*, 127–128.

13 *Ibid*.

14 Müneccimbaşı, Şerh, 1b.

The states (*hay'āt*) and qualities (*kayfiyyāt*), which emanate from the supreme principles and settle in the soul (*rāsikha*), corresponds the luminous states (*al- hay'āt al-nurāniyya*) in Ishrāqī philosophy. The luminous states attach to the accidental lights, which contain light in their essences but become visible and illuminating only by being attached to bodily substances, and affect the degree of light-intensity of these accidental lights. In Peripatetic philosophy, on the other hand, the states (*hay'āt*) and qualities (*kayfiyyāt*) are identical to accidents and attributes in the form of substantial qualities. [15]

In terms of its cause too, the soul was considered non-eternal and created. From the viewpoint of the Peripatetic philosophy, within the framework of the emanation (ṣudūr) theory, the source of the soul namely the Active Intellect which is the intellect of the lunar sphere and the tenth intellect is the last of the vertically-ordered intellects and came into existence after the intellects above it. In the context of Ishrāqī philosophy, on the vertical level the Active Intellect came into existence after both the vertically ordered immaterial (*mujarrad*) and manager (*mudabbir*) dominating rational lights and the horizontally ordered immaterial and manager lights, which are the master of the human soul, and as well as after the masters of the talismans/speice forms of simple and compound elements (*arbāb al-ṭilsimāt, arbāb al-anwār*).[16] Although the Peripatetic and Ishrāqī philosophies use the same terms such as Gabriel, the Holy Spirit [*rūḥ al-quds*] and form-giver [*Wāhib al-suwar*][17], for Active Intellect and master of the Talisman respectively, the source of the soul appears to differ for these two philosophical traditions.

Müneccimbaşı defined the relationship between the human soul and the body as a relationship of attachment (*ta'alluq*) in the sense that the soul hangs onto the body. The material actions that express the impact of the human soul on the body are realized through the interaction between the powers of the soul and the animal spirit (*pneuma*), which is a luminous, immaterial, and steamy-hot body (*jism laṭīf bukhārī nūrāni*).[18] Explaining the relationship between the human soul and the body as a relation of attachment (*ta'alluq*) essentially reflects the Ishrāqī philosophical perspective. For the Ishrāqī philosophy, the relationship of attachment between the soul and body has two consequences. The first is that the soul, which is the original

15 Turğay, İşrâkî *Felsefeye Misâl* Âleminden *Bakmak*, 44–46.

16 İsmail Erdoğan, "İşraki Düşüncede Türlerin Efendileri Meselesi," *Dinî Araştırmalar* VIII/23 (Eylül-Aralık, 2015): 129–130, 132–134; Uluç, *Sühreverdî'nin İbn Sînâ Eleştirisi*, 229; Fatma Turğay, İşrâkî *Felsefeye Misâl* Âleminden *Bakmak*, 130–132.

17 Uluç, *Sühreverdî'nin İbn Sînâ Eleştirisi*, 229.

18 According to Suhrawardī, the reasoning soul, which is the light of the commander and the ruler, realizes giving its light to the body and its impact on the body through the animal spirit. Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, 520,524.

light, uses the body as a locus of manifestation, and the second is that the soul is the commanding and ruling light (*nūr isfahbad*) on the body. The consequence related to the body is that the body desires to achieve richness/fullness from poverty/lack. This relationship is possible owing to three factors: the attraction within the temperament of the body, the affection of the soul to its locus of manifestation i.e. the body and the inclination of the soul to govern and act on the body.[19]

The soul does not exist in the body as accidents exist in a locality; it uses the body as an appearance. The soul, which has neither place nor direction, appears in the body by means of its disposition/qualities and faculties/habits (i.e., it becomes manifest and individualized through images other than its essence). The qualities-faculties/habits (i.e., images) of the soul hang in the "mirror of body". This attachment/hanging is a relational state because when these qualities, faculties/habits, examples, or temperaments of the body weaken, the relation also weakens and ceases. Therefore, the soul exists on its own in a way that does not need the body in terms of its essence, which is abstract light.[20]

As the commander and ruler of the camp, castle, and city of the body, the human soul has powers that are like its soldiers and servants and produce habits, which in turn, is the source of actions and deeds. The process of soul's management and impacting of body takes places through the arrival and melding of the four humors (*al-akhlāṭ al-arbaʿa*) that contain the qualities belonging to the the four elements (*al-ʿanāṣir al-arbaʿa*) at the heart. As a result of this, the proximate disposition which resembles the simple supreme luminous celestial beings, emerges and it transmits and spreads the lights of the human soul to the other bodily organs. The animal spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ḥayawānī*) or the psychic spirit (*al-rūḥ al-nafsānī*) function as a medium for the proximate disposition and the soul governs and affects the body through them.[21]

From the viewpoint of the body, the body is deficient and incomplete and in need of light in order to become alive and visible by getting rid of darkness and death, as its essence is dark and dead and devoid of light. The body desires the light of the soul in order to come to life, manifest and become opulent and complete. Therefore, when the temperament of the body is ready to accept vitality and visibility, it invites the soul, which is light, by attracting it. In response to this attraction and readiness in the temperament of the body, the soul is attracted and directed toward this invitation due to its affection and inclination.[22]

19 Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, 374–378, 400.
20 Turğay, İşrâkî *Felsefeye Misâl* Âleminden *Bakmak*, 228.
21 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 18b, 19a; Turğay, İşrâkî *Felsefeye Misâl* Âleminden *Bakmak*, 229.
22 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 25b–26a; Turğay, İşrâkî *Felsefeye Misâl* Âleminden *Bakmak*, 230.

Ishrāqī philosophy has a monist understanding of existence, similar to the idea of *wahdat al-wujūd* (unity of existence) and different from the dualist understandings of existence of the Platonist, Aristotelian, and Peripatetic/Neo-Platonist philosophies and Islamic theological (*kalām)* thought. From the Peripatetic point of view, being qua being (*wujūd*) as a topic of metaphysics is the most general conceivable thing, something so self-evident (*badīhī*)[23] that it doesn't need to be proven and in its absolute sense has no similar external reality of existence. Being and quiddity are separate from each other in both mental and extramental reality; being is an accident added to the quiddity of existence in the sense of possible beings. Expressing the necessity of the Necessary Being/God requires his being to be compulsory. The qualities that express the possibility of contingent beings do not require the necessity of their existence.[24] According to the Ishrāqi perspective, which denies the distinction between being and quiddity as well as between necessary and possible existence, the concept of being consists of a mere mental construct and is one of the most general conceivable meanings.[25] Being and quiddity can only be separated from each other in the mind; they are one inseparable thing in external reality. What is explicit and therefore does not require proof or full definition is light.[26] Here, light actually corresponds to the light of lights (*nūr al-anwār*) and it has external reality.[27] Indeed the only thing that has existence or reality is the light of lights. Nothing is an ontological entity other than the light of lights. Everything else becomes manifest through the luminosity of the light of lights and they are mere images/shadows in which the light of lights is observed. The soul and the body have the same type of existence. The difference between the two is that light is present in the soul but not in the body. In terms of the Ishrāqī philosophy, darkness (*ẓulma*) means the absence of light and has no ontological reality. Therefore, the twilight substance of the body simply consists of a mental construct.[28]

Unlike Plato, who admitted that the existence of the soul occurs before that of the body, the Ishrāqī philosophers accepted that the soul and the body simultaneously

23 Ibn Sīnā, Metafizik, I, 27; Hatice Toksöz, "Sühreverdî'nin Hikmetü'l-İşrâk Eseri ve Şerhlerinde Varlık-Mahiyet Problemi," Şeyhü'l-İşrâk'ın İzinde *İlk Dönem* İşrâkî Şârihler, Eds. M. Nesim Doru, Ö. Bozkurt, & K. Gökdağ, (Ankara: Divan Kitap, 2015), 215–216.

24 Ömer Türker, "Metafizik: Varlık ve Tanrı," İslâm *Felsefesi Tarih ve Problemler*, 632–643.

25 Ömer Mahir Alper, "Sühreverdî, İbn Kemmûne ve Şehrezûrî'de Varlık ve Şeylik Kavramları: Mukayeseli Bir İnceleme," Şeyhü'l-İşrâk'ın İzinde *İlk Dönem* İşrâkî Şârihler, 156–157.

26 Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, 300, 318.

27 Kılıç, "Sühreverdî'nin Varlık Nurlar Hiyerarşisi," 57–58; Cihan, "Sühreverdî ve İşrâkîlik", 408; Uluç, *Sühreverdî'nin İbn Sînâ Eleştirisi,* 187–191.

28 Turğay, İşrâkî *Felsefeye Misâl* Âleminden *Bakmak*, 230–232.

attain actual reality in the realm of the elements, which is more in line with the approach of the Aristotelian and Peripatetic philosophies. They therefore maintained that the soul, which emerges from the lord/master of the talisman or the principle of emanation (*fayḍ*), has no individuality before hanging on or joining the body. Thanks to the temperament and aptitude of the body and the effects of the attraction and inclination of the soul, it gains individuality and specificity through the body.[29]

Müneccimbaşı provided no explanation about what happens to the soul after the death of the body. However, the Peripatetic and Ishrāqī philosophies have very similar approaches to this problem. According to these two philosophies, the soul gains its individual existence as a result of hanging or uniting with the corporeal body, and continues its individual existence by hanging on to the imaginal bodies after the degradation of the body's temperament or the withdrawal of its light and the appearance of dusk. When taken into consideration with respect to Peripatetic philosophy, the Active Intellect is the reason for the existence of the soul – and light with respect to Ishrāqī philosophy-, the soul must continue its existence after the death of the body due to its connection to the master of the talisman (i.e., one of the horizontal abstract lights) and for it to destroy its own light is unthinkable.

Likewise, the relationship between the soul and the body is a relation of attachment (*ta'alluq*). The existence of the soul does not depend on the existence of the body as the soul is not located in the body by settling and spreading like a material accident. In other words, the soul needs a body that functions as an object or mirror, not in terms of its essence but in terms of its powers, faculties/habits, and deeds: Its evident and observing images/shadows that correspond to its qualities/accidents. If the body mirror disappears, the aspects of the soul related to the body disappear while the essence of the soul continues to exist.[30]

Problem Analysis-II: Forces of the Human Soul, Purpose, and Method

Müneccimbaşı attached special significance to the powers of the soul in relation to the issues such as the soul's achievement of perfection, the conditions required for it, its stages and the purpose, and the method for achieving this goal and explained these issues from this perspective.

According to Müneccimbaşı, the remote (*ba'īd*) disposition corresponding to the essence of the soul is insufficient for the soul's perfection, whereas having a proximate

29 Cihan, "Sühreverdî ve İşrâkîlik," 415–416; Turğay, İşrâkî *Felsefeye Misâl* Âleminden *Bakmak*, 232–233.
30 Turğay, İşrâkî *Felsefeye Misâl* Âleminden *Bakmak*, 234–235.

disposition (*isti'dādan qarīban*) is necessary to this end. The proximate disposition, as one of the conditions or stages of achieving perfection, emerges by repeating praised good actions (*al-a'māl al-ḥasana al-ḥamī*da) and true and authentic views (*al-anẓār al-ḥaqīqa al-saḥīḥa*)[31], in other words, from the relationship between the powers of the soul and the temperament of the body. After the acquisition of a proximate disposition, the subsequent condition or stage of perfection is the emanation of the positive qualities (*kayfiyyāt*) and states (*hay'āt*) from the supreme principles (*min al-mabādi' al-'*āliya) or the emanative principle (*min al-mabda' al-fayyāḍa*).

The next condition/stage is that these positive qualities and states settle in the soul (*rāsikha*) and take the form of a character (*khulq*). The last stage is the easy (*bi-suhulatin*), moderate (*wasaṭ*), and balanced (*i'tidāl*) emergence of voluntary acts and deeds from these gained abilities (*malaka*) and habits without thinking (*bi-lā rawiyya*); in other words, the purification and abstraction from bodily, material qualities through the acquisition of virtues (*faḍāil*).[32]

In this context, the perfection of the soul signifies the emanation of positive qualities of soul (*kayfiyyāt*) and structures (*hay'āt*) from the supreme principles (*min al- mabâdi' al-'*āliya), or the emanative principle (*min al-mabda' al-fayyāḍa*) after acquiring a proximate disposition, these qualities and structures settle in the soul (*rāsikha*) and take the form of character: the easy (*bi-suhulatin*), moderate (*wasaṭ*), and balanced (*i'tidāl*) emergence of voluntary acts and deeds without (*bilā rawiyya*) about these faculties and disposition; and the acquisition of virtues (*faḍāil*). This means that the powers of the soul become actual through the temperament and corporeal powers of the body.

Müneccimbaşı, considering the ideas in religious and sufi thought, as well as, Ishrāqī and Peripatetic philosophies similar in relation to the perfection of human beings, stated that the purpose of self-perfection is to achieve ultimate and real happiness by resembling immaterial (*mufāriq*) intellects through theoretical and practical virtues, which is done by acquiring abstract (*mujarrad*) lights and the light of the lights (*wuṣūl*) and by being directly and immediately incorporated into them (*ittiṣāl*) through taking, understanding, and knowing (*ma'rifa*) the light that overflows from it, and to reach to eternal happiness, pleasure, and joy (*bahja*), including both worldly and afterlife happiness by observing and examining the Messenger and knowing God and the angels through the Book.[33] From the goals Müneccimbaşı set

31 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 1b.
32 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 1b–2b, 4b.
33 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 2a–2b, 4a, 5b–6a.

forth regarding the perfection of the soul, achieving ultimate and real happiness by gaining virtues reflects the purpose of the Peripatetic philosophy; knowing their essence by converging the abstract light with the light of the lights reflects the purpose of Ishrāqī philosophy and Sufi thought. On the other hand, attaining worldly and religious happiness by knowing God and the angels and obeying the Prophet reflects the purpose of religious thought.

However, among these purposes, Müneccimbaşı can be said to have been mainly interested in the purpose set forth in the Ishrāqī philosophy and their method for achieving it. In terms of the Ishrāqī philosophy, the aim of perfecting the human soul is to achieve eternal happiness, pleasure, and joy (*bahja*) by converging the abstract (*mujarrad*) lights with the light of the lights (*wuṣūl*) and being directly and immediately incorporated with them (*ittiṣāl*) by knowing (*ma'rifa*) the essences of light and observing what overflows from it. Müneccimbaşı was interested in what the method should be that would lead to the purpose of knowledge or knowledge by presence (*al-'ilm al-ḥuḍûrî*) [34] directly without intermediaries, with a special Illuminationist relation/intuition between the knower and the known, by means of being and adopting the lights and the Light of the Lights. Accordingly, he believed practical perfection and moral training should exist within the framework of wisdom as a synthesis of the Aristotelian and Peripatetic understanding of middle (*wasaṭ*) and balance (*i'tidāl*). In other words, it would be a synthesis of virtue (*faḍīla*) theory[35] along with the abstraction (*tajarrud*) from physical, bodily, and material attributes as well as the understanding of dirt and purification (*ṣafwa*) in Sufi thought.[36]

Müneccimbaşı's discussion of method centered on the classification of wisdom based on the corporeal tools of the human soul that are instrumental for theoretical and practical acts for the achievement of perfection. According to him, in harmony with the two required ways (reason and action) for dispositional perfection, the corporeal instruments of the human soul are two: theoretical (*nazarī*) and practical (*'amalī*). The

34 Halide Yenen, "Sühreverdî Üzerine Araştırmalar 1: Huzurî Bilgi," *Kutadgubilig* 15 (2009): 114–115. Also, on the theory of knowledge of Ishrâqi wisdom specific to Suhrawardī, see Halide Yenen, "Sühreverdî Felsefesinde Epistemoloji (PhD Dissertation, MÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007).

35 For the theory of virtue in Peripatetic moral philosophy, see Tûsî, *Akhlāk-i Nāṣirī*; Mustakim Arıcı, "Erdemlerin Tasavvuru ve Tanımı: Taşköprizade'nin Erdem Şemaları", *Dîvân Disiplinlerarası* Çalışmalar *Dergisi* 38 (2015/1), 1–38. For Aristotelian virtue theory see Aristoteles, *Nikomakhos'a Etik*, trans. Saffet Babür, (Ankara: BilgeSu Yayıncılık, 2007); Engin Koca, "Aristotelesçi Sistemde Pratik Sanatlar Bağlamında Teori ve Pratik İlişkisi", *Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları Dergisi* 37 (2018): 213–231.

36 Within the framework of their understanding of practical wisdom Suhrawardī and first period commentators also establish a direct relationship between knowledge, virtue theory and purification-abstraction or *riyāḍa* (abstinence) in reaching the truth, as in Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede. Arıcı, "Sühreverdî ve İlk Dönem Şârihlerinde Ahlâk Problemi", Şeyhü'l-İşrâk'ın İzinde *İlk Dönem* İşrâkî Şârihler, 278–279.

human soul uses one the former in its theoretical activities. The theoretical tool is called as the perceptive faculty (*al-quwwa al-mudrika*), intellective faculty (*al-quwwa al-ʻāqila*), knowing faculty (*al-quwwa al-ʻālima*), and theoretical faculty (*al-quwwa al-naẓariyya*), which is actually the cogitative faculty (*al-quwwa al-mufakkira*), and its location (*maḥall*) is the middle part of the brain (*al-tajwīf al-awsaṭ min al-dimāgh*).[37]

The cogitative faculty which the soul uses for its theoretical actions has three states. It is either used in the discovery of universal quddities (*fī iktishāf al-māhiyyat al-kulliyya*) on the individuals of which we do not have the power to influence in terms of their extramental existences *(fī ījād al-juz'iyyat tilka al-māhiyyat fī al-khārij*). In this respect, the cogitative faculty is called the theoretical intellect (*al-ʻaql al-naẓarī*) or the absolute intellect (*ʻāqila ʻala-l-iṭlaq*). The sciences that employ this intellect are called theoretical sciences.

The cogitative faculty is also used for discovering the universal quiddities whose particulars we can influence in relation to their existence in the external world. In this respect, the cogitative faculty is referred to as the practical intellect (*al-ʻaql al-amalī*). Thirdly, when used together with the faculty of estimation (*wahm*), the cogitative faculty is called as compositive imagination (*mutakhayyila)*, intellect and estimation.[38]

Among the things that need to be emphasized in this primarily Peripatetic classification is the presupposition that the quiddity of incorporeal, intelligible and abstract beings, which are the subject to physics, mathematics and metaphysics, can be known with the help of logical laws which correspond to the movement of cogitative faculty as a result of its theoretical action. Another important point is the identification of the practical, i.e. knowledge of the theoretical aspects of the action and deeds. In other words, the knowledge of good and bad is gained by practical reasoning, which is another transformation of the theoretical activity of the cogitative faculty.

According to Müneccimbaşı, the human soul uses its second bodily instrument in its practical activities. In this case, this instrument is called the motive (*muḥarrika*) power, the acting (ʻāmila) power, and the practical power (*ʻamaliyya*). The practical power is divided into two: the power that incites the action (*bāʻitha*) and the power that does the action (*fāʻila)*. The power that incites action is also called appetitive (*nuzūʻiyya*) faculty and is divided into two: the power of desire (*shahawiyya*) and the power of anger (*ghaḍabiyya*). The power of desire directs the soul to attract things

37 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 2a.
38 Ibid.

that are doctrinally useful and appropriate, while the power of anger directs the soul to keep things that are doctrinally harmful and reprehensible away from itself. The power of desire is located (*maḥall*) in the liver (*kabd*), and the power of anger is located in the heart (*qalb*). The power of action is the power that softens and opens the nerves (*ʿaṣab*) of the moving limbs. The soul moves the muscles of the moving limbs (*ʿaḍalatihā*) through the power of action.[39]

Likewise, what needs to be emphasized in this particularly Avicennan peripatetic classification is the fact that the human soul uses practical reason which is a certain movement of the cogitative faculty in gaining knowledge of actions and deeds and for the identification of their goodness, badness, usefulness and harmfulness. However, in the execution of the actions and deeds the soul uses the motive/acting power which is different from the practical reason.

When these two classifications are considered together, the most remarkable aspect seems to be that in its theoretical activities in the form of theoretical and practical reasons the cogitative faculty is preserved from the influence of the faculty of estimation (*wahm*) with the help of laws of logic in order to keep its moderation. This is because the faculty of estimation can make falsehood and truth, as well as, good and bad seem similar. It presents falsehood as truth and likewise leads to bad as if it is good. Estimation (*wahm*) has many tricks for the desire of false as truth and portraying evil as good. Therefore, the term inner devil (*al-shayṭān al-anfusī*) is used for the power of estimation. The science of logic is the method for protecting the cogitative faculty (*mutafakkira/mudrika)* from mistakes and errors due to the effects of estimation.[40]

Two basic definitions and conceptualizations of *ḥikma* existed according to Müneccimbaşı. For the philosophers who considered the action (ʿamal) to be part of philosophy, it means knowing the essences of things as they really are and doing good deeds to the best of human capability for the perfection of the rational soul. However, those, who view the action to be outside the philosophy, define it as the science that investigates (*yubḥath fīh*) the states of things (*ʿan aḥwāl al-aʿyān*) that exist in the outside world as they really are to the best of human capability for perfecting the soul. According to Müneccimbaşı, even though the common opinion relies on the second understanding and excludes the actions from philosophy, the correct view, however, is the one that includes actions within philosophy.[41]

39 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 2a.
40 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 2b, 3a–3b.
41 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 3b.

According to the position that Müneccimbaşı also affirmed, philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical philosophy because the existents (*mawjūdāt*) whose states are being researched, They are either entities whose existence humans do not have the power to intervene (i.e., humans can only obtain information about them; the science that researches their states is theoretical wisdom [*al-ḥikma al-naẓariyya*]), or the things whose existence humans have the power to intervene in (the existents that humans both know and make). The science that investigates their states is known as practical philosophy (*al-ḥikma al-ʿamaliyya*).[42]

Two of Müneccimbaşı's objectives can be mentioned regarding the classification of wisdom. The first is to place deeds or action within wisdom by excluding the approach that sees the practical as outside of philosophy. Building on this, his second objective is the reformulation of the peripatetic classification of theoretical and practical wisdom within the context of the Ishrāqī philosophy and Sufism.

As an Ishrāqī philosopher or a Sufi thinker, Müneccimbaşı made two main criticisms of the classification of wisdom set forth in Peripatetic philosophy. According to Müneccimbaşı, the Peripatetic philosophy's approach regarding metaphysics firstly is erroneous in terms of theoretical philosophy. Secondly, he was of the opinion that the Peripatetic approach to practical wisdom was deficient.

In Müneccimbaşı's understanding, contrary to what is claimed in the Peripatetic philosophy, the science of logic, in the meaning of the demonstrative syllogistic reasoning (*burhān*) based on theoretical reason or concepts, definitions, and propositions, is not effective in knowing the real essences of the subject matters of metaphysics i.e. incorporeal, abstract/discrete luminous beings as they really are. This is because the mind is not an essential element of the reality of the human soul. Similar to the way the mind is in the position of simile, shadow, attribute or accident of the soul as one of its powers, the knowledge obtained through reasoning and mind is mediated. It is not the knowledge of the truth itself, but rather it is the knowledge of the simile, shadow, attribute, or accident of the reality.[43]

Müneccimbaşı opposed the opinions expressed in Peripatetic philosophy that knowing the practical wisdom/knowledge is only based on the practical reasoning power corresponding to one of the theoretical activities of the cogitative faculty and that deeds and actions are not realized through the motive power (*muḥarrika/ʿ*āmila*)*. According to him, the framework of practical philosophy/knowledge should be

42 Ibid.

43 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 4a, 5a–5b.

expanded in terms of its scope, content, and method. In addition to the knowledge and realization of deeds and actions, establishing a direct relation (*wuṣul, ittiṣāl*) with the abstract/discrete lights that are the subject of metaphysics should be included into practical philosophy. Also, the recognition and knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of their essences should also be included within the boundaries of practical philosophy because, by virtue of practical/moral perfection, the human soul becomes prepared and gains disposition for establishing direct relations with the realm of abstract lights. Furthermore, the content of the practical philosophy that deals with the definition and explanation of virtues and vices should also include the content from religious-fiqh, Ishrāqī and Sufi perspectives in addition to the Peripatetic philosophy.

Likewise, the method for achieving the purpose of practical perfection should be based on a method that is a synthesis of the virtue theory belonging to the Aristotelian-Peripatetic philosophy as well as Sufi instruction (*tarbiya*) the purification (*ṣafwa*), abstraction (*tajarrud*), and spiritual witnessing (*mushāhada)*. As the perfection of the soul can be achieved only through a practical philosophy with the above-mentioned scope, content and method, the attainment of the ultimate goal of perfection is possible only through such practical philosophy.

According to Müneccimbaşı, human beings get to recognize, know (*ma'*ārif), and comprehend (*idrākāt*) their essences as they really are by means of reaching (*wuṣūl*) the lights and the Light of the Lights and by establishing an unmediated relationship with them (*ittiṣāl*). Removing ties with and staying away from the sensory and illusory world (*an-'ālam al-hiss wa-l-zūr*) makes this possible: removing the material bodily qualities (*an-'alāiq al-jismāniyya*), dark material barriers (*wa al-'awāiq al-hayūlāniyya al-ẓulmāniyya*), and bodily pleasures; and becoming completely pure/clean (*sāfiyya*) and abstract as a result of turning to spiritual mental pleasures. Depending on the amount of purification (*ṣafwa*) and isolation, the human soul reaches the realm of light, seeing the invisible things that the eye does not see, hearing what the ear does not hear and thinking about that which does not come to the human mind (*la-khaṭara 'alā qalb al-bashar)* seeing the invisible marvelous things belonging to the angelic realm (*min al-'ajāib al-malakūtiyya*); the astonishing things belonging to the realm of *jabarūt* (*wa-l-gharāib al-jabarutiyya)* become evident to the soul (*yankashif 'alayhā*).[44]

Müneccimbaşı provided the following information about the astonishing things in the spiritual/non-material (*malakūt*) and divine (*jabarūt*) realms that become evident to the soul as a result of purification and abstraction:

44 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 4a.

The first thing that the soul adopts and becomes apparent (yankashif) to the soul is the absolute realm of imagination, the Sufis' image and the realm of suspended images (al-ʻālam al-muthul al- muʻallaqa) that the scholars of Sharia call the indelible plate (bi-l-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ). The suspended images are a realm in an intermediate position between the realm of bodies and the realm of the abstract (ʻālam al-mujarradāt). Suspended images are the images (al-aṣwār al-murtasima) portrayed in souls with a celestial structure (al-muṭabiʻāt al-falakiyya) in the heavens, which is located in the human power of imagination (al-quwwa al-falakiyya). Next, the soul moves from the realm of images (ʻālam al-muthul), the angelic world of the Sufis (ʻālam al-malakūt), and the realm of spirits (ʻālam al-arwāḥ) and the protected plate (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ) of the people of Sharīʻa to the realm of the supreme and abstract souls (ʻālam al-nufūs al-mujarrada al-ʻāliya). Here, its reality (ḥaqīqatuhā) and the reality of other supreme souls (ḥaqāiq sāir al-nufūs al-ʻāliya) become evident to the self. Then the soul of the realm of supreme and abstract souls moves forward to the so-called Platonic ideas/forms (bi al-muthul al-Aflāṭūniyya), the non-material/spiritual realm of the Sufis (ʻālam al-jabarūt), the realm of the most-high (al-ʻālam al-aʻlā) of the shariah scholars, and the realm of luminous images (ʻālam al-muthul al-nūrāniyya). Afterwards, the soul moves to the presence of the Light of Light (ḥaḍrat nūr al-nūr) and receives the light overflowing (fayḍ) from it without intermediaries; this is the ultimate desire and highest purpose.[45]

The explanation Müneccimbaşı made above is Platonist[46] and sufi in the sense that physical, material, sensory or bodily qualities, habits/faculties, and the deeds arising from them are bad in themselves. As such, the human soul is obliged to be saved because these things are obstacles to its perfection and are satisfied only with the amounts necessary for its survival. This comes closer to the Epicurean hedonistic understanding[47] and mystical approach rather than Aristippus's hedonism in the sense that it prefers turning toward spiritual pleasures by avoiding sensory-bodily pleasures.

However, Müneccimbaşı also stated that abstraction (*tajrīd*) consists of the protection of the habits from heading toward the extremes (*ʻan al-mayl ilā al-aṭrāf*), correcting them (*taʻdīl*) and making them moderate (*wasaṭ*). Temperament being moderate and middle means that the extremes cannot prevail; however, it also

45 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 4b

46 Erwin Rohde, *Psykhe Yunanlarda Ruh Kültü ve* Ölümsüzlük İnancı, Trans. Ö. Orhan (Istanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık, 2020), 412–413; Fred D. Miller, "The Platonic Soul", *A Companion to Plato*, Ed. H. H. Benson (Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 280.

47 For the Epicurean and Aristippusian hedonist theories, see Phillip Mitsis, *Epicurus' Ethical Theory*: *The Pleasures Invulnerability* (Cornell University Press, 1988); Ole Martin Moen, "Hedonism Before Bentham," *Journal of Bentham Studies*, 17 (2015): 1–10; Ahmet Arslan, İlkçağ *Felsefe Tarihi Helenistik Dönem Felsefesi: Epikurosçular Stoacılar Septikler*, IV, (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), 121–143.

means that the extremes are unable to have the place of the moderate and middle invade one another.[48]

This statement from Müneccimbaşı basically expresses that being completely abstracted and purified from physical, material, sensory, or bodily qualities, habits, and actions or abandoning them completely is not essential and they should only be curbed. As a result, and also more convenient to the Aristotelian and Peripatetic philosophy, it expresses the material excesses of the body, the senses, and the qualities, temperaments, and acts originating from them to not be bad on their own in terms of quality but only in terms of quantity as being in excess or deficient; he viewed such things as an auxiliary tool rather than an obstacle to the perfection of the human soul.

Müneccimbaşı agreed on three issues with the Peripatetic philosophers, whom he described as the people of reason and research (*naẓar wa'l-baḥth)*. Firstly, truth and falsehood, and good and evil can be easily distinguished in the rational (*nātiq*) soul without reasoning. Secondly, the necessity that other powers of the soul must obey the rational soul for the formation of the acquired disposition (*malaka*) of wisdom, which allows a person to act in the right way, to abstain from falsehood, and to abandon bad deeds. Thirdly, he agrees with the Peripatetic philosophers[49] on the necessity of the moderation of the power of reason in order to escape from the influence of the power of estimation. This means the mastery of the three temperaments, (i.e., temperaments of the animal spirit, the brain, and the middle part of the brain).

However, with regard to the formation of the acquired disposition of wisdom, Müneccimbaşı abandoned the view of the people of reason and research (*naẓar wa'l-baḥth) and* adopted the view of the people of pleasure (*dhawq*) and purification. This is because Peripatetic philosophy views that in order for the *malaka* of wisdom to be formed, along with the moderation of the cogitative or rational faculty, the law of logic which protects the human soul from error and from the influences of estimation (*wahm*) is a requirement.

According to Müneccimbaşı, on the other hand, those who possess the sacred soul (*qudsī*) do not need the laws of logic for the *malaka* of wisdom to form in them. In the case of such people, along with the moderation of cogitative faculty, it is sufficient that their human soul transforms into a sacred soul through purification and abstraction.[50]

48 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 4b.
49 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 20a.
50 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 21a, 22b.

The way to do this is apparently by obtaining and possessing virtues. Müneccimbaşı accepted the virtue of wisdom that emerges as a result of the moderation of the human soul's power of reason as the essence and authority of all virtues and presented the wisdom in religious content to be a source for philosophical context. Accordingly, wisdom is as Allah says, "Whoever is given wisdom is blessed abundantly." The Prophet also pointed at wisdom by saying, "Oh Allah! Show us the truth as truth and guide us in following it, show us the false as false and guide us in avoiding it. Oh Allah! Show us things as they are."[51]

In this context, Müneccimbaşı emphasized cunning (*jarbaza*) and stupidity (*ghabāwa*) or foolishness (*balāha*), presenting them through a combination of Peripatetic, religious-*fiqh*, Ishrāqī, and Sufi perspectives in terms of definition and content. He also made harsh criticisms in addition to giving concrete examples from his own period especially in regard to the disgrace of cunning.

Müneccimbaşı described cunning as a habit that emerges from the state when the cogitative faculty is at the extreme (*ifrāṭ*) and goes in a direction that necessitates the extreme and intensity of the effects (āthār) as follows:

Cunning, without thinking, is to easily claim that the wrong is right and the bad is good as well as to insist on this claim even when the reasoning soul knows this knowledge to be false, which is not congruent with fact; the reasoning soul does bad deeds that do not comply with the Sharia. Likewise, cunning is the use of reasoning power in unnecessary places, such as in things that are ambiguous (mutāshābihāt) or contrary to Shariʿa. Most of those who are inflicted with the disgrace of cunning are vile and inflicted with compound ignorance (al-jahl al-murakkab). They abandon the apparent meanings of verses, hadiths, and words of wisdom (kalimāt al-kibār) and translate them with false interpretations far from the truth due to their submission to the devil and his illusions. According to these people, these meanings they interpret are not the illusions and deception of the devil but the shining light (nūr shāriq) that is inherent to their sacred souls (ʿalā nufūsihim al-qudsiyya) from the giver in absolute terms (min jānib al-fayyāḍ al-muṭlaq), as is the case with the heretic innovators. The Sasanians who are deceitful and those who are magicians (asḥāb al-ḥiyal al-shaʿwaza) are likewise people of cunning. These are people who prepare tricks with their devilish and illusional ideas and take the worldly things (min zakhārif al-dunyā) from people's hands with their skills.[52]

51 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 20a, 20b.
52 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 21b, 22b

Based on the preceding explanations, Müneccimbaşı was probably implying that those with the disgrace of cunning were the Shiite-Turkish Safavid state,[53] the inheritor of the famous Sassanids who, together with the Habsburgs, constituted the most important external threat to the Ottoman state and ideology within the framework of the Ottoman-Iranian relations of the period. Esoteric-sufi communities[54] within the Ottoman territories who participated in the rebellion movements that directly targeted the Ottoman state, sultan, and rulers could also be included in this category by the author. These societies were close to the Shiite sect and its constitution, to Sufi circles, and to false sheikhs who pursued worldly gains and tried to use people for worldly purposes. Müneccimbaşı could have also had Vanī Mehmed Efendi[55] in his mind who was his rival in terms of the establishing influence on the Ottoman sultan and the rulers of the state and wanted to continue the Kadızādeli/Salafi tradition and opposed Sufis. Taşköprīzāde stated that cunning (*jarbaza*) is either theoretical in form of the dialectic, opposition, and sophistry being used in place of certain knowledge, or practical in the form of the prophecies, magics, and elixirs.[56]

Müneccimbaşı explained stupidity as a habit (*malaka*) that emerges when the cogitative faculty turns toward the lesser (*tafrīṭ*) form. He explained it as when the power of reason goes from moderation to a direction that necessitates the absence and diminution of the effects belonging to the power of reason as follows:

Stupidity is a habit easily confined to sensory comprehension and is unable to cross the grasp of the sensible without contemplation. Stupidity is to stop the power of thought on the basis of choice (bi-l-ikhtiyār) from engaging with useful knowledge (ʿulūm). Namely, it is the faculty that reveals the deactivation (taʿṭīl) of the usage of reason in useful and unprofitable deeds. The faculty of stupidity occurs in the soul as a result of the power of illusions (wāhima) continuous usage of this faculty only in the sensory sphere. Thus, the owner of this vice/disgrace becomes a complete imitator of manners and behaviors, as is the case with human-like animals such as monkeys and bears. There is no difference between a man with this vile trait and these animals other than utterances and speech. On the other hand, such a person likewise has commonalities in this respect with some

53 Öz, *Kanun-ı Kadimin Peşinde*, 129–130, 143–144.

54 For the Sufi community who did not see the Ottoman state as legitimate or who made the power of the Ottoman sultan a subject of discussion, was in a verbal or armed struggle, and executed people in between the XVI-XVII centuries. See Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler 15-17. Yüzyıllar* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013), 296–317, 357–366; Necdet Yılmaz, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2007), 429–459.

55 Semiramis Çavuşoğlu, "Kadızâdeliler", *DİA*, XXIV, 102; Erdoğan Pazarbaşı, "Mehmed Efendi, Vanî", *DİA*, XXVIII, 458–459; Aykıt, "Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede," 9.

56 Taşköprīzāde, *Sharḥ*, 42.

birds that imitate speaking through education. If we examine the states of such a fool, we see that most of the words they speak, as with these birds, do not understand their true meaning. Despite all flaws, a fool is closer to salvation than the cunning person and is more receptive to treatment. Because ignorance of a fool is simple, their ignorance ends more easily, whereas the ignorance of the cunning is compound, so their ignorance is hard to end.[57]

When considering Müneccimbaşı's explanation, the disgrace of stupidity denotes the limitation of knowledge to sensory sources as the only way of knowing of the rational soul and also denotes imitation as the only way of performing deeds.

Müneccimbaşı's approach to the power of desire (*al-quwwa al-shahawiyya*), the third basic power of the soul with its moderation being chastity (*'iffah*), and two extremes transgression (*fujūr*) and and indifference-unwillingness (*jumūd, humūd*), constitutes a synthesis of Peripatetic views with sufi understanding in a religious-legal (*fiqh*) framework.

The power of desire is also called animal power (*al-quwwa al-bahīmiyya*) and the power that desires evil (*al-quwwa al-ammāra*). Unlike the power of anger, the power of desire in the liver provokes the soul to attract only bodily and animalistic desires with things that are suitable for nature and natural powers. The meaning of desire (*shahwa*) is the inclination of the soul toward what is suitable for nature and natural powers through its lust-motive power.[58]

The explanation Müneccimbaşı gave for chastity, which is the moderation and virtue of the power of desire, is as follows:

Chastity is a habit that firstly consists of the temperament of the power of desire, and secondly of the moderation of actions (af'āl) in terms of quantity and quality that reveal the deeds (a'māl) of the power of desire as necessary, easily, and without thinking. As a matter of fact, chastity is the habit that enables the soul to be convinced of the things that are necessary for survival, the existence of the body and the continuation of the species, which are Islamically lawful. Chastity is not to demand tasty food, but rather to be limited to the quantity at hand for survival. It is to not demand so many drinks to torment yourself, but to be content with the amount at hand that satisfies your thirst. It is to not demand clothes for the purpose of arrogance, but to be content with the ones to protect the body from the harm of heat and cold. It is to not demand high-rise houses, but to be content with the ones that make it possible to be protected from rain, snow, and everything that Sharia and reason require to be concealed. It is not to demand the most beautiful and

57 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 22a–22b.
58 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 24a.

most pleasant women, but to be content with the one necessary for reproduction. The determination and willingness of chastity has a great share in the acquisition of human perfections (kamālāt) and in cleansing the soul from the deeds that cause the soul to engage in animalistic, predatory, and devilish things (fī takhlīs).[59]

According to Müneccimbaşı, the excessive extreme for power of desire is the disgrace of transgression. Transgression arises from the excess of the power of desire and the temperament of the power of desire exceeding moderation and going in extreme directions in the form of transgressions. It is a habit that enables the soul to engage in lustful things and attain desires that correspond to natural lust. Transgression does not differentiate between *halal* and *haram*; it forgets its essential competence and deals with temporal and animal pleasures.

The other extreme which comes from the inadequacy or negligence of the power of desire is the disgrace of insensibility and unwillingness. Insensibility or unwillingness is a faculty that arises from the inadequacy of the power of desire and the temperament of the power of desire passing from moderation to an extremely narrow direction in the form of insensibility and unwillingness that reveals the optional, rather than necessary, cancelling the appropriate and inappropriate effects of the power of desire.[60]

By giving examples of stories from Rūmī's *Mathnawī* and other sufi texts[61] in order to describe people who like sensual things (*maḥsūsāt*) but alienated from rational things (*maʿqūlāt*), as well as with the aim of explaining the relationships among the rational human soul, the desire and the anger, Müneccimbaşı included the method of tasawwuf which includes advice giving, lesson-drawing, and representations based on analogy (*tamthīl*) and simile (*tashbīh*) into the genre of practical philosophy and ethics. While explaining the vice of transgression, Taşköprīzāde, however, made his argument based on the idea that lust and greed cannot be completely satisfied, and therefore this situation will make a person slave to the power of lust and deprive them of freedom.[62]

What Müneccimbaşı states that within the theory of virtue and vice purification and abstraction is particularly related to the virtue of chastity, which is the moderate power of desire and to the vice of transgression (*ifrāṭ*), its excess level, for the power of desire is the source of the need to have corporeal/material, natural, bodily, sensory,

59 *Ibid*.
60 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 24a–24b.
61 Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, 24b–25b.
62 Taşköprīzāde, *Sharḥ*, 46.

and animalistic things. Abstraction, purification, and moderation mean being content with *halal* quantities of natural material/physical things such as eating, drinking, and shelter that are necessary in terms of enabling survival and maintaining the existence of the body and natural things like reproduction that keep people alive yet do not cause death when not possessed. Hence, the power of desire and the virtues and disgrace stemming from it constitute the center and basis of the relationship between the theory of moderation and virtue; this corresponds to the means the human soul has to attain intangible, luminous, abstract, and spiritual pleasures as well as the method of purification and abstraction.

In terms of the structure, style, method, content, and problems, Müneccımbaşı's chapter reflects one of the two orientations that determine the nature of the renewalist thought (*tajdīd*) that had been initiated by the sultan, administrative military, bureaucracy, and ulama since the 17th century in the Ottoman Empire. Two factors, namely external and internal, can be mentioned in the quest for renewal that started to take shape in the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century. The external factor is the curiosity among the Ottoman scholars and statesmen around the question of what was happening in Western Europe. This question and curiosity was posed by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, a scholar and grand vizier ((1661-1676), and by his circle.[63] As for the internal factor, it was the idea of reforming the world order (*nizām-ı alem*) and circle of justice and modifying the old system in the context of amendment, adjustment, and revival. This was transformed, changed, and disrupted in pursuit of the Ottoman Empire's golden age/age of happiness in terms of the breadth of the country and the richness of the treasure and power that was accepted during the reigns of Suleyman, Selim I, and Mehmed II.[64]

Two orientations existed for the idea of renewal. The first orientation was the understanding based on the lifestyle that emerged from the synthesis of hadith science and Sufism, especially in the Hijaz region. The second orientation, on the other hand, was the understanding with a more theoretical approach as found in Istanbul. This understanding can be evaluated in two parts: renewal through updating and adjusting the ancient, based on the science of logic-demonstrative reasoning of the method of *kashf-ḥads* and renewal through the new ways of knowing in Western Europe and new developments in mathematics.[65]

63 İhsan Fazlıoğlu, "Gelecek Geçmişi, Şimdi Kılma Bilinci: Çağdaş Dönemde İslam-Osmanlı Mirası ile İlişkilerin Kökleri Üzerine", *Müslüman Dünyada* Çağdaş *Düşünce*, I, ed. Lütfi Sunar, (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2020), 66, 68.

64 Öz, *Kanun-ı Kadimin Peşinde*, 105–118, 142, 172–186.

65 Fazlıoğlu, "Gelecek Geçmişi, Şimdi Kılma Bilinci," 64, 69–71.

Müneccimbaşı's approach in his chapter on ethics can be placed under the first part of the theoretical approach using the second orientation in terms of moral thought (i.e.,under the conception of renewal using the ancient method). However, his project in this commentary should not be understood as an effort to separate the major methods of Islamic thought i.e. Peripatetic philosophy, spiritual medicine (*al-ṭibb al-rūḥānī*), religion-*fiqh*, and a part of Sufism (i.e., Islamic thought) which had been attempted to be reconciled and synthesized within the genre of practical philosophy by abandoning the mission of integration. On the contrary, it was rather an attempt to expand the scope of this reconciliation/synthesis initiative within practical philosophy and ethics with the addition of Ishrāqī philosophy to the frames of Peripatetic philosophy, spiritual medicine and religion-*fiqh* and additional emphasis on tasawwuf.

Conclusion

In his commentary on al-Akhlāq al-'Aḍuḍiyya, Müneccimbaşı adopted an approach that combines the similar aspects of Peripatetic and Illuminationist understandings of soul. These included views about soul's being an incorporeal substance independent of the body with a separate existence, its simultaneous origination with body (that it does not pre-exist the body), its material effects on body and need for embodiment due to its natural inclinations and, the perfection and attractiveness in the temperament of the body from a Peripatetic point of view, and similarly due to its being a dominant light requiring a locus of manifestation to govern and act, according to Illuminationism.

By placing metaphysics into the domain of practical philosophy, Müneccimbaşı argued that by virtue of practical perfection the truth of the metaphysical beings can be obtained directly through intuition without any intermediaries.

In the context of Ishrāqī wisdom, the attainment of happiness through arriving at (*wuṣūl*) and conjoining with (*ittiṣāl*) the Light of Lights and the abstract lights in the form of knowing and spiritual witnessing (*ma'rifa-mushāhada*) their reality remains problematic in terms of according the Aristotelian-Peripatetic and Platonist/mystical frameworks. The former relies on the theory of virtue which involves balancing and moderation of corporal and material pleasures that originates from the soul's faculty of desires with the help of wisdom arising from the soul's faculty of reason. In the Platonist/mystical framework the method is spiritual exercise (*riyādhah*) and abstinence (*mujāhada*) which require total purification and separation from bodily and material pleasures and other things.

When taking ethics and practical philosophy into consideration, Müneccimbaşı's commentary can be placed under one of the two currents of Ottoman renewalism (*tajdīd*). Within the current of traditional renewalism, Müneccimbaşı's project aimed at the stylistic, methodological and content-related renewal and revival of the traditional genre of ethics and practical philosophy through the use of the method of verification (*taḥqīq)* for certain problems, the synthesis of Peripatetic and sufi methods within Ishrāqī wisdom and finally the further integration of philosophical, sufi, and religious-juristic methods.

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