An Examination of Authenticity and Content: Demonstrating The Epistle on Nafs al-amr Attributed to Jurjānī as Having Been Taken from al-Samarqandī's *al-Maʿārif*[*]

Muhammet Maşuk Aktaş[**]

Abstract: This article examines the authenticity of the alleged epistle on *nafs al-amr* which has been attributed to Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī since at least 971 A.H. The research have confirmed that the alleged epistle does not belong to Jurjānī, but rather it is an autonomous copy of a passage of Shams al-dīn al-Samarqandī's *al-Maʿārif fī sharḥ al-Ṣaḥāif* on *nafs al-amr* and its differentiation from the external world and the mind. Secondly, the study demonstrates the similarities and the distinctness between the philosophies of al-Samarqandī and Jurjānī, with references to Jurjānī's thoughts on *nafs al-amr* in his other books. Hence, it is argued that the alleged epistle is weak to represent Jurjānī's thoughts on *nafs al-amr*. Thirdly, upon examining a great number of manuscripts, the article reveals that Jurjānī himself or his students had probably copied the passage and written some notes on it. However, the manuscript was mistakenly attributed to Jurjānī later on. Thus, certain considerations have been made regarding the probabilities of this historical error. Lastly, the article evaluates al-Samarqandī's thought on *nafs al-amr* based on the passage and shows the connection of al-Samarqandī's thoughts on *nafs al-amr* with the truth theory of propositions. Based on some discussions which are written in most of the *al-Maʿārif*'s manuscripts, but absent from the published edition; it is discovered that al-Samarqandī has a new perspective on the debate on "elements of propositions: *dhāt-ʿunwān-waṣf*" and "*ḥaqīqiyya* propositions" between al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī. As a result, the article points out the overwhelming need to publish and analyze the epistles on *nafs al amr* in a theoretical framework in order to uncover what Muslim philosophers have to say about the truth-maker theories.

Keywords: *Nafs al-amr*, Samarqandī, Jurjānī, truth theory, propositions.

** P.h. D. Student, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of Islamic and Turkish Philosophy.
Correspondence: muhammetmasukaktas@gmail.com

Introduction

In Islamic Philosophy, the truth-maker of propositions are extensively discussed since Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) in relation to the concept of *nafs al-amr*. Fittingly to this conception, Naṣīr al-dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) wrote his understanding about truth of propositions in a brief but autonomous epistle. It is possible to say that after al-Ṭūsī's epistle the discussions about the truth theory went through a productive path. The reason behind this is not only that al-Ṭūsī is the first philosopher in the history of philosophy who wrote an autonomous epistle about truth-maker but also his both clear and controversial answer, which is "*muṭābaqa* to the forms in Active Intellect/s", and this made the topic discussed more widely in both autonomous works and the corpuses.[1] Afterward, al-Ṭūsī's answer has been criticized by many scholars and philosophers and various understandings has been developed thanks to them. Thereby, the problem of *nafs al-amr* is deliberated comprehensively in both corpuses of philosophy and kalam, and in autonomous epistles which are totally rich literature. This literature sometimes consists of commentaries and glosses of al-Ṭūsī's epistle, and sometimes consist of productive number of autonomous books which addresses al-Ṭūsī in a way or another. The literature of *nafs al-amr*, as the time went by, overstepped the bounds of al-Ṭūsī's brief epistle, and a lot of autonomous works containing extensive inquiries has been contributed to the truth-maker problem.

The *nafs al-amr* literature, which rapidly increased after al-Ṭūsī, brings the problem of authenticity into consideration. Sometimes, some epistles have been attributed to certain specific scholars, and thus have risen to prominence. It is discovered that the alleged epistle, which has been attributed to Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), is not only not an autonomous text but also is taken and copied from al-Samarqandī's (d. 722/1322) *al-Ma'ārif fī sharḥ al-Ṣaḥāif*. In this article firstly, it is displayed that the epistle does not belong to Jurjānī, via correlating with *al-Ma'ārif*. Then, the content of the epistle is studied, comparing

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1   For al-Ṭūsī's importance in truth-maker discussions, see M. Maşuk Aktaş, "Nasîruddîn et-Tûsî'de Nefsü'l-emr Problemi: Mutâbakat Teorisi Bağlamında Bir Değerlendirme" (Master thesis, Istanbul Medeniyet University, 2021), 108-143. There are significant logical and metaphysical differences between classical correspondence theory of truth and the *muṭābaqa* theory. Hence, I prefer not to translate the term. Still, it will be difficult to express myself without using the word. Thus, I will obligatorily translate *muṭābaqa* as "correspondence", but both logical and metaphysical differences must be had in the mind.

The thesis will be published soon, with an additional chapter which covers the history of truth-maker discussion from Plato up to al-Ṭūsī.

with Jurjānī's understanding of *nafs al-amr* in his authoritative books. Thirdly, the probable reasons for this authenticity problem, which caused a great number of problems, is argued. Since, the alleged epistle has been attributed to Jurjānī for approximately five centuries, it has been a fundamental resource for some academic researchers. Therefore, some researchers were led to have an inconsistent exegesis of Jurjānī's thought on *nafs al-amr*. Hence both to make a humble contribution to the history of thought in Islamic philosophy, and also to examine whether al-Samarqandī and Jurjānī's thoughts on *nafs al-amr* can be understood consistently, the content of this passage is explored. By this manner, in the last title of the article, al-Samarqandī's understanding of *nafs al-amr* is discussed, in light of the passage.

1. On the Belongings of the Text and Its Authenticity

1.1 The Names of the Text and the History of Its Attribution to Jurjānī

There are lots of manuscripts of the alleged epistle, which have been attributed to Jurjānī, in different renowned libraries around the world. The text has been recorded in different catalogues and manuscripts by divergent names. Some of the recorded names is as below: *Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr wa-l-farq baynahu wa-bayna al-khārij*, *Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr wa-l-farq baynahu wa-bayna al-khārij wa-l-dhihn*, *Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*, *al-Risāla al-sharīfiyya*, *Risāla sharīfiyya fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr wa-l-khārij*, and *al-Risāla al-maʿmūla fī taḥqīq al-ashyāʾ*.

When the dates of copying the manuscripts are examined, it comes in sight that the text has been attributed to Jurjānī as an autonomous epistle from very early times. A manuscript, which dates back to 971 A.H and its attribution to Jurjānī as an autonomous epistle, shows that the error way back.[2] There are various copying dates mentioned in different parts of manuscripts, such as 1051, 1086 and 1171. This very fact reveals that attribution of pseudo-epistle to Jurjānī continued after 971 A.H and it was published as an autonomous epistle and attributed to Jurjānī in *Rasāʾil al-Imtiḥān* which contains many epistles about significant topics demanded in Ottoman exams.[3]

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2   Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī (!), *al-Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr wa-l-farq baynahu wa-bayna al-khārij wa-l-dhihn*, Suleymaniye Library, Reşid Efendi 1015, 9a. This manuscript is copied at Tokat province by Mahmad ʿAlī al-Charcīnī (?).

3   Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr wa-l-farq baynahu wa-bayna al-khārij*", *Rasāʾil al-Imtiḥān*, 197-8.

After the publication of *Rasā'il al-Imtiḥān*, many researchers published the text and translated it as an autonomous epistle of Jurjānī. Moreover, it became a main source for the discussion of *nafs al-amr* in academic research. The text, as it is concluded after investigations, has been published four times.[4] Other than that, the text has been translated four times, two times to Turkish[5] and the others to English.[6] Consequently, lots of secondary sources discussing the problem of *nafs al-amr* refer to the text attributed to Jurjānī and evaluate it as Jurjānī's thought.[7] However, the findings of this article demonstrates that the text is neither an autonomous epistle nor belongs to Jurjānī.

1.2. The Text is not an Autonomous Epistle, and It Belongs to al-Samarqandī, Rather Than Jurjānī

The text, which has been attributed to Jurjānī, is taken from *al-Maʿārif fī sharḥ al-Ṣaḥāif* of al-Samarqandī whose death is earlier than Jurjānī's, for more than a century. In other words, the alleged epistle is an autonomous copy of *al-Maʿārif*'s passage about *nafs al-amr*. Thus, it does not belong to Jurjānī. To compare the inscription of pseudo-epistle and the related passage of *al-Maʿārif* is a best way to demonstrate that the text is not an autonomous epistle and taken from *al-Maʿārif*. Owing to the tables, the mistake will be clearer.

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4   Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr wa-l-farq baynahu wa-bayna al-khārij*", *Rasā'il al-Imtiḥān*, 197-8; Recep Duran, "'Nefsu'l-emr' Risaleleri", *Araştırma* 14 (1992): 102-104; İhsan Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi ve Matematik Bilimlere Uygulanması: Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf Örneği", *İslâm Düşüncesinde Süreklilik ve Değişim: Seyyid Şerif Cürcânî Örneği* (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2015), 187-9; Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr wa-l-farq baynahu wa-bayna al-khārij*", *Thalāth rasāil fī nafs al-amr*, ed. Saʿīd Fūde (ʿAmmān: Kalam Research & Media wa al-Aşlayn, 2017), 71-2.

5   Duran, "'Nefsu'l-emr' Risaleleri", 100-2; Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi", 190.

6   Moiz Hasan, "Foundations of Science in Post-Classical Era: The Philosophical, Historical, and Historiographical Significance of Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī's (d. 1413) Project" (PhD Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2017), 421-3; Hasan Spiker, *Things as They are: Nafs al-amr and the Ontological Foundations of Objective Truth* (Abu Dabi: Tabah Foundation, 2021), 61-6. The translation of Spiker is not just a translation but also a short commentary on the translation. He translates each passage autonomously and writes explanatory comments on them.

7   For studies displaying the content of the alleged epistle as Jurjānī's understanding of *nafs al-amr* see Hasan, "Foundations of Science in Post-Classical Era", 185-212; Robert G. Morrison, "Cosmology and Cosmic Order in Islamic Astronomy", *Early Science and Medicine* 24 (2019): 356-7 and 363; Spiker, *Things as They are*, 61-7; Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi", 173-6; İhsan Fazlıoğlu, "Hakikat ile İtibar: Dış-dünya'nın Bilgisinin Doğası Üzerine –XV. Yüzyıl Doğa Felsefesi ve Matematik Açısından Bir İnceleme–", *Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1/1 (Ekim 2014): 21.

al-Ma'ārif fī sharḥ al-Ṣaḥāif of al-Samarqandī[8]	*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr wa-l-farq baynahu wa-bayna al-khārij wa-al-dhihn* which has been attributed to Jurjānī[9]
حان أن ننجز ما وعدنا من تحقيق نفس الأمر والفرق بينه وبين الخارج والذهن. فنقول وبالله التوفيق: [١] تحقيق الأشياء إما فرض عقلي وهو ما لا يكون إلا في القوى الدراكة، أو حقيقي وهو ما يكون خارج القوى الدراكة، سواء وجد الفرض والعقل أو لم يوجد. وهو الذي يقال له: إنه في نفس الأمر.	اعلم أن: [١] تحقّق الأشياء إما فرض عقلي وهو ما لا يكون إلا في القوى الدراكة، أو حقيقي وهو ما يكون خارج القوى[١٠] الدراكة، سواء وجد الفرض العقلي أو لم يوجد. وهو الذي يقال: إنه في نفس الأمر.
[٢] والحقيقي إما بالنظر إلى أنفسها أو بالنسبة إلى الخارج عن أنفسها وهو المسمى بالخارج.	[٢] والحقيقي إما بالنظر إلى أنفسها أو بالنسبة إلى الخارج عن أنفسها وهو المسمى بالخارج.
[٣] فنفس الأمر خارج القوى الدراكة فهو أعم من الخارج. والخارج من الذهن، والتحقيق الذهني أخص من الخارجي؛ لكن بمعنى آخر. وهو أن ما يوجد في الذهن يصدق في الخارج أنه موجود في الذهن، لا أنه موجود في الخارج. وكذلك بالنسبة إلى ما يكون بحسب نفس الأمر بعين هذا.	[٣] فنفس الأمر خارج القوى الدراكة فهو أعم من الخارج. والخارج من الذهن؛ لكن بمعنى آخر. وهو أن ما يوجد في الذهن يصدق في الخارج أنه موجود في الذهن، لا أنه موجود في الخارج. وكذا بالنسبة إلى ما يكون بحسب نفس الأمر بغير هذا.[١١]
[٤] وإذا كان نفس الأمر أعم من الخارج، فمتى صدق معنى في الخارج صدق في نفس الأمر؛ مثل إذا صدق أن الجسم مركب في الخارج صدق أنه مركب في نفس الأمر.	[٤] وإذا كان نفس الأمر أعم من الخارج، فمتى صدق معنى[١٢] في الخارج صدق في نفس الأمر؛ مثلا إذا صدق أن الجسم مركب في الخارج صدق أنه مركب[١٣] في نفس الأمر.

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8   Shams al-dīn Mohammad b. Ashraf al-Samarqandī, *al-Ma'ārif fī sharḥ al-Ṣaḥā'if*, ed. Naẓīr Mohammad al-Naẓīr 'Īyād & 'Abdullah Mohammad 'Abdullah Ismā'īl (Cairo: al-Maktabat al-Azhariyya li't-turāth, 2017), I, 443-6.

9   Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*", t.y.; Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*", 2017; Duran, "'Nefsu'l-emr' Risaleleri", 102-4; Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi", 187-9.

10   The word "القوى" does not exist in some publications. See Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*", t.y., 197; Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*", 2017, 71.

11   It is "بحسب الأنفس كذا" in some publications, rather than "بحسب نفس الأمر بغير هذا". See Duran, "'Nefsu'l-emr' Risaleleri", 103; Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi", 187.

12   The word "المعنى" does not exist in the publications of *Rasā'il al-Imtiḥān* and Sa'īd Fūde. See Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*" t.y., 197; Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*", 2017, 71.

13   The word "أنه مركب" is missing in the publication of Sa'īd Fūde. See Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*", 2017, 71.

[٥] واما صدق في نفس الأمر بمعنى أنه في نفسه كذلك، لا يصدق بحسب الخارج إذا لم يكن موجودا فيه؛ لأن ما لا يكون في الخارج لا يكون موصوفا بشيء في الخارج؛ لكن جاز أن يكون كذلك بالنظر إلى نفسه أن يصدق أن السواد المعدوم في الخارج لون في نفسه، ولا يصدق أنه لون في الخارج.	[٥] وأما إذا صدق في نفس الأمر بمعنى أنه في نفسه¹⁴ كذلك، فلا يصدق بحسب الخارج إذا لم يكن موجودا فيه؛ لأن ما لا يكون في الخارج لا يكون موصوفا بشيء في الخارج؛ لكن جاز أن يكون كذلك بالنظر إلى نفسه؛ إذ¹⁵ يصدق أن السواد المعدوم في الخارج لون في نفسه، ولا¹⁶ يصدق أنه لون في الخارج.
[٦] هذا في الحكم الإيجابي. وأما في السلبي فالسلب في نفس الأمر أخص من السلب الخارجي. فإذا صدق أن السواد ليس ببياض في نفس الأمر صدق بحسب الخارج من غير عكس؛ كما إذا صدق السواد ليس يكون في الخارج عند عدمه فيه، ولا يصدق بحسب نفس الأمر. وهذا لما عرفت أن نقيض الأعم أخص من نقيض الأخص.	[٦] هذا في الحكم الإيجابي. وأما في¹⁷ السلبي فنفس الأمر أخص من الخارج. فإذا صدق أن السواد ليس ببياض في نفس الأمر صدق بحسب الخارج من غير عكس؛ كما إذا صدق أن السواد ليس بلون¹⁸ في الخارج عند عدمه فيه لا يصدق بحسب نفس الأمر. وهذا لما عرفت أن نقيض الأعم أخص من نقيض الأخص.
[٧] وأحوال ذوات الأشياء من الحاجة والاستغناء والاستلزام والاقتضاء والعوارض والذاتيات والحقيقيات والاعتباريات إنما تعرف وتحقق بحسب أنفسها. وأكثر الأغلاط إنما نشأت من التباس حكم الأنفس بحكم الخارج أو الذهن.	[٧] وأحوال ذوات الأشياء من الحاجة والاستغناء والاستلزام والاقتضاء والعوارض والذاتيات¹⁹ والحقيقيات والاعتباريات إنما تعرف وتحقق²⁰ بحسب أنفسها. وأكثر²¹ الأغلاط إنما تنشأ من التباس حكم نفس الأمر بحكم الخارج أو الذهن.

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14   It is "نفس" in the publications of *Rasā'il al-Imtiḥān* and Saʿīd Fūde, rather than "نفسه". See Jurjānī (!), *"Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr"*, t.y., 197; Jurjānī (!), *"Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr"*, 2017, 71.

15   In some publications it is "إذا", rather than "إذ". See Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi", 188.

16   It is "فلا" in some publications. See Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi", 188.

17   The word "في" is missing in the publications of *Rasā'il al-Imtiḥān* and Saʿīd Fūde. See Jurjānī (!), *"Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr"*, t.y., 197; Jurjānī (!), *"Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr"*, 2017, 72.

18   It is "بكون" in some publications, rather than "بلون". See Duran, "'Nefsu'l-emr' Risaleleri", 103.

19   It is "الذاتيات" in some publications, rather than "والذاتيات". See Duran, "'Nefsu'l-emr' Risaleleri", 104; Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi", 188.

20   It is "تحقق" in some publications, rather than "وتحقق". See Duran, "'Nefsu'l-emr' Risaleleri", 104; Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi", 189.

21   It is "أو أكثر" in some publications, rather than "وأكثر". See Jurjānī (!), *"Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr"*, 2017, 72.

[٨] فمن أتقن ما أصّلناه هاهنا سهل عليه الاطلاع على الحقائق والدقائق؛ بل بالحقيقة عرفان العلوم العقلية بدون معرفة كالمتعذر.	[٨] فمن أتقن ما أفدنا٢٢ ههنا سهل عليه الاطلاع على الحقائق والدقائق؛ بل بالحقيقة عرفان العلوم العقلية بدون معرفته٢٣ كالمتعذر. فحصل بها٢٤ كتبنا تحقيق نفس الأمر، والفرق بينه وبين الخارج والذهن.

It is possible to make some comments on the tables. Firstly, both texts are the same, and there is no diversity between them, except a few words and few letters. After all, the aforementioned exceptions are basic differences which can be observed in all manuscript studies and do not make significant theoretical shifts. However, there are two considerable divergences in the texts: (i) There is an extra proposition in the third paragraph. In *al-Ma'ārif*, it says "والتحقيق الذهني أخص من الخارج (*wa al-taḥqīq al-dhihnī akhaṣṣ min al-khārij*)", while this sentences does not exist in the pseudo-epistle, which has been attributed to Jurjānī. This proposition is very crucial, because it has a clear implication for the relation among *nafs al-amr*, *khārij* and *dhihn* clearly. When the content of the text will be evaluated in the fourth heading of the article, the theoretical reflections of this proposition will be discussed. (ii) The last sentence of the third paragraph is very different in the texts. The statement after "وكذا بالنسبة إلى ما يكون بحسب (*wa kadhā bi-l-nisba ilā mā yakūn bi-ḥasab*)" is as "نفس الأمر بعين هذا (*nafs al-amr bi-'ayn hādhā*)" in *al-Ma'ārif*, while it is "نفس الأمر بغير هذا (*nafs al-amr bi-ghayr hādhā*)" in some press of pseudo-epistle, and "الأنفس كذا (*al-anfus kadhā*)" in others. It is definite that all three versions of this statement make essential differences.

Secondly, after examination lots of manuscripts of both *al-Ma'ārif* and pseudo-epistle, it is possible to comment on the tables that even the small differences of words and letters, which does not change the meaning theoretically, are very similar between *al-Ma'ārif* and pseudo-epistle. The differences of *al-Ma'ārif*'s manuscripts generally have parallels with the differences in the manuscripts of pseudo-epistle. This fact brings to consideration that the pseudo-epistle may have been attributed to Jurjānī even before the date 971 A.H.

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22   It is "أصلها" in some publications, rather than "أفدنا". See Duran, "'Nefsu'l-emr' Risaleleri", 104; Fazlıoğlu, "Seyyid Şerif'in Nefsü'l-emr Nazariyesi", 189.

23   It is "معرفة" in the publication of Sa'īd Fūde, rather than "معرفته". See Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*", 2017, 72.

24   It is "لما" in the publication of Sa'īd Fūde, rather than "بها". See Jurjānī (!), "*Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr*", 2017, 72.

Lastly, the resemblance of the texts reveals that it is written only by one author. Therefore, it is certain that the text which has been attributed to Jurjānī for long times neither belongs to him nor is an autonomous epistle. Taking both cases into consideration can hugely contribute to discussions that take place in the history of thought in Islamic philosophy. Thanks to this, the thoughts of al-Samarqandī and Jurjānī can be dealt with in a consistent way, rather than a superficial way.[25] Because, although the content of the text is not generally inconsistent to Jurjānī's philosophy as it will be indicated in the second heading, it is disqualified to represent his comprehensive understanding. Hereby, it is fundamental to compare Jurjānī's thought of *nafs al-amr*, centered around his authentic books, with the content of pseudo-epistle.

2. A Comparison of Jurjānī's Authentic Understanding of *Nafs al-amr* with the Content of Passage in *al-Maʿārif*

To evaluate Jurjānī's complete understanding of *nafs al-amr* in a theoretical framework will require more than an article. Hence it is not possible to discuss his theory fully here. On the other hand, as much as possible, to compare Jurjānī's theory of *nafs al-amr* in his authentic books with the alleged epistle will help us to determine that it does not belong to him. It will also help to verify whether Jurjānī's thought about *nafs al-amr* conform with al-Samarqandī's, or not. This will show us whether the content of the pseudo-epistle, which has been attributed to Jurjānī over 450 years, is consistent with Jurjānī's theory of *nafs al-amr* in the authentic works. In this part of the article, these questions will be examined.

Inquiring the consistency of the alleged epistle with Jurjānī's original thought will differ according to the method of reading a text. It is possible to

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25 In fact, Moiz Hasan implies that Jurjānī understands *nafs al-amr* as a third ontological binder, apart from external world and mental being. See Hasan, "Foundations of Science in Post-Classical Era", 135. On the hand, when he examines the problem centered around the pseudo-epistle, he underlies that *nafs al-amr* is not a third ontological category. For this see Hasan, "Foundations of Science in Post-Classical Era", 185-93. In the second heading of this article, we will investigate whether it is possible to interpret the content of pseudo-epistle and Jurjānī' authentic works. Nevertheless, the inconsistency of Hasan's comments is rooted in authenticity problem. To discover that the text belongs to al-Samarqandī, will help the researchers to determine his impact on later scholars. Because Hasan mostly mentions to Jurjānī's understanding of *nafs al-amr*'s impact on later scholars, such as ʿAlī Kūshī, Khojazāda, Dawwānī, Dashdakī and Tashkoprīzāda. See Hasan, "Foundations of Science in Post-Classical Era", 121. After this discovery, it is likely to mention to the influence of al-Samarqandī, who died approximately a century before Jurjānī, on later scholars and historize the problem of *nafs al-amr* steadier.

find contradictions to Jurjānī's understanding, if we try to read the text in al-Samarqandī's terms and theories with their whole philosophical background. To illustrate, their attitude toward mental existence and their understanding of quantified attributive propositions are some of their disagreements. However, if we read the text by means of *the death of the author*, a few connoisseur remarks will make pseudo-epistle and Jurjānī's authentic books coherent.[26] This will allow readers to read the content of the alleged epistle compatible with Jurjānī's philosophy. Nonetheless, the pseudo-epistle has some distinctness which differs from strong language, as much as it seems to be disqualified to represent Jurjānī's complete theory of *nasf al-amr*, although there is no contradiction.

2.1. The Conceptional and Topical Distinctness Appear Between Jurjānī's Works and The Alleged Epistle

The language of the alleged epistle differs from Jurjānī's authentic books at two points. Firstly, al-Samarqandī at the beginning of the discussion uses the term "the faculty of perception (*al-quwwa al-darrāka*)", instead of the term "mental existence (*al-wujūd al-dhihnī*)". When he clarifies his intention by the term "the faculty of perception" he emphasizes that it is sometimes called "mental existence" (*qad yuʿabbar ʿanhā bi-l-dhihn*).[27] After that, al-Samarqandī uses the term "mental existence" more frequently. The reason of al-Samarqandī's partial abstention for not using the term "mental existence" directly is that it is a controversial topic, so he does not use it until he clarifies that in which meaning he uses the term. On the other hand, Jurjānī does not share the same attitude with al-Samarqandī about the topic. As a matter of fact, when Jurjānī discuss the problem of *nafs al-amr*, he uses in his authentic books the terms of "mental existence" and "shadow existence" comfortably, instead of "the faculty of perception", and he does not show any hesitation or abstention for this.[28]

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26   There are lots of disagreements in the details of both al-Samarqandī's and Jurjānī's ontology. It is contingent to accentuate that in their complete philosophical patterns, the parts of existence, such as external and mental, will differ. Whereas, this difference will shape the relation of *nafs al-amr* with external and mental existences. In other respects, if we focus only on the text and ignore its background in whole *al-Maʿārif*, it will not be possible to find out such clear contradictions. *The death of the author* makes such a reading possible.

27   This sentences does not exist in the printed version of *al-Maʿārif*. However, it exists in most of the manuscripts. See Esad Efendi 1253, 9a; Esad Efendi 1272, 20a; Fatih 3036, 78b; Laleli 2432, 75a; Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 828, 13a.

28   See Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, ed. Eşref Altaş, Muhammet Ali Koca, Muhammed Yetim and Salih Günaydın. (Istanbul: Nashriyyāt waqf al-diyāna al-Turkiyy, 2020), II, 83-5 ve 201.

Secondly, Jurjānī's discussion of *nafs al-amr* in his authentic corpuses has a significant impact on the later scholars' understanding of *nafs al-amr*. To exemplify, the conclusion of "all conceptualizations (*taṣawwur*), including the concepts of impossible things, have their own *nafs al-amr*", the idea of "it cannot come into question that any conceptualizations do not correspondence (*muṭābaqa*)", and the theory of "metathetic (*ma'dūla al-mahmūl*) propositions, simple negative (*sāliba basīṭa*) propositions and negated predications (*sāliba al-mahmūl*) are three different kinds of propositions, and their truth-maker (their relation with *nafs al-amr*) are not the same" are some topics that Jurjānī made a consequential influence on later thinkers understanding of truth-maker.[29] When Jurjānī discusses *nafs al-amr* in his commentaries or glosses, even if he talks about it secondarily, he argues these three topics in a very sophisticated way. Thus, even his secondary discussions in the authentic works are more elaborated than the content of the alleged epistle. If the pseudo-epistle would belong to Jurjānī, it would be reasonable to expect that he would mention some of these topics which are his original thoughts.

To sum up, the technical language of the alleged epistle, which has been attributed to Jurjānī for centuries, and the topics discussed with *nafs al-amr* problem are very different from Jurjānī's authentic works. Hence, it is possible to conclude that it does not belong to him.

2.2. A Comparison of Jurjānī's Authentic Thoughts on *Nafs al-Amr* with the Content of the Autonomous Pseudo-Epistle

After examination of Jurjānī's understanding of *nafs al-amr* in his authentic corpuses it is possible to conclude that the alleged epistle is disqualified to represent his comprehensive and more sophisticated thoughts. We want to briefly indicate his theory and compare it with *al-Ma'ārif* to show the differences between his theory and the content of the pseudo-epistle as well as his influence on later thinkers about the topic. In this sense, three topics, which Jurjānī refers to them when he discusses the problem of *nafs al-amr*, will be evaluated: (i) the existential import of

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29   To see Jurjānī's impact on later scholars it is important to analyze the notes taken around the manuscript of the pseudo-epistle in the collection of Hacı Hüsnü Paşa, numbered 260. In this manuscript, the scribal gathers many comments of lots of philosophers on *nafs al-amr*; such as Lārī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, Ṭarsūsī, Khalkhālī, Abū Khayr, Qāḍī Mīr Maybūdī, İbn Malak and Mawlā Birkātī (!). However, these notes are more related to Jurjānī's glosses about *nafs al-amr* on *al-Tajrīd*, rather than the alleged epistle. Because these notes discuss deeply the Jurjānī's understanding of *nafs al-amr* in the glosses, and they do not discuss the content of the pseudo-epistle. Actually, if the scribal would copy separately Jurjānī's glosses of *nafs al-amr* in *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, and put the notes around it, it would be more coherent.

metathetic propositions, simple negative propositions and negated predications, (ii) all conceptualizations have their own *nafs al-amr* and it is not possible for them to not correspondence, (iii) the truth-maker of propositions depends on the existential import of its conceptualizations.

2.2.1. How to Assert Negatively: Metathetic Propositions, Simple Negative Propositions and Negated Predications

al-Samarqandī underlines that the truth-maker of affirmative and negative propositions is measured by the existential import of the propositions. Yet, some other scholars argue the negative asserts more detailed than al-Samarqandī's explanations. To illustrate, al-Samarqandī does not differentiate metathetic propositions and negated predications from each other. Thus, he does not debate the truth-maker of each negative assertion. On the other hand, a group of logicians (Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1265) is one of them) differ them from each other and deliberate their truth-maker. While Jurjānī considers these kinds of assertions differently and investigates their existential import and their *nafs al-amr* widely.[30] On the other hand, philosophers like al-Ṭūsī reject the difference between metathetic propositions and negated predications.[31] al-Samarqandī's understanding of negative assertions is closer to al-Ṭūsī's, instead of al-Abharī's. In his logical works, he did not differentiate negated predications from metathetic propositions.[32] Therefore, when al-Samarqandī argues the truth-maker of propositions, although he clarifies the *nafs al-amr* of simple negative propositions, he does not discuss the truth-maker of the negated predications. It is plausible to conclude that al-Samarqandī and Jurjānī think differently in the details of the negative assertions and their existential imports.

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30   See Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, II, 84; Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiya al-ṣughrā*, (Istanbul: Cemal Efendi Matbaası, 1318), 127 ve 136-7; Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiya al-kubrā 'alā Sharḥ al-Maṭāli'* (n.p., n.d.), 35. Ottoman philosophers associated this discussion, which Jurjānī brought up in his different books, with their understanding of *nafs al-amr* and the truth of negative assertions. See Mehmet Aktaş, "Kemalpaşazâde'nin Zihnî Varlık Risâlesi: Tahkîk ve Değerlendirme" (Master thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2014), 25-32; Mehmet Aydın, "Kara Seyyîdî Hamîdî ve Zihnî Varlık Risâlesi", *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 37 (2013): 87-89; Aḥmad Afandi Taşköprīzāde, *al-Shuhūd al-'aynī fī mabāḥith al-wujūd al-dhihn*, ed. Mohammad Zāhid Kāmil Cūl (Baghdad: Manshūrāt al-Jamal, 2009), 46-48.

31   To see al-Ṭūsī's understanding about negative assertions, Naṣīr al-dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Ta'dīl al-mi'yār fī naqḍ Tanzīl al-afkār*, ed. Mehdi Mohaghegh and Toshihiko Izutsu (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1974), 168.

32   To examine al-Samarqandī's standpoint about metathetic propositions and simple negative propositions see Shams al-dīn al-Samarqandī, *Qisṭās al-afkār*, ed. and trs. Necmettin Pehlivan (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014), 197-205.

2.2.2. All Conceptualizations Have Their Own Nafs al-Amr

Also, different examples can be given to show that the content of the alleged epistle is disqualified to represent Jurjānī's theory of *nafs al-amr*. The passage, which Jurjānī discusses that all conceptualizations -even the concepts about the things which are impossible to exist- have their own *nafs al-amr*, is one of those examples. The pointed passage, which initiated lots of productive discussions about truth-maker problem between later philosophers, is as follow:

> **[TEXT 1]** It is impossible to be mistaken about the object (*mādda*) of conceptualizations themselves (*fī anfusihā*). Because the conceptualizations cannot be not corresponding (*muṭābaqa*). Every form of any conceptualization is corresponding (*muṭābaqa*) to thing of the form, whether it is existent or nonexistent, whether it is contingent or impossible. However, sometimes a predication could be attached to the conceptualization, and it would be judged that "it is the thing A" [for instance]. For this reason, this proposition could be both true and false. On the other hand, the pure conceptualization cannot be false.[33]

This passage forced the later philosophers to debate two main questions related to the problem of *nafs al-amr*: (i) "does every conceptualization have their own specific truth-maker (*nafs al-amr*)?", (ii) "is it possible to claim that all conceptualizations are corresponding to the thing of their forms"?[34] These questions sparked off worthwhile debates, and numerous autonomous epistles are written about them.[35] Whenas, the relation of conceptualizations with *nafs al-amr* is not mentioned at all in the autonomous epistle which has been attributed to Jurjānī. This displays that the alleged epistle, even is not contradicted to Jurjānī's theory of *nafs al-amr*, however it is disqualified to represent his thoughts.

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33   Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, III, 316.

34   al-Dawwānī, Mīr Abu al-Fatḥ and al-Galanbawī are some of those philosophers, who discussed these questions, especially the first one. To follow the debate between them see Ismāʿil al-Galanbawī, *Risāla al-Imkān* (al-Aṣlayn, n.d.), 150-2; Ismāʿil al-Galanbawī, *ʿalā Mīr al-Tahdhīb* (n.p., n.d.), 162 vd.

35   One of the most important epistles about the first question belongs to al-Galanbawī. See Ismāʿil al-Galanbawī, "*Risāla fī taḥqīq māhiyya al-mumtaniʿ*", *Rasāʾil al-Imtiḥān*, n.d., 194-7. Another inquiry, which digs into the problem of "all conceptualizations are corresponding", belongs to al-Dawwānī. See Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī, "*Risāla fī qawlihim ʿal-tasawwurāt lā yaḥtamil ʿadam al-muṭābaqa*'", *Rasāʾil al-Imtiḥān*, n.d., 168-170.

2.2.3. The Discussion of the Existential Import of Propositions and Their Nafs al-Amr, Shaped by the Description of the Components of the Propositions by External Existence and Mental Existence

It can be said that the Jurjānī's understanding for the truth of propositions is not incompatible with the content of the pseudo-epistle. However, his opinion about the problem is more elaborated than the alleged epistle. According to him, to determine whether a proposition corresponds to *nafs al-amr* or not, it is necessary to determine by which kinds of the existence the components of a proposition are described. To say it in more technical way, the truth of a proposition, such as "Some A are B", can be measured by the correspondence of the *relation* (*nisba*) of predication, which is received in the mind about the objects (*dhawāt* or *afrād*), which are pointed out by the universal *'unwān* of "A", to the *relation* (*nisba*) of objects' existence, which is what they belong to.[36] In the present case, the truth is the correspondence of proposition's *relation* to *relation* of the things represented in the existential import of the proposition. There are two components of a proposition, A: that about which judgment is passed (*maḥkūm 'alayh*), B: that which is judged to be the case (*maḥkūm bih*). According to Jurjānī, both of them can be described by either external existence or mental existence. Hence, there are four possibilities of propositions' existential import:

(i) A: external, B: external

(ii) A: mental, B: mental

(iii) A: external, B: mental

(iv) A: mental, B: external [37]

To see how these four possibilities affect the truth-maker of the propositions it would be beneficial to illustrate them with specific examples. "The book, which I burn it, smokes" is a proper proposition for the first possibility. Because both the object "The book, which I burn it" and the property "smokes" are realized externally, in this example, an external property is predicated to an external

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36 Jurjānī emphasizes that the truth of a proposition is measured by the correspondence of received *relation* to things' own *relation*. See Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, II, 201.

37 Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, II, 200-1. Jurjānī constituted these four possibilities by using the kinds of existence. Accordingly, absolute existence is divided logically into whether its properties and effects come in sight or not. If it come, it is external and *aṣīl* existence, and if it does not come, it is mental and *ẓillī* existence. These two are the real kinds of absolute existence. For further theoretical discussion see Aktaş, "Nasîruddin et-Tûsî'de Nefsü'l-emr Problemi", 76-106.

object. "Contingency is the opposite of impossibility" is an example of the second possibility. Neither contingency nor oppositeness nor impossibility are something realized externally. Hence in this proposition, it is predicated to a mental object by a mental concept. Jurjānī gives two different examples for the third possibility: (a) propositions like "human beings are contingent", (b) propositions like "Zayd is blind". Although the predications of both groups of propositions are mental properties, however there is a significant difference. The conceptualization of the predications of the second group are absence in external existence. From this point of view, Jurjānī points out to a principle, which is "it is possible that sometimes some external objects are descripted by some properties which are externally absence". According to Jurjānī, the fourth possibility is always false, because it always holds a contradiction.[38] Holding contradiction can be explained as follow: if "A" points out to only mental objects and "B" is an external description than according to fourth possibility the meaning of a proposition would be this: "the objects of 'A', which their properties and effects do not come in sight, holds the description B, which its properties and effects come in sight". So, this is a pure contradiction and does not have a truth-maker, which will make it true. It is always false.

According to Jurjānī *nafs al-amr* is absolutely more general (*a'amm muṭlaq*) than the external existence, and it is partially general (*a'amm min wajh*) than mental existence.[39] In this sense, it is possible to assert that the theories of al-Samarqandī and Jurjānī about the relation of *nafs al-amr* with external and mental existence are compatible with each other. Notwithstanding, this understanding of Jurjānī may seem at first sight incompatible with his standpoint which is "all conceptualizations have their own *nafs al-amr*". If *nafs al-amr* is partially general than mental existence, then there must be a field which has mental existence but not *nafs al-amr*. If all conceptualizations have their own *nafs al-amr*, how is it possible to be a mental existent that does not have *nafs al-amr*? Jurjānī states that the things which have mental existence but not *nafs al-amr* are our false propositions.[40] According to this, the false propositions, which are assertions and

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38   Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, II, 201. Jurjānī emphasizes that the objects of propositions that about which judgment is passed can be either ascertained or supposed or assumed. According to these three manners of objects, the judgment of proposition (such as categorical, mental and *ḥaqīqiyya* judgments), the existential import of propositions and the truth-maker (*nafs al-amr*) of propositions will differ completely. See Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiya al-ṣughrā*, 128-35; Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiya al-kubrā*, 33-5. For a further discussion compared between al-Ṭūsī, Jurjānī and other commentors of *al-Tajrīd* see Aktaş, "Nasîruddin et-Tûsî'de Nefsü'l-emr Problemi", 114-124.

39   Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, II, 201-2; Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, ed. Maḥmūd 'Omar Dimyāṭī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1998), I, 166-8.

40   Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, II, 202.

therefore received in the mind, have mental existence. However, the *relation* of false propositions does not correspond to the *relation* of things represented in the existential import of propositions. Hence, although they have mental existence, they do not have *nafs al-amr*.

It will be helpful to illustrate Jurjānī's opinion with some examples: if Kudve, who has never been at Edinburgh but dreaming that he has been there, asserted about an external existence by an external existence and judged as "I have been at Edinburgh" that would be false. However, if Kudve conceptualizes this proposition and predicates about it with the property of "dreaming", the proposition of "I am dreaming that I have been at Edinburgh" would be true. Because the *nafs al-amr* of the conceptualization of "been at Edinburgh" for Kudve is the imagination of Kudve. Hence if he predicates about it by the property, which has its own *nafs al-amr*, it would be true. Nonetheless, if he digresses and relates the conceptualization of "been at Edinburgh" with external existence, rather than his imagination, his judgement would be false. Because the *relation* of the proposition does not correspond to the existence of thing represented in the existential import of the proposition. As it is understood from the illustration, there is no incompatibility between Jurjānī's understanding, that all conceptualizations have their own *nafs al-amr*, and his other standpoint, that *nafs al-amr* is partially general than mental existence.

According to Jurjānī, the truth-maker of propositions depends on their existential import. If a proposition belongs to the first possibility of making judgement, its *nafs al-amr* is the external existence. If it belongs to the second possibility, its *nafs al-amr* is the mental existence, which crosses *nafs al-amr*. If it belongs to the third possibility, its *nafs al-amr* could be both external and mental, according to the kind of receiving predication. The fourth possibility, on the contrary, is always false, because it is contradicted. It is possible to read Jurjānī's rich stratified theory of *nafs al-amr* as an enrichment of Aristotle's classical definition of truth with external and mental kinds of existence. It is dealt in this heading that although it is possible to explain al-Samarqandī's and Jurjānī's understanding of *nafs al-amr* consistently, their language and elaboration of the problem differ to a certain degree. To sum up, the pseudo-epistle could be understood as compatible with Jurjānī's authentic theory of *nafs al-amr*, but it is disqualified to represent his rich multilayered standpoint about truth-maker.

3. An Evaluation About the Reasons of Attribution of Related Text to Jurjānī

Insofar, it is proven that the alleged epistle does not belong to Jurjānī, it is not an authentic epistle and it is an autonomous copy of *al-Maʿārif*. Apart from that, it would be beneficial to delve into the reason/s of this authenticity problem. Is it possible that a passage of *nafs al-amr* which is discussed in one of the largest corpuses of later Islamic thought, which belongs to al-Samarqandī, has never attracted the attention of anyone? This question will lead to some other questions, such as "Have the philosophy and works of al-Samarqandī ever examined and argued around the later scholars sufficiently?"

There are three main indicators that show the influence of al-Samarqandī on later Muslim philosophers and their discussion about his thought. Firstly, many of al-Samarqandī's books were textbooks in the curriculum of madrasas, which were widely distributed to Islamic world. There are hundreds of the textbooks' manuscripts in many libraries around the world. Furthermore, lots of thinkers wrote lots of commentaries and glosses about these textbooks. Secondly, al-Samarqandī's standpoints and arguments many times have been quoted and debated in theoretical books, which were written after him. They generally quote him directly or paraphrase his understandings by saying that "according to al-Samarqandī..." or "the author of *al-Qisṭās* (*ṣāḥib al-Qisṭās*) claims that..." or "someone has alleged that (*qīla*)". Also, there are hundreds of *al-Maʿārif*'s manuscripts in the libraries around the world. Moreover, there are certain powerful notes around the passage that is about *nafs al-amr*, which both explain al-Samarqandī's opinions and discuss them.[41] To conclude, due to all these three justifications, it is clear that the

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41 For example, in the manuscript of Carullah next to the related passage it is written that "[this is] where [the problem of] *nafs al-amr* studied (*maṭlab nafs al-amr*)". In the oncoming lines of the manuscript there are other notes related to the topic, which are narrated from several sources, such as Ḥasan Çelebi's glosses on *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, and from *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd* and from Abu al-Faḍl. See Carullah 1247, 54a-54b. In the other manuscripts at times some notes and headings are added to the passage. One of them is as follows "here [in this passage] is a landmark about the difference between *nafs al-amr* and external [existence] and mental [existence] (*wa fī hāza al-mawḍiʿ ishāra ilā al-farq bayna nafs al-amr wa al-khārij wa-al-dhihn*)". See Esad Efendi 1253, 9a. In another manuscript, the scribal or a reader of the manuscript has written that "the landmark of verified examination of *nafs al-amr*'s meaning, and its difference from external [existence] and mental [existence] (*maṭlab taḥqīq maʿnā nafs al-amr wa-l-farq baynahū wa bayna al-khārij wa-l-dhihn*)". See Atıf Efendi 1291, 16a. In all these manuscripts the scribal or the readers of them give the other readers a good information about the content of the passage. It is interesting that the headings and notes taken by scribal, or the readers are the same or very close to the names of pseudo-epistle, which has been wrongly attributed to Jurjānī. besides these, in the manuscript of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa there are many helpful and important notes around the passage. See Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 827, 12b-13a.

reason for the misattribution of al-Samarqandī's passage to Jurjānī is not because al-Samarqandī's theories were not known by the later philosophers.

It is very common in the manuscripts of Islamic world that the copyist (*mustansikh*) or one of the readers take notes or to put reminder headings, such as in Carullah 1247 and Esad Efendi 1253.[42] Some extended passages of many corpuses mostly seem like an autonomous epistle about a specific topic. For example, Jurjānī's passage on *nafs al-amr* in his *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd* claims to be an autonomous inquiry about the topic. Also sometimes we find in the manuscripts that this passage of *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd* was copied separately.[43] Hence, it is plausible to estimate that the aforementioned passage of *al-Maʿārif* was copied autonomously owing to its importance. But this estimation does not explain how its attribution ended up with Jurjānī.

When the manuscripts of the pseudo-epistle are examined, a more interesting fact draws our attention. There are several notes with *minhu* signature around the four manuscripts.[44] The notes with *minhu* signature are the glosses of the author himself on his own work after he finishes (*tammat*) it. Because in Islamic tradition no one, even the author himself, can add something to a finished book. However, if the alleged epistle itself does not belong to Jurjānī, how is it possible that the notes with *minhu* notes belong to him?

Therefore, there are three reasonable estimations about the *minhuwāt* notes: (i) These notes are al-Samarqandī's *minhuwāt* on his *al-Maʿārif*. It is possible that a copyist who has copied the related passage of *al-Maʿārif* autonomously, also added the *minhuwāt* of al-Samarqandī, if he wrote them. Then when the alleged epistle has been attributed to Jurjānī, the *minhuwāt* has also been attributed to him. It should be said that this is a solid estimation, that is made after searching tens of *al-Maʿārif*'s manuscripts but none of these *minhuwāt* have been discovered in it. Moreover, there is no information in the biographical books about al-Samarqandī's *minhuwāt* on *al-Maʿārif*. In these circumstances, the first possibility could be labeled as weak. (ii) These *minhuwāt* could be taken by copyists or readers of the manuscripts from other authentic works of Jurjānī. Although this possibility seems

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42 See Carullah 1247, 54a; Esad Efendi 1253, 9a.

43 This gloss of Jurjānī is copied autonomously with the pseudo-epistle, attributed to him. See Veliyüddin Efendi 3227, 98a.

44 T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Library 1636-XIX, 190b; T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Library 2298-XX, 159a; T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Library 2511- IX, 189b; Çelebi Abdullah 392, 148b. The note in Çelebi Abdullah is the same one in Diyanet 2298.

convincing at first, it is seen when the *minhuwāt* have been searched at Jurjānī's large corpuses where he discusses the problem of *nafs al-amr* in detail that there is no sign of these notes or statements anywhere.[45] Also, it is unusual for *minhuwāt* to take them from another book and put them around the text as *minhuwāt*. These cases make the second possibility inadequate to explain this situation. (iii) Although the text belongs to al-Samarqandī, due to its importance Jurjānī himself copied the text, and then took some notes around it. However, students or scholars who came after supposed that the autonomous manuscript is an authentic epistle and the notes, around the text are Jurjānī's *minhuwāt*. Considering that the other two explanations were very hesitant, this possibility remains the most plausible explanation. It is still conceivable to think that there are several other possibilities to clarify the reason for misattribution. For example, it is imaginable to suppose that a scribal has attributed the alleged epistle to Jurjānī on purpose to gain more money. However, considering that the pseudo-epistle is less than a leaf, this would be an unfounded speculation. Because generally the manuscripts, which are used as a trade material, are voluminous books. Whereas it is unprecedented that an epistle with less than one leaf is sold for premium prices. Also, al-Samarqandī is not a less famous philosopher than Jurjānī, so this purposely misattribution would not be a good commercial.

If the *minhuwāt*, which occur in more than one manuscript, truly belong to Jurjānī, than there are two conceivable possibilities: i- When Jurjānī scrutinizes *al-Ma'ārif*, owing to its value he copied the passage about the *nafs al-amr* and take some notes on it. ii- When Jurjānī taught *al-Ma'ārif* or only this passage of *al-Ma'ārif* his students copied this part of the book autonomously and they wrote around it some comments of Jurjānī, which he discussed during the lecture. Based on our available historical knowledge, it is not certain to determine which possibility is closer to the truth. Either way, it is certain that the alleged epistle copied from *al-Ma'ārif*, and someone wrote notes around it, and then all these have been attributed to Jurjānī. Furthermore, the similarity of the differences between the manuscripts of *al-Ma'ārif* and of the differences between the manuscripts of the pseudo-epistle support our comments about *minhuwāt*.

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45 The aforementioned *minhuwāt* have searched in Jurjānī's corpuses. They do not exist in the voluminous works, neither which we quoted above, such as *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, *al-Ḥāshiya al-ṣughrā*, *al-Ḥāshiya al-kubrā* and *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* nor which we did not mentioned them, such as *Ḥāshiya Sharḥ Ḥikma al-'ayn*, *Ḥāshiyat Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-muntahā al-'uṣūlī* ve *Ḥāshiyat Mukhtaṣar al-ma'ānī*. This study has conducted by both scanning of books directly and also online searching in the several online platforms, which are available to do textual search.

To summarize, although the reason cannot be determined certainly, somehow the passage, which al-Samarqandī discusses the problem of *nafs al-amr* in *al-Ma'ārif*, copied autonomously and has been attributed to Jurjānī. On the basis of the fact that there are some *minhuwāt* in several manuscripts, probably Jurjānī himself or his students, due to its significance, copied the related passage. And who came after them misattributed it.

4. A Brief Analysis of al-Samarqandī's Understanding of *Nafs al-Amr* Based on the Passage

The problem of truth-maker is connected to lots of philosophical discussions. Hence, a complete evaluation of al-Samarqandī's understanding of *nafs al-amr* would require a comprehensive examination of al-Samarqandī's philosophy, based on his works of logic, philosophy, kalam and language. But it is obvious that such a comprehensive examination is beyond the boundary of an article. Nonetheless, to understand why this passage has attracted big attention and copied autonomously for generations it is essential to look at the content of this passage. Therefore, the theory of al-Samarqandī about *nafs al-amr* will be analyzed, with reference to only this passage. Thanks to such analysis, it can be determined both the influence of al-Samarqandī on Jurjānī and also to what extent this passage is compatible with Jurjānī's understanding of *nafs al-amr*, regardless of the secondary studies which sometimes deduce inconsistent conclusions.

al-Samarqandī, at the beginning of the chapter about the division of existents and none-existents, emphasizes that *nafs al-amr* is absolutely more general than external existence.[46] After, he promises that the problem of *nafs al-amr* will be discussed at the end of the chapter, and skips to the other topics, such as the problem of division of existence to external, mental, utterance and written, the problem of the parts of none-existences and the discussions about the mental existence. During these discussions although he uses lots of times the terms like propositions, their correspondence (*muṭābaqa*), truth and *nafs al-amr* he does not talk directly about what these terms are. Before the finishing of the chapter, he initiates the passage as follows: "and now, as we promised, it is the time to begin the deliberation about verified examination of *nafs al-amr*'s meaning, and its difference from external [existence] and mental [existence]".[47]

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46   al-Samarqandī, *al-Ma'ārif*, I, 427.
47   al-Samarqandī, *al-Ma'ārif*, I, 443.

This passage is noteworthy, because it clearly indicates that the problem of *nafs al-amr* is related to the problem of truth-maker and the correspondence of propositions. At the beginning of the passage, al-Samarqandī firstly deals with *nafs al-amr* of positive propositions and its comparison to external and mental existences and after that he underlines that *nafs al-amr* of negative propositions is different from affirmatives'.[48] al-Samarqandī's passage shows that the problem of *nafs al-amr* is associated with correspondence of propositions, or the truth-maker discussion in another saying.[49] Considering from that point of view, the content of the passage reminds the Aristotle's well-known definition of truth:

> **[Text 2]** To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.[50]

Aristotle, in this passage, examines the truth via propositions. We do not know whether al-Samarqandī read Aristotle's famous definition of truth, which has been differently understood during the history of philosophy and converted many times. Nonetheless, it is known that the content of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in this passage was well transferred and stored under the favor of philosophical discussions, in the collective intellectual memory, from ancient Greece up to al-Samarqandī and so on. Hence, al-Samarqandī's discussion of *nafs al-amr* related to affirmative and negative propositions partially reminds Aristotle's definition.

According to Aristotle, the truth of an affirmative proposition depends on predicating about a thing with an existing property, and the truth of a negative proposition depends on predicating about none-existing with a none-existing property. Hence, it is not possible in this theory to talk about truth without talking about existence. In that case, do the true properties of things have to be measured always with external existence? This question also pursuits whether the only kind of existence is external or not. Throughout the history of philosophy, there are many schools and thinkers who annotated Aristotle's passage about truth with

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48   al-Samarqandī, *al-Maʿārif*, I, 445.

49   In the Islamic philosophy, it is a common standpoint that the problem of *nafs al-amr* is about the correspondence. Thus, around some manuscripts of the pseudo-epistle narrated from a scholar named ʿAbd al-Raḥmān a gloss: "According to the philosophers *nafs al-amr* is the Active Intellect. According to Sunnī school it is the Sacred Safe and Separate Tablet. However, the famously known is that *nafs al-amr* is nothing more than the correspondence of things to the facts (*nafs al-amr ʿinda al-ḥukamā al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl, wa ʿinda ahl al-sunna al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ; wa lākin al-mashhūr huwa anna nafs al-amr ʿibāratun ʿan muṭābaqat al-shayʾ li-l-wāqiʿ*)". See Hacı Hüsnü Paşa 260, 276b; T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Library 1636-XIX, 190b.

50   Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, ed. and trs. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1991), Book IV 1011b23 §7, p. 57.

external existence and now in contemporary philosophy we call it the classical theory of correspondence. However, al-Samarqandī explains his understanding of *nafs al-amr* with the idea that there are other kinds of existence than external. In this sense, al-Samarqandī's standpoint of truth-maker differs from the classical correspondence theory.

According al-Samarqandī, there are two kinds of realization of things: (i) which leans on the assumption of reason; (ii) the verified one, which does not lean on any assumption. The first group only exists in the personal faculty of perception. The second group, which is called it is in *nafs al-amr*, exists even if there is no assumption of reason. al-Samarqandī emphasizes that the faculty of perception is sometimes called as mental existence.[51] After this explanation al-Samarqandī began to discuss the relation of affirmative propositions with *nafs al-amr*.

4.1. *Nafs al-Amr* in Affirmative Propositions

According to al-Samarqandī, when it comes to the affirmative propositions, *nafs al-amr* is absolutely more general (*a'amm muṭlak*) than the external existence.[52] This assertion claims that all affirmative predication about the things, that exists externally; with a property, which belong to this thing in external existence, are true. But, some true propositions, which correspondence to their *nafs al-amr*, are not about the external things. al-Samarqandī exemplify his assertion with two different cases. For example, if there is a black book on my desk it would be true if I predicate about it as "This book is black", because this external thing, which is the book, in *nafs al-amr* holds the property of blackness. On the other hand, according to al-Samarqandī, if there were nothing yellow in the external world, still it would be true to predicate about it as "The externally none-existing yellow is a color". Because in this proposition we do not predicate about yellow's existing, but rather about its essence (*dhāt*).[53]

When al-Samarqandī finishes the discussion about the relation of *nafs al-amr* and external existence, he starts to argue its relationship with mental existence.

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51 See Esad Efendi 1253, 9a; Esad Efendi 1272, 20a; Fatih 3036, 78b; Laleli 2432, 75a; Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 828, 13a.

52 al-Samarqandī, *al-Ma'ārif*, I, 443-4.

53 al-Samarqandī, *al-Ma'ārif*, I, 444-5. It will be discussed below, when the position of al-Samarqandī is compared to understandings of al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī, what does it mean to predicate about essence itself without its existence.

However, at the beginning of the passage, he does not use the term mental existence (*al-wujūd al-dhihnī*). Instead, he uses the term the faculty of perception (*al-quwwa al-darrāka*). At the progressive aspect of the discussion, at the third paragraph of the passage -which is in the table above- after the sentence of "*wa-l-taḥqīq al-dhihnī akhaṣṣ min*" he emphasizes that "(the faculty of perception) is sometimes called mental existence (*qad yuʿabbar ʿanhā bi-l-dhihn*)" and after he uses the term mental existence until the end of the passage.[54] The reason for al-Samarqandī's partial abstention about that term probably is that mental existence is a controversial topic in the Islamic philosophy. By this means, al-Samarqandī wants to point out that his theory of *nafs al-amr* is solid, regardless of the debates about the details of mental existence. Whatever is the ontological status of mental existence in the different classes of Islamic thought, al-Samarqandī demonstrates that having consciousness is enough to argue about *nafs al-amr* and its relationship with consciousness. During this argumentation, the mental existence, which is only the faculty of perception and refers to humans' consciousness, does not imply any metaphysical background. When he clarifies his intention about the mental existence later, he uses it conveniently.

When al-Samarqandī remarks that *nafs al-amr* is absolutely more general than the external existence, he states that the external existence is more general than the mental existence. At this stage, the scope of the mental existence will be narrower than the scope of the external existence. However, the generality of the external existence, in that case, is not absolute. Contrarily, its generality is partial (*min wajh*).[55] According to this, if we predicate about an object, which has only mental existence, that it does not exist externally but only mentally, this proposition would be realized externally (*mā yūjad fī al-dhihn yaṣduq fī al-khārij annahū mawjūdun fī al-dhihn lā mawjūdun fī al-khārij*). Due to the same reason, al-Samarqandī emphasizes that also *nafs al-amr* is partially more general than mental existence (*wa kadhālik bi-l-nisba ilā mā yakūn bi-ḥasab nafs al-amr bi-ʿayn hādha*).[56]

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54   This sentence of "*qad yuʿabbar ʿanhā bi-l-dhihn*" does not occur in the printed version of *al-Maʿārif* and some of the manuscripts. But it exists in many manuscripts. See Esad Efendi 1253, 9a; Esad Efendi 1272, 20a; Fatih 3036, 78b; Laleli 2432, 75a; Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 828, 13a.

55   al-Samarqandī expresses that the generality between the external and mental existences is different from the generality between *nafs al-amr* and external existence. See al-Samarqandī, *al-Maʿārif*, I, 444. Here, al-Samarqandī openly imports that the generality of external and mental existences is another meaning (*lākin bi-maʿnā ākhar*). By this, he clearly implies that this generality is partial. Because as it is known in logic there are only two kinds of generality: absolute, partial. If it is not absolute, then has to be partial.

56   al-Samarqandī, *al-Maʿārif*, I, 444.

These two sentences, which al-Samarqandī mentions one after another, are more cryptic compared to the other parts of discussion. Thus, it would be helpful to exemplify these circumstances. Supposing that Kudve, who has never been at Edinburgh, is dreaming that he has been at Edinburgh last summer. This dream, which is realized at the faculty of perception, is true corresponding to the faculty of imagination, and has its own *nafs al-amr*. However, in the external existence Kudve has never actually been at Edinburgh. In another saying, the affirmative predication of "Kudve is dreaming about that he has been at Edinburgh" is a true proposition. On the contrary, the proposition of "Kudve has been at Edinburgh" is a false assertion.[57] To conclude, *nafs al-amr* of the true propositions are absolutely more general than the external existence and is partially more general than the mental existence.

4.2. *Nafs al-Amr* in Negative Propositions

al-Samarqandī, thereafter, briefly examines the relation of negative propositions with external and mental existence. According to him, the logical ground which is "the negation of the more general is narrower than the negation of the narrower" the true negative propositions, which have *nafs al-amr*, are narrower than negative propositions which externally exist. To illustrate, the proposition of "the black color is not white" has its *nafs al-amr* and is true because it is externally true. However, it would be wrong to deduce that if something does not exist externally it would not have *nafs al-amr*.[58] Because of the fact that the external existence is narrower than *nafs al-amr*, its negation is more general than negation in *nafs al-amr*.

When al-Samarqandī finishes the discussion about *nafs al-amr* of the affirmatives and negatives he points out certain topics related to it. All the states (*aḥwāl*) of the essences of things, such as the need of contingents or self-sufficiency, implication and requirement, essential and accidental, real and conceptual entity, can be known via essences themselves. According to him, the reason for the most philosophical mistakes is to mix up the predication about the essence itself with its external or mental existences.[59] Hence, a person, who understands the relation of *nafs al-amr*, external and mental existences and their similarities with their differences as it is explained in the passage, would have a valid standpoint in most difficult philosophical themes and will help himself to protect from errors.

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57 There are some notes around the manuscripts, which enunciates that these sentences are referring what is mentioned in the examples. See Feyzullah Efendi 1142, 11b.

58 al-Samarqandī, *al-Maʿārif*, 1: 445.

59 al-Samarqandī, *al-Maʿārif*, 1: 445-446.

4.3. The Relation of al-Samarqandī's Understanding of *Nafs al-Amr* to His Understanding of Quantified Attributive Propositions (*Taḥqīq al-maḥṣūrāt*): A New Approach to the Debate of al-Abharī and al-Tūsī

al-Samarqandī's most fascinating idea is the meaning of the sentence, which comes after the passage narrowed above. In this sentence al-Samarqandī underlines that the problem of *nafs al-amr* is about truth-maker and related to propositions by saying that "it became clear from all these that there are four version of propositions, the three famous versions and the version of propositions which is about things themselves (*wa 'ulima min hādhā anna i'tibār al-qaḍāyā arba': al-thalātha al-mashhūr, wa mā yakūn bi-ḥasab anfus al-ashyā'*)".[60] This sentence refers to the theoretical and logical background of *nafs al-amr* problem. However, the sentence needs an interpretation to comprehend. What are the three famous versions of propositions? What is their connection to *nafs al-amr*? At that point al-Samarqandī does not give details and skip to a new topic.

After the examination of almost all the manuscripts of *al-Ma'ārif* we find in some manuscripts notes about three famous versions of propositions. They are *ḥaqīqiyya*, *khārijiyya* and *dhihniyya*.[61] In that case, al-Samarqandī's theory gets more interesting. Because according to these notes quantified attributive propositions (*taḥqīq al-maḥṣūrāt*) must be interpreted in four different versions. However, after long search it is found out that until fifteen or sixteen centuries in the tradition of Islamic philosophy there are three main explanations of *maḥṣūrāt*: (i) The theory of Ibn Sīnā and al-Ṭūsī which asserts that all quantified attributives are *ḥaqīqiyya* propositions and enlarges the meaning of *ḥaqīqiyya*; (ii) the theory of al-Rāzī and al-Khūnajī which interpreted them as *ḥaqīqiyya* and *khārijiyya*; (iii) the theory of majority which explain them as *ḥaqīqiyya*, *khārijiyya* and *dhihniyya*.[62]

When al-Samarqandī says that there are four versions of *maḥṣūrāt*, it seems to be an original standpoint. However, he does not clarify the fourth version. In his logical work when al-Samarqandī explains the *maḥṣūrāt* he talks about the three versions and does not clarify the fourth version in there either.[63] After al-Samarqandī explicates the three versions, he criticizes some Muslim philosopher

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60   Atıf Efendi 1292, 16a; Esad Efendi 1254, 68a; Esad Efendi 1272, 20b; Fatih 1164, 10b; Fatih 3036, 78b; Fatih 3146, 13b; Feyzullah Efendi 1142, 11b; Feyzullah Efendi, 1143, 17b; Reisü'l-küttab 537, 20a; Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 827, 13a; Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 828, 13a.

61   Bkz: Feyzullah Efendi 1142, 11b; Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 827, 13a.

62   For these three classes see Aktaş, "Nasîruddin et-Tûsî'de Nefsü'l-emr Problemi", 34-5.

63   To follow his understanding of *maḥṣūrāt* see al-Samarqandī, *Qisṭās al-afkār*, 193-5.

who deny the *dihniyya* version of propositions and underline even some antient philosophers accepted this version. Some ancient philosophers, probably Alexander of Aphrodisias is one of them, explained all *maḥṣūrāt* as *khārijiyya* and al-Samarqandī emphasizes that even at that time the logicians who rejected the theory of Alexandre accepted the *dihniyya* propositions.[64]

Although al-Samarqandī's standpoint reminds the disagreement between al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī, he does not state anything about the third version. In that circumstance, it is probable to conclude that al-Samarqandī altered his standpoint or justified different opinions in his divergent books. However, before jumping to this explanation it should be questioned whether his apparent difference can be understood consistently. For this, it is essential to determine what is the thing or concept that divided to (*maqsim*) *ḥaqīqiyya*, *khārijiyya* and *dihniyya* propositions. The remarkable expression in al-Samarqandī's sentence is that he does not claim that there are four parts or kinds of proposition, but four versions of it. Hence it is not necessary that the fourth version is a part of the proposition. To simplify this, the disagreement between al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī must be described.

According to al-Abharī, there are three parts of *maḥṣūrāt*, which are *ḥaqīqiyya*, *khārijiyya* and *dihniyya*, depending on conceptualization of propositions' components. In *khārijiyya* propositions it is predicated about external objects (*dhawāt* or *afrād*) by an external property. In *dihniyya* propositions it is predicated about mental objects by a mental property. On the other hand, in *ḥaqīqiyya* propositions the predication is not about the existence of the object, but predicated about "the object which is assumed (*farḍ*) to be an individual of the universal conceptualization of propositions' subject (ʿ*unwān*) if it would exist, by a property (*waṣf*) in the charge of its existence". This interpretation of *ḥaqīqiyya* proposition involves an indirect conditional assertion. Hence al-Abharī wants to clarify that this conditional expression indicates implication (*luzūm*) and interpreted his interpretation as follows: "the individuals which are implicant of ʿ*unwān* are also implicant of *waṣf*". Although the second interpretation deepens the meaning of the *ḥaqīqiyya* proposition, but it makes the attributive proposition very close to the conjunctive conditional propositions. Thus, to resolve this problem al-Abharī interprets the *ḥaqīqiyya* proposition for the third time: "what holds the first condition (if it would exist it would be an individual of the ʿ*unwān*) holds the second

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64   To follow the standpoint of Alexandre of Aphrodisias and al-Ṭūsī's criticism about it see Aktaş, "Nasîruddin et-Tûsî'de Nefsü'l-emr Problemi", 38-45.

condition (the property if it existed)". Owing to the third interpretation, al-Abharī prevents the mixture of the attributive propositions with conditional propositions.

al-Ṭūsī, on the other hand, rejects for many reasons the interpretation of al-Abharī. Frankly, al-Ṭūsī criticizes lots of logicians (mostly ancients) via rejection of al-Abharī's interpretation. al-Ṭūsī firstly criticizes the logicians who interpreted *maḥṣūrāt* as only *khārijiyya*. He emphasizes that it is impossible to predicate about mathematical objects in *khārijiyya* propositions. Also, in *khārijiyya* propositions the *'unwān* lost its universality. The first condition in al-Abharī's interpretation includes the impossible objects, therefore all "I" propositions would be true, and all "E" propositions would be false. Although al-Abharī tries to solve these problems, according to al-Ṭūsī he failed. Because when he brought the condition of implication to the interpretation of the propositions, he unwittingly accepted that the attributive propositions only can be about essential necessary modals. However, this acceptance will sharply restrict lots of philosophical and scientific inquiries. Finally, al-Ṭūsī rejects al-Abharī's interpretation of *dhihniyya* propositions. According to al-Ṭūsī, false propositions occur in our mentals. Therefore, if *dhihniyya* propositions would understand, as al-Abharī mentions, all false propositions would be true when they understood as *dhihniyya*. According to al-Ṭūsī the only way to escape from this conclusion is to restrict the interpretation of *dhihniyya* with the condition of "not being externally impossible". In that case al-Ṭūsī states that the rejection will be answered but the interpretation of *dhihniyya* will alter to his understanding of *ḥaqīqiyya*. After that al-Ṭūsī explains his understanding of *ḥaqīqiyya*.

According to al-Ṭūsī there are three requirements in *maḥṣūrāt*: (i) The description of the objects by *'unwān* must be by the modality of actuality. (ii) The individuals of *'unwān*, which are the objects of the proposition, should not be conceptualized as impossible. (iii) Although the description of objects by *'unwān* and by *waṣf* require partial conceptualization of existence, however the descriptions do not require to determine the kind of the existence. For al-Ṭūsī's interpretation of *ḥaqīqiyya*, it is enough to conceptualize the general meaning of existence without any condition. According to him any *maḥṣūrāt*, which provide all three requirements, are *ḥaqīqiyya*. Hence al-Ṭūsī's *ḥaqīqiyya* propositions are more general than the interpretation of al-Abharī, thereby than the interpretation of logicians' majority.[65]

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65   To follow the disagreement between al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī see Aktaş, "Nasîruddin et-Tûsî'de Nefsü'l-emr Problemi", 38-73.

Many Muslim philosophers mention that al-Ṭūsī's interpretation of *ḥaqīqiyya* has a significant standpoint in the history of logic.[66] In fact some of them impose two different terms for the *ḥaqīqiyya*: (i) the famous interpretation, (ii) the interpretation of the verifiers (*muḥaqqiqūn*).[67] After evaluating the disagreement between al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī, the significance of al-Samarqandī's understanding of *maḥṣūrāt* in the history of logic can be established.

When al-Samarqandī finishes the discussion of *nafs al-amr* he asserts a partially cryptic claim, which is "it became clear from all these that there are four versions of propositions, the three famous versions and the version of propositions which is about things themselves". It is clear that al-Samarqandī refers to *khārijiyya*, *dhihniyya* and the famous interpretation of *ḥaqīqiyya* propositions when he says "the three famous versions". When he talks about "the version which is about things themselves", he refers to the verifiers' interpretation of the *ḥaqīqiyya*. The fourth version of propositions, which al-Samarqandī indicates as predication about the things' *nafs al-amr*, are the verifiers' interpretation of the *ḥaqīqiyya* propositions, which are mostly defended by Ibn Sīnā and al-Ṭūsī. Considering all these historical and theoretical background, it is coherent to comment that al-Samarqandī pays regard to al-Ṭūsī's criticism of al-Abharī and he straightens and renovates al-Abharī's understanding of *maḥṣūrāt* against al-Ṭūsī's criticism. Also it can be said that al-Samarqandī is located in the middle of the two.

When al-Samarqandī discuss about the division of *maḥṣūrāt* in his *Qisṭās* he does not deal with the verifiers' interpretation of *ḥaqīqiyya*, probably because its quite general meaning makes it as an umbrella. It is not a division of propositions, but it is what is divided to (*maqsim*) the other three. However, when he argues the problem of *nafs al-amr* in his *al-Maʿārif*, to draw attention to that *nafs al-amr* is discussion of truth-maker he talks about the verifiers' interpretation of the *ḥaqīqiyya*. Therefore, he shows that without conceptualizing or knowing the determined existence of essences it is still possible to have true propositions via predicating about essence itself. Briefly, al-Samarqandī, who inquires the problem of *nafs al-amr* based on the truth of propositions, shows both affirmative and negative propositions' truth-maker and the relation of *nafs al-amr* with external

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66   Jamāl al-Dīn Ḥasan (Ḥusayn) Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ Manṭiq al-Tajrīd*, ed. Moḥsin Bīdārfar (Intishārāt Baydār, 1363), 55; Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Tajrīd*, II, 83.

67   The traces of this terminology go back to al-Ḥillī. However, its standardization is much later. To see this terminology ʿAjam Sinān, *Ḥāshiya Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, Rağıb Paşa 761, 45a. It is plausible to assume that al-Samarqandī's understanding of *maḥṣūrāt* has an influence on this terminology.

and mental existences. As a result, al-Samarqandī underlines that there are four versions of *maḥṣūrāt*. By this means, he offers a third path between al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī in the history of logic.

Conclusion

The problem of truth-maker has occupied philosophy from its early times. In fact, it is possible to trace this problem back to the poems of the mythological era when philosophy, as we understand it nowadays, have not started yet. Later on, both in dialogues of Plato and the corpuses of Aristotle we can find passages about the truth problem. For centuries, the debates about the truth were centered on Aristotle's famous passage in *Metaphysics*. It would be wrong to assume that the Muslim philosophers were alienated from the issue. While early *mutakallimūn* answered the question as "corresponding to occurrence" the early philosophers usually did not examine the truth-maker elaborately but tried to debate with the skeptical groups and refute them. On the other hand, for the first time al-Ṭūsī wrote an autonomous epistle about the topic. Later on, the Muslim philosophers argued about *nafs al-amr* in their corpuses and their autonomous works. Hence it would be fair to indicate that the number of works written about the topic has been increasing after al-Ṭūsī's epistle. The rise of the amount of *nafs al-amr*'s epistles sometimes caused the problem of authenticity.

In the first heading of this work, it is confirmed both that the alleged epistle which has been attributed to Jurjānī is not an autonomous work and that it is fully taken from al-Samarqandī's *al-Ma'ārif*. It is revealed with the proofs and tables that the text belongs to al-Samarqandī, and it is not an autonomous epistle, also it does not belong to Jurjānī. It is also shown that some researchers made some inaccurate comments about Jurjānī's theory of *nafs al-amr* relying on the pseudo-epistle, and most of them are wrong.

In the second part, it is discussed whether the content of the alleged epistle is compatible with Jurjānī's authentic understanding of *nafs al-amr*. Here, it is determined that although the content does not contradict with Jurjānī's authentic theory it differs from his language and also is not qualified to represent his detailed understanding. Centering around the authentic works of Jurjānī, the relation of negative assertions with *nafs al-amr*, the fact that all conceptualizations have *nafs al-amr* -even impossible concepts-, and the diversification of the components of propositions over the existential conceptualization were evaluated in this context.

In the third heading, the answer about how a text of a famous philosopher such al-Samarqandī ended up to be attributed to Jurjānī was searched. Here, it is claimed that probably either Jurjānī himself or his students has copied autonomously the passage of *nafs al-amr* in *al-Maʿārif* due to its importance. Later on, it was assumed that it is an autonomous epistle and misattributed to Jurjānī. It is emphasized whatever was the first cause of this mistake, it lasted until today and caused very inaccurate comments about Jurjānī's philosophy.

At the last part of the article, the content of the passage is examined. By this means, it is aimed to exhibit both the reasons, which made Jurjānī copied the passage autonomously, and the consistency of Jurjānī's understanding with the content. There was a discussion about the truth-maker of the affirmative and negative propositions in the passage. According to this, the relation of *nafs al-amr* in the different kinds of propositions, with external and mental existences are revealed. It is possible to interpret al-Samarqandī's theory in this passage parallel with Aristotle's famous passage of truth. al-Samarqandī reinterpreted Aristotle's definition of truth and elaborated it with different kinds of existence. As a result, al-Samarqandī concludes that quantified attributive propositions are four kinds. His understanding of the quantified attributive propositions is an original approach to the disagreement between al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī. Moreover, his new approach has significant potential to answer many questions that we face today. To show all these potentialities his theory is portrayed, comparing with al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī.

To comprehend the answers of Muslim philosophers about truth-maker, which is still a serious controversial topic in philosophy, or to predict the problems which their answer will burden philosophy it is crucial to edit the epistles of *nafs al-amr* in qualified editions. Most of the works about this problem remain unpublished. There are three major duties of researches for achieving this: (a) To determine the manuscripts of these works, their physical qualities, their names and their authenticity. (b) To publish them with qualified analyses. (c) To evaluate theoretically the solutions about truth-maker problem offered by Muslim philosophers. By this means, it would be possible to debate doctrinally about the complete theories of these texts. This article could be considered as a small contribution to both the authenticity problem and also to the problem of theorizing the answers.

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